Book Review

Tatiana Zhurzhenko. Borderlands into Bordered Lands: Geopolitics of Identity in Post-Soviet Ukraine. Stuttgart: Ibidem-Verlag, 2010. 321 pp. + Images, Maps. $49.50. ISBN: 978-3-8382-0042-2.

Since 1991 Ukraine has become more important in the geopolitical trajectory of Eastern Europe. The country showed considerable promise throughout the decade, gaining independence from Soviet power and engaging in nation- and state-building. Notwithstanding the occasional regressions toward authoritarianism that marked the presidencies of "the two Leonids" Kravchuk and Kuchma, Ukraine seemed on the right track toward territorial sovereignty, economic stability, and the consolidation of Ukrainian national identity. After the victory of the Orange coalition in 2004 Western observers thought Ukraine was destined for European Union integration.

One major issue stood in the way, however: the case of the Ukrainian-Russian border, the symbol of division between Europe and Asia, which acts as the tinderbox for geopolitical instability between the two continents. Border disputes between Ukraine and Russia and fears of regional separatism shape political discourse, and enter into the regional and national identities of these and neighboring countries:

The 'migration of borders' destroys old communities and shapes new ones; it causes resettlements, deportations, and even ethnic cleansing, while creating new minorities or homogenizing the population inside the new borders. With these border changes, not only do the political and legal systems become subjects of reform; school education, official national symbols, dominant historical narratives, and even the official language can change as well. Border shifts reshape the collective memories and identities of populations, and challenge their loyalties and emotional attachments. A new nation state usually requires a new national history; it needs symbols and myths for the majority of its population to identify with. (29)

The migrating borders and their impact on identity in regions of the former Soviet Union are the main subject of Tatiana Zhurzhenko's evocatively titled Borderlands into Bordered Lands: Geopolitics of Identity in Post-Soviet Ukraine. Zhurzhenko employs various methodologies in her understanding of post-Soviet border making, as well as state- and nation-building, chief among them the political implications of border changes in Ukraine's proposed EU integration, the sociological impact of Soviet nation-building on populations today, and the discrepancies between international relations and (ultra)-nationalist domestic politics. The border between Ukraine and Russia, particularly the "Slobozhanshchyna" region (Kharkhiv oblast in Ukraine, Belgorod oblast in the Russian Federation), is a stage where the macro- and micro-dramas of post-Soviet politics, society, economics, and culture are performed and transformed every day.

The border region between Ukraine and Russia is significant on three primary levels of analysis: “(1) the symbolic geography and geopolitics of the post-Soviet space/'new' Eastern Europe; (2) the Ukrainian-Russian border in bilateral relations, in the nation and state building processes and in regional politics, and (3) the micropolitics of border construction and the role of the border in everyday life”; thus providing the basic structure of Zhurzhenko’s book (38). The first level of analysis involves a discussion of the historical role of borders, and the theoretical and philosophical underpinnings of a geopolitical concept of post-Soviet identity construction. This discussion is largely influenced by the historical developments of Eurasianism and pan-Slavism, popularized throughout the twentieth century and revived after the fall of the Soviet Union. In contemporary Ukrainian discourse, however, pan-Slavism and especially Eurasianism are synonymous with authoritarianism and Russian neo-imperialism, and stand in the way of closer cooperation and integration with the West, as well as the stability and development of Ukraine’s own institutions (73). Though neither theory is widely accepted in the former Soviet Union nor Yugoslavia they exert much influence on the political discourse surrounding nation-building, regional separatisms, geopolitics, and international cooperation.

In the remaining two levels of analysis Zhurzhenko applies her understanding of border politics to the borderlands between Ukraine and Russia, a contiguous region that shares much of its history, economic life, and culture in common, but is now separated by imposed international borders. This discussion focuses on the effects of regionalism on nation- and state-building processes, particularly the threats to regime stability presented by regional and language separatisms, and the answers or proposed solutions provided by political and societal actors. The interactions of Belarus and Russia (read: the domination of the former by the latter) present both real and perceived anxieties about the future of Ukraine. Zhurzhenko notes how the discourse of pro-Western Ukrainian intellectuals on Belarus “was actually more about the fate of Ukraine and could be summarized as ‘Today’s Belarus is tomorrow’s Ukraine’” (102). Will Ukraine break free from Russian hegemony in the region and pave its own course toward Western-style democracy, civil rights, and sovereign economic institutions, or will the state continue its present slip toward authoritarianism, the repression of civil liberties, and greater economic cooperation with/dependence on Russia? What are the implications of the border region for the larger geopolitical discourse of Eurasia? What is the significance of the border for its inhabitants?

Ukraine’s border with Russia presents unique challenges for both the region and the continent. Real problems do exist for states bordering Russia, as the arms trade and various forms of trafficking are ubiquitous on the Ukrainian-Russian border. Zhurzhenko does not go into any detail about the issue of arms, drug, and human trafficking at the border. Rather, her work focuses on instances of economic and strategic cooperation, which are faciliated by relaxed travel and visa requirements, and common memories and shared experiences throughout history. The Ukrainian-Russian border is typical of what Zhurzhenko calls a “soft border” that is “shaped by identities, representations, and images of ‘us’ and ‘them’, memories and stories. In other words, soft borders are narrative constructs” (156). The discourse at the Ukrainian-Russian border is Zhurzhenko’s primary concern, and the observations she provides are telling of the past, present, and future relations of the two populations.

