The gradual
transition of the Ukrainian Military Sector towards a contracted army model was
formally declared by the Presidential Decree “On the State Program of the
Transition of Ukrainian Military Forces for Staffing by Contracted Servants”,
adopted in April of 2002(The
Ministry of Defence of Ukraine, 2013). The Decree obligated the Ukrainian
Ministry of Defense and the General Commanding Office of the Ukrainian Military
Forces to develop and implement a range of activities in preparation of the
Ukrainian military transition towards the professional service by the end of
2015. Additionally, the current president of Ukraine Victor Yanukovych declared
“contracting out the Armed Forces of Ukraine” as one of his personal strategic priorities (president.gov.ua,
2010).
Despite
these formal declarations, at the beginning of 2013, the professional army proposal
is still a subject of controversial debates among Ukrainian politicians and
media. Part of the explanation of the struggling military reform in Ukraine is
the lack of the political will, leadership, and adequate skills to pursue the
reform on the part of the Defense Ministry. For instance, the former Minister
of Defense of Ukraine Dmytro Salamatin, who served in the office for less than
a year and resigned from his post in December 2012 (liga.net,
12/25/2012), has been accused of the lack of
knowledge about the military and the defense sector. As a businessman and a
former Russian citizen, he did not manage to build the coalition of supporters
among the military, which slowed down professional army reforms (TVI.ua,
01/17/2013).
The current
Minister of Defense of Ukraine Pavlo Lebedev (who was born in Russia, lived and
managed a business in Crimea and other regions of Ukraine, until he started his
political career(ubr.ua,
2013)) has recently declared the year of 2013
as the final term for the conscription military in Ukraine, and the start of
the official and final transition towards the professional army (UNIAN,
12/29/2012). Among other, the Minister is also
promising to modernize the Ukrainian Army with the new military equipment, to
enhance the training and educational opportunities for military commanders, and
ensure greater social protections and public benefits for military servants. The
goal of the reform is to create “modern European-like armed forces, small in
numbers but well-trained, properly supported, mobile and professional”(RIA
Novosti, 12/30/2012). In the process of the professional military
reform, the Ukrainian Armed Forces are to be downsized almost 50% by 2017, from
the current 193,000 personnel to 100,000. Along with this, the website of the
Ministry of Defense states that most likely Ukraine will be able to perform a
full transition towards the professional army by 2025, and the process ought to
be organized in three stages: 2011-2015, 2016-2020, 2021-2025 (The
Ministry of Defence of Ukraine, 2013).
Among the
major obstacles of the contracted army in Ukraine are the insufficient budget
allocations towards the program and the defense sector in general, as well as
the poor capacity of the existing military infrastructure that prevents the
reform from happening (Glavcom.ua,
12/04/2012). For example, current military
salaries for entry and middle level military personnel (including health and
other complimentary benefits) are too low to serve as an attractive incentive
for young Ukrainian people to seriously consider a military career. There are
also issues with the military infrastructure. As a result of the economic
recession and general budget cuts, public funding for creating the permanent
and in-service housing for the military and their families is insufficient, and
it will not cover the needs of the projected professional army personnel (Glavcom.ua,
12/04/2012). On the other hand, some experts
claim that the costs of maintaining a professional versus a conscription army
are approximately the same because the professional army helps saving the costs
of recruiting and training new personnel every year.
According to
the military expert and Director of the Army Studies Center Valentyn Badrak,
because of the budgetary and other reasons, the contracted army reform in
Ukraine is doomed to a failure, at least in the near-term future (BBC
Ukraine, 12/29/2012). Additionally, the military service
in Ukraine is associated with the low prestige and a few negative stereotypes,
forcing many young people to seek for the ways of avoiding their regular
military duty, not to mention preventing them from considering the military service
as a professional career path. In response, some experts suggest developing
both financial and non-financial incentives that would motivate young people to
join the professional army, for instance, offering better health care programs
for military and their families, and offering special admission policies to
elite Ukrainian universities (Viyskova
Panorama, 01/20/2013). It should be mentioned that the distrust
of Ukrainian citizens towards the security forces goes beyond the military. For
example, a recent opinion poll conducted by the Ukrainian think tank “Razumkov
Center” has indicated a generally low level of citizen’s trust in militia
(domestic police) (Zhdanov,
11/19/2012). At the same time, Ukrainian militia
is the largest among European countries (about 300,000), which is 120,000 more
than the entire country’s military force (Zhdanov,
11/19/2012). Hence, Ukraine clearly suffers from
the over-spending in some of its security policy areas, and under-spending in
the others.
