SOMO #2

Pinnick, Kathryn, “When the fighting is over: the soldiers’ mothers and the Afghan madonnas,” In Post-Soviet Women: from the Baltic to Central Asia, edited by Mary Buckley, 143-155. Cambridge University Press, 1997.

Pinnick’s article primarily discusses the Pre-Chechnya foundation of SOMO as well as the non-combat roles of women who served in Afghanistan.  What stands out is Pinnick’s discussion of the early years of SOMO when mothers (who had sent sons to Afghanistan) felt significant tension when they participated in anti-war protests. They sought to deliver their message without trivializing the role their sons had played, and also without denying the importance of young men doing their state-obligated duty. This larger thought-provoking question (can one support the troops without supporting the war?) seemed to be lost on the initial SOMO participants. Perhaps they did not see the need to critically interrogate this question.

This article also sheds light on how SOMO initially viewed power relations. It’s really no surprise that SOMO both needed and distrusted the government to make significant changes in the military, but Pinnick doesn’t directly answer whether or not this need/distrust dichotomy is what prevented large-scale uprisings against the wars in Chechnya. I get the feeling that this is the larger issue, as Jagudina’s dissertation indicated.

Vallance, Brenda. “The rule of law and Russian military reform: The role of Soldiers’ Mothers in Russian society.” The Carl Beck Papers in Russian and East European Studies. No. 1407, 2000.

Vallance argues that the unique impact of SOMO on civilians was the promotion of human rights talk. Vallance indicates that wide-spread human rights discourse simply didn’t exist in the immediate post-soviet aftermath due to a prevailing feeling of disempowerment. She also attributes this lack of discourse to the wide-spread assumption that military reform was simply “off the table” in terms of public negotiation. In many ways the military remained a sacred institution beyond public criticism, which largely explains why SOMO seemed such a radical departure. SOMO insisted on pushing issues of national security into the public sphere, and succeeded by capturing media attention. However, Vallance measures this success primarily through the existence of news stories, but doesn’t provide analysis of how those stories were received by Russians.

In a conversation earlier this semester with Prof. Six, I was interested to learn about the nature of information sharing amongst Russians concerning conscription of sons. She informed me that many mothers were aware of SOMO and the information it provided, but that non-SOMO mothers did not speak to each other concerning the details of preventing their sons’ conscription. Six indicated that mothers knew that other mothers engaged in bribing or other acts to get their son out of service, though it was not discussed in conversation. Information spread vertically, but was not shared horizontally. Vallance’s argument that SOMO inspired people to start to talk about their rights is only part of the story. Individuals and families may have started the conversation, but they weren’t willing to share that with others quite yet.

Alexseev, Mikhail A., “Back to hell: civilian-military ‘audience costs’ and Russia’s wars in Chechnia,” In Military and Society in post-Soviet Russia, edited by Stephen L. Webber and Jennifer G. Mathers, 97-113. New York: Manchester University Press, 2006.

Alexseev’s article doesn’t directly address SOMO, but it does analyze various political and security events concerning Chechnya and their public reactions (primarily polling results from VTsIOM). The idea of ‘revenge’ can often play a part in political decision making and even encourage military action, and I wanted to discover the nature of this link concerning Russia and Chechnya. A VTsIOM poll from 1999 found that 85% respondents believed that terroristic acts happened to Russia due to the air strikes on Chechnya. In my research so far I have not found an overwhelming feeling of distaste for Chechens on behalf of Russians, but more of a sense of neutrality toward the ethnicity. Revenge seems to be (at least societally) targeted at Russia, rather than coming from Russians. The fact that 85% attributed Russian military actions as the cause of terrorist attacks seems to largely shift blame on the government. This certainly seems in line with SOMO and their approach that the Russian government, and not Chechens, was the real enemy.

Ultimately, this article caused me to think about 1)the lasting endurance of SOMO influence and 2)lack of pre-existing disdain for Chechens as a facilitator for SOMO.  I’m honestly impressed that there didn’t seem to be wide-spread hatred for Chechens as a result of various terrorist acts (such as the backlash against Muslims post 9/11 in the US), but instead indifference and perhaps some sympathy.

Alexseev also explains the Soviet legacy of Russians conflating personal insecurity with the weakness of the central government and argues that even though the war in Chechnya was not popular, Russians overwhelmingly felt the need for strong decisive leaders. In January 1995, a VTsIOM poll showed that 42% believed failure in Chechnya occurred due to ‘inept military command and operational planning,’ and 27% thought it was due to soldiers engaging in difficult combat operations; both of which stress the strategic, rather than moral, aspects of war. The Russian desire to ‘restore order’ seemed to trump opposition to the war.