The populations of Kharkiv and Belgorod called the “Slobozhanshchyna” home long before the present-day borders were drawn, that is, imposed from above by Soviet geographers. All too frequently similar instances of top-down border drawing results in conflict, in which the populations vie for control over a demarcated region’s resources. Zhurzhenko’s careful treatment of the “Slobozhanshchyna” convincingly demonstrates that the region is, unique and the discourse between populations is a phenomenon. The region’s trajectory vis-à-vis recent social and political developments in Ukraine and Russia (among other things, the promotion of Russian to second official language in parts of Ukraine, re-re-reelection of Vladimir Putin and what his presidency spells for democratic hopefuls in Russia) is unknown, but Zhurzhenko’s book highlights an instance of cross-border cooperation, everyday interaction and cohabitation at the regional level, on the periphery.

Zhurzhenko's book provides a welcome introduction for students of nationalism and post-Soviet geopolitics. Observations about the history and future of the "Slobozhanshchyna" region are well-presented and serve to influence further studies of similarly significant border regions across the globe. The various sociological, political, and geographic theories employed throughout the work are explained in sufficient detail so as to engage casual readers and serious scholars alike. Zhurzhenko’s prose is marred by a number of editorial oversights, which are perhaps the result of simultaneous or subsequent translations from native to publication languages. This issue does not detract from the importance of Zhurzhenko’s study nor the strength of her arguments throughout. Rather, the lack of “fine-tooth comb” editing is merely an eye-sore in what is a compelling addition to the literature of post-Soviet nation- and state-building, and the role of ideology and discourse in the construction of post-Soviet society.

Picture taken at Petrova Crkva;
Looking through the entry gate

Impressions from the Field V

Picture taken by Petrova Crkva

Picture taken by Petrova Crkva 

One develops a keen sense of history when strolling through Novi Pazar. On display are – as if one were to walk through a live museum – old Ottoman bathhouses, Mosques, Orthodox Churches, bakeries, a great big fort and remnants of the Yugoslav socialist past. What becomes apparent when visiting the town’s most prominent sights is the grade of deterioration each of the buildings display. Is it random coincidence, I started to wonder after some time, that most of the Orthodox structures are wonderfully renovated while some of the Muslim sights seem left to deteriorate?

Picture taken by Đurđevi Stupovi; 
Looking up at the Monastery

Picture taken by  Đurđevi Stupovi

            Take for example the Petrova Crkva (Peter’s Churc). The Church stands somewhat elevated on a small hill about a mile or so away from city center and is surrounded by graves that look like they have been around for quite some time. The Petrova Crkva herself dates back to the 9^th century while I have been told that it was built on top of another site that dates back to the 6^th century. In 1979, the Church was placed on the UNESCO’s world heritage list, which perhaps explains the sights fresh appearance. When comparing newer images of the Church to older pictures found on the web, one will notice that reconstruction efforts were made, specifically to the cobblestones and the entry gate leading to the Church herself.

Picture taken in NP; Looking at
the Hammam from the outside

Picture taken in NP; in the courtyard
of  the Hammam; looking at the
gate leading in to the bathhouse 

The same is true for the Monastery called Đurđevi Stupovi (The Tracts of St. George). On foot, it takes about an hour-long hike to reach the Monastery, which too appears cleaned up and renovated. Đurđevi Stupovi was built in the 12^th century as an endowment to Stefan Nemanja, the founder of the Nemanja Dynasty and father of Serbia’s first King Stefan Nemanja; needless to say that this structure is historically significant.

                Upon returning to town, it became apparent to me that historically significant Ottoman and/or Islamic structures had received less care and perhaps financial support. The most likely once magnificent Isa-Begov Hammam (Turkish Bath), built in the 15^th century, surely has seen better days. The inside courtyard is used as a café courtyard during summer time because of its cooling properties but lies bare and unused for the rest of the year. Inside the courtyard, I met a professor who expressed regretted over the deterioration of such magnificent structures.

Picture taken inside Altun-Alem's
courtyard;looking at a Dervish tombstones  

Picture taken inside Altun-Alem's
courtyard; looking at the
fresh water well  

Mosques too have not received any state funding. Novi Pazar’s Altun-Alem Mosque (With the Golden Gem Stone) has been built in the 16^th century and is its oldest and perhaps most famous Mosque in Novi Pazar. The architecture was considered unusual for Serbia for its single dome and portico that is covered with two smaller domes. Similar structures can be found in Turkey. Atlun-Alem has a courtyard that includes the original fresh water well, a maktab (elementary school where children learn how to read and write, grammar, and Quran recitation etc.) and old Muslim grave sites. As I looked around the mosque’s courtyard, I was invited to climb the minaret by its caretaker. I had visited many mosques, though was never able to climb a minaret before and excitedly accepted. As we climbed the long, narrow and dark tower, the caretaker explained to me that he had brought the mosque and its surroundings by himself in order. The entry gate coming from the road as well as the maktab seemed indeed nicely renovated, as were some of the dervish gravesites that carried Turkish names in Arabic calligraphy. The inside of the mosque too seemed restored with its newly painted white walls and wonderfully soft red carpet. State finances did allegedly not reach this mosque. Instead, private investments allowed for somethe renovation of the prayer house.

Picture taken inside Altun-Alem's mosque;
looking at the stairs leading up-down the minaret 

Picture taken in Novi Pazar's Altun-Alem Mosque; looking
down at the city from the minaret 

            In midst of these cultural and religious structures tower huge socialist blocs – remnants of this region’s not so long gone Yugoslav past. There is not much controversy that surrounds these buildings. They are used as sturdy apartment blocs, storefronts or office buildings that are shared by Bosniaks, Roma, and Serbs alike. Perhaps they also stand as sturdy reminders for a past in which the government provided living spaces and financial aid for cultural pastime to all citizens of Novi Pazar and surrounding regions. 