On the top
of the budget issues, there are several ideological reasons preventing the professional
army project from running a full speed, as evidenced by the resistance of both
politicians and the public against the military reform. For example, there is a
belief that the transition towards a contracted army would be fatal for the
military sector of Ukraine, and if anything, it will further deplete the
existing military capacities (TVI.ua,
01/17/2013). The process will involve
privatizing (contracting out) some of the military capacities and Ukraine has
not yet developed fair and transparent privatization procedures. According to
the military expert and a former adviser of the State Property Fund of Ukraine Volodymyr
Lartsev, the process of shifting from conscription to a professional army is
aimed at using the existing army resources for someone’s personal gain:
"Facilitating the issue of the transition towards a
contracted army now – is a crime against the military capacity of the country
and the capabilities of the Military Forces. The thing is, in my mind, these
declarations are mainly aimed at hiding that someone just wants to steal our
army, the property of Ukrainian army that we still have, including the military
equipment. That would explain the appointment of Pavlo Lebedev as the Minister
of Defense. Yes, he is a military man, and this is better than Salamatin (former
Russian citizen with the lack of army knowledge). Lebedev’s biography shows
that he has different tasks. Therefore, the entire “contract” thing will only
be on paper. Instead of transitioning to a contracted army, it is better to
leave the army as it is, and just work on improving it instead." (TVI.ua, 01/17/2013)
Whether we
agree with Mr. Lartsev and other military reform skeptics or not, Ukrainian
military commanders have been facilitating the process of the transition
towards the professional army, and it should be expected that slowly but surely
the Ukrainian Army will keep moving in that direction.
Sources:
BBC Ukraine. (12/29/2012). Міністр оборони обіцяє перехід на контрактну
армію у 2013/The Minister of Defense Promises the Transition to Professional
Army in 2013 Retrieved from http://www.bbc.co.uk/ukrainian/politics/2012/12/121229_army_contract_ukraine_sd.shtml
Glavcom.ua. (12/04/2012). Олександр Кузьмук: Грошей
на житло військовим в новому бюджеті немає/Oleksandr Kuzmyk: There are no Funds
for the Military Housing in the New Budget. from http://www3.glavcom.ua/articles/8889.html
liga.net. (12/25/2012). Salamatin Dmitriy
Albertovich. from http://file.liga.net/person/1007-dmitrii-salamatin.html
president.gov.ua. (2010). The History of
Presidency. Retrieved 01/19/2013, from http://www.president.gov.ua/en/content/president_history.html
RIA Novosti. (12/30/2012). Ukraine Plans to Suspend
Military Draft in 2013. Retrieved from http://en.rian.ru/military_news/20121230/178490694.html
The Ministry of Defence of Ukraine. (2013). Military
Reform: Questions and Answers.
Retrieved 01/15/2013, 2013, from http://www.mil.gov.ua/index.php?part=reform_faq&lang=ua
TVI.ua. (01/17/2013). Контрактна армія: міф чи
реальність?/Contracted Army: a Myth or Reality? Retrieved from http://tvi.ua/program/2013/01/18/znak_oklyku_schodnya_vid_17012013
ubr.ua. (2013). Pavel Valentynovych Lebedev. from http://bp.ubr.ua/profile/lebedev-pavel-valentinovich
UNIAN. (12/29/2012). Новий міністр оборони обіцяє
відмінити призов уже в наступному році/The New Minister of Defense Promises to
Cancel Military Conscription Next Year. Retrieved from http://www.unian.ua/news/544341-noviy-ministr-oboroni-obitsyae-vidminiti-prizov-uje-v-nastupnomu-rotsi.html
Viyskova Panorama. (01/20/2013). Українська армія стане контрактною лише на папері/Ukrainian Army will
be Contracted Only on Paper. Retrieved from http://wartime.org.ua/4865-ukrayinska-armya-stane-kontraktnoyu-lishe-na-paper-ekspert.html.
Zhdanov, I. (11/19/2012). Міліція і вибори – усе
погане повертається, Або коли командир "Беркуту" стане членом
ЦВК?/Militia and Elections - All Bad is Coming Back, or When is the Commander
of Berkut Going to Become a Member of the Central Election Commission. Ukrayins'ka Pravda. Retrieved from http://www.pravda.com.ua/articles/2012/11/19/6977681/