Zawilski, Valerie, “Saving Russia’s Sons: the Soldiers’ Mothers and the Russian-Chechen Wars,” In Military and Society in post-Soviet Russia, edited by Stephen L. Webber and Jennifer G. Mathers, 228-240. New York: Manchester University Press, 2006.

A lot of authors analyze political motherhood- Zawilski really gets it. Zawilski writes about the dual image of the ‘suffering mother’ and the ‘strong woman’ and argues that political motherhood was more than just a feeling of responsibility toward offspring, but a larger responsibility to a relatively new society. This all serves to explain why it was that SOMO felt so justified in their protests. They were simply performing their pre-existing gender roles, just on a much larger scale.

Several authors (including Zawilski) engage in discussing whether or not SOMO was a feminist movement (broadly defined as the promotion of women’s position in society) by nature of their intended goals, but not so much by their agents or actions. The relevance of the feminist/non-feminist debate is how it was perceived externally. SOMO largely did not want to be associated with western feminism because it was seen as having little to no value to Russian women.

What is unclear, however, is Zawilski’s statement that “it was largely public opinion, guided by Russian media, that forced the Russian Government to end its military campaign in Chechnia.” I’ve seen several authors now make this claim, but it’s generally said as an afterthought rather than the main argument. I’m curious to find a substantive reason behind this claim. I’m also left wondering, did SOMO influence/change public opinion, or did they just voice the dominant opinion already there?

Lebedev, Anna Colin, “From a Mother’s worry to Soldiers’ Mothers action: building collective action on personal concerns,” In Understanding Russianness, edited by Risto Alapuro, Arto Mustajoki and Pekka Pesonen, 84-98. New York: Routledge, 2012.

What struck me most about Lebedev’s research was her statement that during a 5-year long observation of the CSM she only saw one visitor “suggest the organization of a collective protest action.” Lebedev’s article partially addresses this tension between the universal vs. particular concern. Those visiting SOMO offices came in with individual, particular claims and often left just after their claim was (successfully?) resolved. It seems that very few desired to stay on as volunteers after achieving their own goals. Those crossing into the status of ‘activists’ had to let go on their individual claims in order to effectively embrace the larger human rights fight.

Lebedev also wrote about something completely new to me- evidence that some Russians regarded the CSM as a governmental organization/having government level authority. Letters addressed to the CSM often included ‘the Kremlin’, ‘Red Square’ and even ‘The White House’ in their address. Given what I’ve already read (primarily from Oushakine and Jagudina) concerning Russians’ dual dependence/distrust of the government, this suggests perhaps similar feelings for the CSM. People didn’t completely trust the CSM, but didn’t feel there was any other way. Of particular interest is the association of CSM with the US government- I wonder if some people felt the actions of the CSM were far too radical to actually be Russians, but instead US operatives acting on behalf of Russian mothers.

Finally, Lebedev gives her own analysis of the dependence relationship of Russians to the state. Lebedeve argues that the dependence factor may have actually caused Russian mothers to be more receptive to SOMO as a legitimate actor. Since SOMO offices routinely gave direct guidance to mothers seeking their advice, it was easy for mothers to renounce their autonomy. In a sense, Lebedev argues that mothers give up confidence in themselves to solve their problems when they seek advice from SOMO. Yet I’m not sure why Lebedev constructs this in such an austere way. Why is this viewed as a denunciation of rights, and not just collaboration with those who experienced similar situations?

Danks, Catherine J., “Committee of Soldiers’ Mothers: mothers challenging the Russian state,” In In the Hands of Women: paradigms of citizenship, edited by Susan Buckingham and Geraldine Lievesley, 163-189. Manchester University Press, 2006.

Danks cites a popular statistic that in a 2004 Levada center survey, 72% of female respondents regarded the CSM as overall good for Russia. This begs the question, however, that what percent of these respondents would demonstrate their allegiance publicly (ie- work as volunteers for SOMO), and which would only do so in private/anonymously? The answer to this question could reveal some interesting observations about the transformation of the public/private dichotomy into the post-soviet period and the broader process of democratization.

What I’m continually surprised by is information that SOMO discouraged public acts of emotion. SOMO wanted speeches delivered “on international solidarity rather than to show their personal pain.” I wonder if they thought public displays of pain would make them seem weak, or otherwise unreliable, thus alienating potential volunteers. Danks claims that this stoic public face acted as a form of liberation for SOMO from traditional conceptions of women.