Picture taken in Novi Pazar; looking at one of the buildings
that were built during the existence of Yugoslavia 

       

It's Official, but is the Ukrainian-Russian Language Debate Really Over?

On August 8 President Viktor Yanukovych signed into law the controversial bill raising the status of Russian as a second official language in 13 of Ukraine's 27 administrative territories. This piece of legislation guarantees the rights of Russian-speaking Ukrainian citizens, at minimum 10% of the total population of Ukraine, to use Russian in all spheres of life. The report from the head of the press service of the Presidential Administration of Ukraine confirms that the decision is the result of Ukraine's continued efforts to protect its citizens rights through European standards: "The purpose of [the legislation] is to ensure the comprehensive development and functioning of the Ukrainian language in all spheres of public life on all administrative territories, guaranteeing free development, usage, and defense of all the native languages of Ukrainian citizens, fulfilling the obligations, assumed under international treaties on these matters, and further introducing European standards in this area." Native languages guaranteed protection under the new law include: Russian, Belarusian, Bulgarian, Armenian, Gagauz, Yiddish, Crimean Tatar, Moldavian, German, Modern Greek, Polish, Romani, Romanian, Slovak, Hungarian, Ruthenian, Karaim, and Krymchak.

The benefits of the language law are apparent for those populations who view it as a safeguard of their human rights. Citizens should have the right to speak whichever language they would like, and most countries in Europe and the West guarantee this right. History brought these populations together and the responsibility to protect and serve their interests falls on the shoulders of the government. One of the problems that persists in Ukraine today, however, is how the interests of the minority nations fit into the interests of the ruling regime.

While the legislation will be tied up within Ukraine's state bureaucracy for a number of months, the bill continues to stir debate. The signing of the bill might end the legislative debate about language, but the discussion among citizens and demonstrations will no doubt continue until the late-October parliamentary elections. The national languages and nations that call Ukraine home deserve to be protected by the rule of law, but much of the debate has focused on the Russian population, decidedly the largest contingent among the minority national / language groups. Fears originating among Ukrainian nationalists and the united opposition parties echo sentiments about the Russification of Ukraine under the Soviets. Linguistically speaking, Russian continues to act as a language of international communication in Ukraine, a holdover of Soviet times when Russian was the lingua franca of the multinational state. the situation is further complicated by how alive the memories of the persecution of Ukrainians, as harmful nationalist elements within the Soviet state, are in the minds of Ukrainian citizens today.

Independent Ukraine has only carried the modifier for 20 years now, and even independence has been marred by frequent political, social, and economic scuffles, and, perhaps more tragic, strengthened partnerships with their neighbors to the east. Ukraine's geopolitical position was, is, and perhaps always will be challenged by the Soviet past and the continued domination of the Russian Federation in the country's various enterprises. Russia's seemingly apparent stranglehold on Ukraine and its close relationship with (read: control over) Yanukovych and the Party of Regions paints a bleak picture of Ukraine's future sovereignty.

In my next post, I plan to shed some light on reactions to the language law in the Russian and Ukrainian blogospheres and social media sites, specifically highlighting instances where the two populations share similar sentiments about the bill and what it means for the future of relations between Russia and Ukraine.

Articles referred to in this post:


"Интеллигенция Украины требует учесть ее мнение в вопросе о языках," http://ria.ru/world/20120810/720783875.html



"На Украине вступил в силу закон о статусе русского языка," http://ria.ru/world/20120810/720566903.html


"Янукович подписал закон о статусе русского языка в регионах Украины," http://ria.ru/world/20120808/719251865.html


"Analyst: Language Law Unlikely to Add Rating to Regions Party," http://www.kyivpost.com/content/politics/analyst-language-law-unlikely-to-add-rating-to-regions-party-311280.html


"Language law comes into force in Ukraine," http://www.kyivpost.com/content/ukraine/language-law-comes-into-force-in-ukraine-311340.html

"Language law signed. Now what?" http://www.kyivpost.com/content/ukraine/language-law-signed-now-what-311312.html

SOMO #5

Denman, Gregory. “Women’s Movements Against Collective Male Violence,” MS Thesis, Kansas State University, 2006.

Denman’s thesis analyzes and compares 4 different women’s movements and their strategies against militaristic violence. He argues that above all, the CSM strived to remain visible. Hunger strikes, marches, and protests all contributed to keeping the CSM relevant and in the news. These mothers also often carried or wore pictures of their dead or missing sons (something I’ve seen many Gold Star Mothers do as well). All of this was done to make the war feel more tangible and unavoidable in daily life. What I’d like to find out is if SOMO over-saturated society with their demonstrations.

Denman also addresses some of the discrepancies between statistical information provided by the CSM versus the military reports. In the late 1990s, the CSM reported that 40,000 soldiers deserted the military due to hazing, whereas the military argued it was only 20-30% of that number (this does lead to curiosity about what other reasons the 70-80% deserted for). The CSM also claimed twice the amount of casualties in the first Chechen war than the military reported. The family of a “missing” rather than dead soldier would not receive financial compensation for their loss. 

Peter D. Waisberg, « The Duty to Serve and the Right to Choose: The Contested Nature of Alternative Civilian Service in the Russian Federation », The Journal of Power Institutions in Post-Soviet Societies [Online], Issue 1 | 2004, http://pipss.revues.org/224

Waisberg analyzes how civil organizations participated in public discussions of instituting alternative service, which seemed to be a common unifying factor among these organizations. Waisberg makes two observations that stand out-

1. SOMO “groups saw alternative service as the means to an end, rather than an end in itself.” This is an important distinction in progressive politics, and demonstrates the more long-term strategic planning of SOMO. In progressive politics it's often easy to be appeased by small successes, yet this is a dangerous approach because it can halt momentum of a movement. 

2. Public discussions exhibited a “complete lack of discussion of what constitutes religious freedom and freedom of conscience.” Given the widespread use of technical and legal language employed by SOMO, it is surprising that these terms were not more specifically defined. If SOMO wanted to shift patriotism to meaning upholding the rule of law, why leave anything ambiguously defined?

Sperling, Valerie. “The last refuge of a scoundrel: patriotism, militarism and the Russian National Ideal,” Nations and Nationalism, Vol. 9, Is. 2. April 2003.

Sperling argues the greatest strength of the CSM is its ability to instill doubt in society concerning the military.

Her article also critically explores different avenues of patriotism. Though the CSM sought to re-constitute the meaning of patriotism, the traditional form was very much entrenched in society. It’s important to note that that SOMO and the military shared the same end goal- honor and pride in the country. Even though they pursued quite different strategies to achieve that goal, it can be quite difficult to change minds when your approach is to change means to the same end.

The CSM wanted to shift sources of national pride from the military to Russia’s political institutions. They argued that upholding rule of law and promotion of human rights would be better standards to measure national honor. This approach, unfortunately, is what caused many to perceive the CSM as anti-military, instead of just pro-reform. 

Eichler, Maya. “Militarized Masculinity and State Leadership in the Russian-Chechen Wars,” in Militarizing Men: Gender, Conscription, and War in Post-Soviet Russia.

This chapter of Eichler’s book seeks to explain how the Russian government tried to instill a militarized form of patriotism to justify military intervention.

I’m continually interested by how the government and SOMO both seemed to prioritize the legal/technical aspect as justification for their respective goals. Yeltsin appealed to the constitution as why Russian soldiers needed to defend the unity of Russia, as well as playing up the theme of crime and lawlessness in the region. At least publicly, the operation was justified by linking the Dudaev regime to criminal acts. Similarly, SOMO often claimed that the military operation violated the new constitution, partly because alternative service was largely not enforced or accessible and partly because of the lack of transparency concerning the validity of the operation. Regardless, it’s fascinating that both sides focused on the law as their main argument against each other.

The ethnic and religious dimensions of modern war also play a huge part in opposition movements. Eichler wrote that Yeltsin tried to distinguish the military operation from an action directed toward Muslims. Wagnsson’s dissertation addressed the seemingly lack of ethnic hatred on behalf of Russians toward Chechens, and Zdavomyslova to some extent talked about this- but the most direct correlation I can find between SOMO and the Chechen ethnicity is SOMO’s concept of universal motherhood. In this sense, SOMO transcended ethnic divisions in favor of gendered divisions. They argued that mothers are mothers, independent of their ethnicity. I have not found out how this message was received by society. I’d like to find out to what extent terrorism has been conflated to a specific ethnicity in Russia, and how this conflation has been dealt with by SOMO.

Though my research primarily focuses on the first Chechen war, the interim time period is telling of the endurance of SOMO influence. By 1999, the “fear of terrorism helped justify the need for masculinized-militarized protection and strong leadership, and generated support for the military campaign and for Putin as a leader.” Vulnerability persuaded the public to support a figure they believed would restore Russia’s status and diminish (perceived) threats. Of course, no civil organization can bear the weight of removing societal fear of death/violence, but I’m left to wonder if a strategy that did not include a direct discussion of the dangers of societal vulnerability could have any lasting effect. It seems that regardless of the technical changes made in the military (ie- ending conscription, changing term limits, etc), a society driven by vulnerability is one tolerating (accepting? encouraging?) military adventurism.

“The Societal Crisis of Militarized Masculinity.”

Re-thinking and re-constituting gender roles are major themes in Post-Soviet Russia. This chapter discussed the feminization of men in the military via dedovshchina. Hazing was a means to force new conscripts to perform menial tasks overwhelmingly associated with womanhood. Eichler writes that “enduring their feminization is a phase that conscripts must pass through on their way to achieving ‘manhood.’”  It’s no surprise here that womanhood was demeaned, but it is interesting that experiencing the tasks of womanhood was seen as a pre-requisite to masculinity. The fact that the dedy called new/weak conscripts sestri does demonstrate an active gendered aspect of dedovshchina.

The relation to SOMO-

So much of SOMO’s strategy relied on promotion of traditional gender roles. It seems true that to many SOMO participants, these roles served as a source of empowerment through the image of the strong, heroic mother protecting her children. However, this empowerment seems restricted to the public image of the mother, while not addressing (ignoring?) the private role of the mother; the mother who is expected to cook and clean and be confined to menial tasks. It’s concerning that SOMO put so much stock in the paramount importance of motherhood without (at least I have not read of) critically interrogating the highly gendered nature of the phenomenon they were trying to eradicate.

At the same time, it’s often noted that draft evaders did not receive significant public scorn for their actions. They were not feminized for not wanting to fight. Being able to evade the draft more often carried a class association than it did a gendered one.

Overall comments/conclusions

My goal was to discover how SOMO uniquely impacted civil society in the 1990s. Above all, it seems exposure was their primary success. I'm still critically analyzing the influence/representation distinction to determine how SOMO acted as both a mouthpiece of society, and the agent filling in the words.

Zdravomyslova makes compelling arguments that SOMO taught struggling mothers the language of the law, even if it couldn't teach many mothers to be public about their opposition. Vallance supports this claim, and argues that if nothing else, SOMO educated mothers and young men about their legal rights.

What a wonderful opportunity to complete this research. There is still so much to be discovered about the public/private dichotomy and its relation to the military, and I look forward to continuing this research.

SOMO #4

Vallance, Brenda J. “Shaping Society’s Demands: Russian Soldiers’ Mothers and Military Reform,” Conflict Studies Research Centre, December 1996.

Vallance’s article outlines the various methods used by SOMO to convey their message to civilians. What this article emphasizes above all else is the legality of SOMO and the way in which they conformed to the legal structure in order to gain legitimacy. It seems that this practice definitely made SOMO more appealing to western nations, but I’m unsure how Russian civilians viewed this strategy. Considering the tension between people and state, I wonder I SOMO was conflated with governmental structures, and if this alienated potential support.

Здравомыслова, Е. “ОТ СОЦИАЛЬНОЙ ПРОБЛЕМЫ - К КОЛЛЕКТИВНОМУ ДЕЙСТВИЮ: ПРАВОЗАЩИТНАЯ ОРГАНИЗАЦИЯ ‘СОЛДАТСКИЕ МАТЕРИ РОССИИ,’” 25-26.02.95 г.  http://www.indepsocres.spb.ru/zdrav3.htm

Zdravomislova speaks to the prior invisibility of dedovshchina and the Sakalauskas case that made the public aware of problems in the military. This raises the question; is dedovshchina confined to military origins, or is it a manifestation of pre-existing cultural trends? As of now it’s difficult to see dedovshchina as not having roots in cultural trends. Many authors discuss how the military was considered the institution of male socialization, and most of these authors point to the apparent lack of male role models in young men’s lives as the reason for the necessity of this institution. I’m curious if young conscripts go into service with certain expectations of masculinity and violence- or they conflate the two. I want to find a study on this.

The Russian military is often considered a “state within a state” due to its isolationism, and I think this may be the root of the problem. For too long the military was seen as “off limits” to civilians. Zdravomislova argues that SOMOs biggest accomplishment should be that people started talking about military service.

Elkner, Julie. “Dedovshchina and the Committee of Soldiers’ Mothers under Gorbachev,” in The Journal of Power Institutions in Post-Soviet Societies, iss. 1, 2004.

SOMO largely served in a watchdog position which was met with scorn from the military. This in itself isn’t surprising, but Elkner explains some of the methods the military used to discredit SOMO.

1) Referred to women as hysterical and characterized them as incapable of viewing information objectively and without emotion.

2) Claimed that women knew nothing of military service, and thus could only contribute ignorant ideas to the conversation.

3) Claimed that women were overemphasizing the dedovshchina crisis, and that women would actually make up cases in order to get their son discharged.

Podrabinek, Kirill. “Vozvrashchaias’ k teme,” Index, no. 19, 2003.

http://index.org.ru/journal/19/podrab19.html

Podrabinek explains the historical basis for military hazing (world-wide) and concludes that switching to a contract based military provides the only hope of ending the practice. For the most part, Podrabinek paints a very bleak picture about the nature of individuals serving in the military. Since commanding officers benefit from hazing, there is no chance of reaching them or changing their behavior. Even though hazing would still exist (to perhaps a lesser extent) in a volunteer force, at least soldiers would know what they signed up for, explains Podrabinek.

Podrabinek ultimately raises more questions than he answers. He asks the reader to consider whether or not just abolishing the military altogether would be better for the course of the country since Russia has caused more harm to itself than any external country ever could. This was the first I’ve read calling for the abolishment of the military, and I’m somewhat surprised I haven’t found SOMO at some point entertaining the same idea. I’m curious as to if it just seemed to radical an idea that it would have alienated potential support.

Dedovshchina in the Post-Soviet Military: Hazing of Army Conscripts in a Comparative Perspective

Ed. Francoise Dauce and Elisabeth Sieca-Kozlowski

Ibidem-Verlag: Stuttgart, 2006.

Bannikov, Konstantin. “Regimented Communities in a Civil Society,” 2002.

Bannikov investigates how dedovshchina spreads beyond military service to pervade civil society. His main argument is that young men go from wielding power and being feared (by men only a few years younger) and inevitably attempt to transfer that new sense of self onto their new social life. He describes three main approaches:

1. Ex-military tend to gravitate towards policing/security positions which require experience with violence. In this way, these men seek to maintain the validation of their authority through civil society.

2. Some men will seek to transform societal structures around their past experience with authority and violence. The workplace becomes a new arena for drastic hierarchical orders.

3. The family becomes a unit to dominate. Hazing is used to socialize children and wives.

What is so striking to me about dedovshchina is the relatively small age gap between perpetrator and victim. Bannikov explains that there is a sense of reciprocity at work; even though new soldiers may not have done anything to warrant hazing (to any degree), older soldiers want to repay the damage done to them. This cycle, unfortunately, seems impenetrable.

Bannikov also talks about the societal expectation for military service, which is something I’ve definitely seen differing accounts of. Bannikov explains that generally middle aged and older men generally felt in favor of conscription, whereas the majority of women and young men opposed compulsory service. While for some it may be easy to explain this by characterizing women as the “weaker sex”, Bannikov sides in favor of SOMO as the emergence of strong women, capable of risking everything for the well-being of their children.

Yet what stands out most is Bannikov’s tacit assertion that boredom is at the root of dedovshchina. It seems that soldiers at posts with little to do, and few resources among them, would turn to treating each other violently as opposed to any other alternative. This is something work exploring.

Lebedev, Anna Colin. “The test of reality. Understanding Families’ Tolerance faced with mistreatment of conscripts in the Russian Army.”

Of everything I’ve read, Lebedev’s article is the only which seeks to explain parental acceptance of the practice of dedovshchina. Several authors talk about apathy and lack of faith in the government to make reform, but none so far go beyond a defensive position.

Similar to Maya Eichler’s argument (and the inspiration for my research) that “the waging of war depends on women’s and men’s acceptance of their militarized identities as patriotic mothers and soldiers,” Lebedev demonstrates the role women can play to support conscription and traditional forms of militarized patriotism. One mother expressed regret for getting her son out of the military service because she fears it made him weak. Contrary to Bannikov’s claims above, Lebedev considers women to have had a stronger hand in pushing militarized masculinity, or at least expressing regret for taking that opportunity from their sons.

Some parents recognized the potential dangers of military service but felt that these dangers were less than those of staying at home. Unemployment and alcoholism awaited young men, whereas some parents believed the military could offer a better/disciplined life for their sons. A corollary to this was the sense of pride some parents felt for their sons not evading military service. One letter from a mother of a dead soldier expressed anathema for mothers who tried to take their sons out of service, claiming that SOMO let sons “stay tied to mother’s apron strings.”

While most parents seem to have taken more moderate positions on conscription evasion, there is again a sense of powerlessness. Many felt that the job of the family was to serve as a watchdog, but not to have the responsibility of fixing societal problems. Again, responsibility is relegated to the government, even though they expressed doubt about its ability to enact reform.

Lebedev also brings to light the economic politics of military service. Several letters from mothers contacting SOMO speak to the high cost of bribing officials and allude to the idea that their sons were fighting the rich man’s war.

Though admittedly anecdotal evidence, Lebedev questions to what extent society actually considered conscription necessary for the socialization of young men. In one letter, the author argues it didn’t matter whether one went to university or the military in terms of their masculinization, which was actually dependent on their prior character. Another author spoke to the importance of attending university as a better tool for socialization than military service.

Obraztsov, Igor V. “The Reasons for Dedovshchina and Ways to Prevent it: A Retrospective Analysis.”

Obraztsov spends the first half of the article defining dedovshchina, explaining it in relation to the technical term “relations violating the regulations.” Though RVR is a wider term to encompass “any negative phenomenon taking place between conscripts,” the term seems sterile and detached. I discovered that while dedovshchina is commonly used in the media, RVR is the preferred term for military reports.

Obraztsov then discusses the modern roots of dedovshchina in the Russian army. He finds two main roots; 1) in the late 1960s  military service decreased by one year, and those who were conscripted before the cut off took their aggression out on those able to serve less time and 2) Khrushchev’s general loosening of discipline in conjunction with the conscription of those with previous criminal records allowed for violence to go unpunished. The point Obraztsov is trying to make is that dedovshchina did not exist in the Imperial army because 1) soldiers were conscripted for much longer amounts of time, making them functionally career servicemen and 2) older soldiers played a more active part in training of young conscripts.

The article also seeks to expel the notion that dedovshchina is an inherently Soviet legacy, instead arguing its spread in any country that does not engage in contract service. Ending conscription, then, would be the first necessary step reversing the cycle. Overall, Obraztsov is optimistic that improving material conditions of soldiers and providing better training would go a long way in ending the practice.

Impressions form the Field IV

            In my previous blog entry Impressions from the Field III, I told the story of one man who was caught on account of his smuggling business. Smuggling, I noted, is common in and around Novi Pazar, and creates jobs. I also noted that smuggling is nothing out of the ordinary. People simply buy and sell counterfeited goods as they do other items.

I too browsed through the shops where forged Luis Vuitton, Channel and Ives Saint Laurent items stood on display next to tracksuits from Nike and Adidas and soon showed interest for one of the various wallets. “You know”, said the young shopkeeper as he watched me fiddling with the purse, “these wallets come from Turkey, those are the best imitations you will find”. The imitation was good indeed. The price was too. The price for the replica is €10 as opposed to the original for which one has to shell out around €500. This was not the last time I was told about the superiority of Turkish counterfeited goods. “We don’t sell Chinese goods here”, said another lady in a store in Novi Pazar’s center. “The quality of our Turkish products is pretty good and we never have any complaints from our customers”, she said, adding, “our boss always personally selects the items for our store on his travels to Turkey”.

Looking up at the mosque were police presence is at times strong at the close of communal prayers

However, should Serbia pursue EU accession, Belgrade will have to enforce the controversial Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA) that strictly prohibits the reproduction and sale of copyrighted materials and brands. Where then, I asked in my previous blog, are the police in all this?

The police have a strong presence in Novi Pazar. I noticed them most often close by the mosque in the city center nearby the old bakeries and their presence seemed to grow whenever believing devotees streamed out after their communal prayer. Perhaps the police seek to reduce the possibility of clashes through their presence after two rivaling Islamic groups clashed in front of Novi Pazar’s Altum-Alem Mosque in 2007. Yet, the police are not in all circles viewed as a protective force and their presence is at times interpreted with ambivalence.

During conversations and structured interviews in Novi Pazar, I asked what should be done to improve life in this southern Serbian region. The answers where often of similar nature and connected with Novi Pazar’s police. “Life in this region”, I was told in a conversation with a young man in one of the retail booths that line Novi Pazar’s streets, “would be better if the police would punish people who do something wrong”. I don’t understand what you mean, I said. “Look”, he explained, “people who commit crimes here do not get punished sufficiently. Somebody can draw a knife or a gun, threaten a person, and get away with it”. In another conversation, I was told that life in this region would be better if the police would no longer except, or expect bribes to look past one’s offense.

Novi Pazar's streets are lined with vendor booths 

Another common theme was the ethnic composition of the police force. “Most of the police officers are Serbian, you know? Between 80% and 90% of all people that live here are Bosniaks and/or Muslims and yet, the police forces are almost 100% composed of ethnic Serbs, why?”; I was asked of a young man who studies at Novi Pazar’s state University. “Should there not be some sort of an equivalence between the police force and the people on whose behalf they supposedly work?” Consequently, the police are viewed as the long arm of Serbia’s state and not necessarily as the ‘friend and helper’ of the local population. Not surprisingly, graffiti slurs often adorn the walls with the acronym A.C.A.B. – All Cops Are Busted. But what do the police think about their ambivalent role among Novi Pazar’s community?

All Cops Are Busted

A senior police official was to give me some answers about how he sees his, and the role of the police forces in Novi Pazar. I waited somewhat nervously in the lobby to be let in to the policeman’s office and anticipated to meet an official in a stiff, blue suit. Instead, a relaxed police officer in jeans and polo shirt greeted me friendly. “There are problems in this town, you know? But problems in this town are not as bad as the media portray them”, he told me. “It is true that there are more Serbs that serve in the police forces here in Novi Pazar, yet the problem is the following; The men who serve here in the police are not from Novi Pazar. There are men from all over the country because we function according to a rotation principal. One man from Novi Sad may one day enroll to serve but he will not work in Novi Sad, he will come down here, or go to Smederevo or Banatski Karlovac. There might be more Bosniak policemen around, but they serve anywhere in Serbia, and not necessarily here. Look”, he said, “two percent of Serbia’s population are Bosniak and 98% are Serb; We have to look at the big, nationwide picture, and not only at what goes on around here. We are a national, and not a regional institution.” The exchange was thought provoking because I did not know, or think about a rotation principle by which one enrolls in one city or region but has to serve in another altogether. Yet, the police then truly appear to be the long arm of the Serbian state – a state from which the Bosniak population feels alienated. The disconnect is therefore apparent, even though I am sure that the police official does not harbor cruel intentions – to the contrary. 

The police official made me understand the complexity of the situation as he explained that he walks a fine line in his job. “I do not talk to a Bosniak or a Serb when I have to solve a problem”, he clarified, “I talk to a resident of Novi Pazar and a citizen of Serbia. I try to do my job as best as I can, and I believe that the people of this town know and appreciate my work.”

The policeman and I did not talk about counterfeit goods this day, nor did we talk about them on any other day. Perhaps he had more pressing problems on his mind.

Bookreview / Article Analysis

Branka Mihaljović. The Bosnian War. “Ćosićeva Rehabilitacija Ratne Politike Devedesetih”. Radio Slobodna Evropa (Radio Free Europe), March 3, 2012.

http://www.slobodnaevropa.org/content/cosiceva_rehabilitacija_ratne_politike_devedesetih/24507663.html

Dobrica Ćosić published a controversial book called Bosanski Rat (The Bosnian War).

The author was a close associate of the Tito regime, though he opposed Tito’s ethnic policies and the decentralization of the Republic.  He particularly resisted Kosovo and Vojvodina’s autonomy. As Yugoslavia’s government became more decentralized in the late 1980s, so grew Ćosić’s opposition toward the Yugoslav system.  He was convinced that Serbs (and Montenegrins) would be demoted in the ethnical hierarchy of Yugoslavia should the system collapse.  

Following Tito’s death, Ćosić led the opposition that sought to reach equality for Serbia within the Republic. Then, in 1986, the Serbian Academy of Arts and Sciences (SANU) published the SANU Memorandum. Ćosić served as the SANU’s president at the time of the Memorandum’s publication. Among the cornerstones of the Memorandum was Serbia’s underprivileged role in the Republic, Yugoslavia’s growing fragmentation and lack of democracy. The Memorandum was partially responsible for the re-nationalization of Serbia’s politics. Ćosić supported Slobodan Milośević’s presidency and Radovan Karadžić’s rise to power. He served as the Secretary General for the Non Alignment Movement (NAM) in 1992 and later held Serbia’s presidency between 1992 and 1993.

In all, Ćosić has published over thirty novels and novellas, bringing to light the history of the Serbian people whose demise he decries. “Winners during war and losers throughout peace” is his better-known idiom describing Serbia. Ćosić retreated from his political engagement until Kosovo’s independence in 2008 when he criticized Europe’s ‘betrayal’ of Serbia by recognizing Priština. Since then, Ćosić has propagated a partition of Kosovo whereby its Serbian-populated north would fall to Serbia, while most likely, southern Kosovo would join Albania. His opinions are unlike the popular Serbian political view that staunchly holds to the United Nation’s Resolution 1244 and a unified Serbia.               

Ćosić’s digressive viewpoint with regard to Kosovo is interesting and perhaps telling of Serbia’s political consciousness. On the matter of Kosovo, Ćosić’s assessments may not be the most popular, especially among the Serbs that live in Kosovo’s north.  The fact that Kosovo is and will remain an independent country is also clear to Serbia’s citizenry. Yet, Serbia’s political elite cannot move forward, nor can it move backward. Should Serbia recognize Kosovo’s independence, calamities in Southern Serbia and Northern Kosovo are inevitable. At the same time, Serbia will continue to face political difficulties internationally should it continue to hold on to UN Resolution 1244 – especially regarding questions of EU accession. Serbia is stuck.

Picture taken in Serbia's capital Belgrade; On the left is Serbia's new president Tomislav Nikolić with his slogan "President of the People, not of a Political Party" 

The same may be true for Serbia’s recognition of genocide in Srebrenica. Serbia’s citizens are caught in a political limbo, where politicians jockey to appear apologetic on the international stage (as was Boris Tadić who ‘apologized’ for the genocide) while others, such as Nikolić – Serbia’s new president – doubt that the genocide occurred.

In a recent article published by Radio Slobodna Evropa, former politician and Sociologist Vesna Pešić lamented that Serbia’s youth is not sufficiently informed about what exactly happened during the 1990’s. This may be in part due to Serbia’s partial control of the media and subsequent limited information. Therefore, ideologues such as Ćosić may fill the void and jockey to win the ear of the allegedly poorly informed population. The conservative, anti-lustration oriented faction may have won the latest electoral round (as demonstrated with Tomislav Nikolić’s victory during the last presidential elections). Perhaps Ćosić’s Bosanski Rat was a foreboding that Serbia’s political pendulum has once again swung to the right.

Picture taken in Serbia's capital Belgrade; The sign advertises a new newspaper called the Independent Newspaper. The slogan in the upper left promises a paper that will not lie to the people and reads "I do not want for them to lie to me anymore" - them meaning the popular newsmedia  

Branka Mihaljović. The Bosnian War. “Ćosićeva Rehabilitacija Ratne Politike Devedesetih”. Radio Slobodna Evropa (Radio Free Europe). March 3, 2012.

In his latest book The Bosnian War, Academic and ideologue of Greater Serbia Dobrica Ćosić represents the Bosnian Serbs as the victims of the Muslim-Croat coalition and the Republika Srpska as the only Serb victory of the twentieth century. The book has been published in the form of a diary and records the events between the years 1992 – 1995.

In a diary entry dated to May 16^th, Ćosić recorded that “Muslims declared war on Serbs so as to complete the conquest of Bosnia i Herzegovina and the extermination of Serbs form the first Islamic Republic of Europe”. 

Ćosić writes these lines at the time when tanks roll toward Pale and snipers begin their three year siege of Sarajevo, paramilitary troops began to clear Eastern Bosnia, and survivors of Prejodor and surroundings are being deported to concentration camps…

Dobrica Ćosić published his book in defense of Republica Srpska – a place he considers a hard earned war trophy.

In the Center for the Young, Ćosić addressed a crowed of predominantly elderly supporters: “the book The Bosnian War is my defense of freedom and truth and national rights that are contained in Republika Srpska – that much too costly – but single political and war victory of the Serbian people reached in the second half of the 20^th century”. 

 

Among the promoters of the book is Dragoslav Bokan, a former follower of the right wing Nazi guru Dragoš Kalaić.

The vultures from Belgrade, Europe, and the world were hovering over us – this strange parasitic class that mocked Dobrica Ćosić and others like him, arrested and tortured me and people like myself. Between the choice of two concepts – that of Prince Lazar and the Despot Stefan; The concept of leaving the knightly field, dying with ones sword in hand or that of leaving on a shame-wagon into the reality of a new age to come. Unfortunately, the Serbian leadership in BiH chose the latter one under the horrific pressure from the world and Belgrade – left to stand without a concept, to say one thing while thinking about another whilst proclaiming a third.       

“To have abandoned all our war aims, and to have forsaken – not even tried one of two possible concepts, the war and samurai like knights’ or else wise concepts of the mature years and all else Dobrica Ćosićs brings with him”, said Bokan.   

Although the writer Vladimir Kecmanović was young at the time of the propaganda during the 1980’s war preparation, he learned how to use the dead in his favor.

The very people that that marked the Serbian pits and executions of WWII and proclaimed the wars of the 1990’s as warmongering and necrophilia nowadays force us to confront ourselves with the tragedy of Srebrenica. Mentioning Skelani, Kazan Sijekovac and other crimes against Serbs that immediately preceded Srebrenica, leads to a state of ‘truth-seeking’ hysteria.     

Is this event, and this book – in which entries from the 11^th to the 15^th of July are missing, the dates of the genocide in Srebrenica, the only planned killing in the history of European history since WWII that lead to a redrawing of borders though out by the Serbian state – only a story on the fringe, told by marginalized, though at one time powerful people? Or is this part of the process by which the goals of the 1990’s war are being rehabilitated Serbia never gave up in the first place?

Sociology professor Zagorka Golubović believes neither one nor the other.

“I would say this is a backdoor rehabilitation of the values that promoted the idea of a Greater Serbia, and led to war… No one will tell you this openly, but we have found in our research in which we asked people when they felt the most comfortable, most responded they felt best during Tito’s times and the 1990. It is improbable that Boris Tadić or any other representative will tell you that their plan is to rehabilitate that past. Yet, unfortunately, the issue is a complete chaos of ideas and contradictions, and nobody who solves them”, says Zagorka Golubović.

Historian Branka Prpa was terrified by the words spoken at Ćosić’s book promotion.

It is frightening that ideas that have lead to war are once again affirmed and set in the political milieu as a crucial question of Serbia’s political future. If you rehabilitate the war of the 1990’s, you rehabilitate all those that have been tried at the Hague since. This type of rehabilitation that is if nationalistic nature has been absolutely present for the past 20 years at the political top of this country, concluded Prpa.    

At the promotion alongside Ćosić also spoke the aforementioned Bokan, Kecmatović and professor for communication Darko Tanasković and another, younger representative of ideologies close to the generation of Marko Krstić.