Predictions about the 2012 Russian presidential elections continue to flood cyberspace from official news outlets to independent perspectives from well-known actors from Russian civil society. The continuation of the Medvedev-Putin tandem seems (to this observer) to be the most likely outcome of the 2012 elections considering the benefits each has on certain spheres of Russia’s social, political, economic, and military institutions. The “managed pluralism” approach to governing Russia under the Medvedev-Putin mandate has had its share of ups and downs, which has caused considerable disenfranchisement in Russian civil society. Medvedev has called for an end to “government manipulation of the economy” and “for the devolution of power to the regions and municipalities” in partial hopes of filling these positions by public elections rather than the current Kremlin-appointed system.
Despite Medvedev’s ‘call to arms’ against the continuation of government meddling in the economic sectors and civil society, Russian citizens agree (71 percent) that they have no bearing on state matters. In addition, 63 percent of Russian citizens expect that the major threats to Russia in the future will come from within, as opposed to the 37 percent who see the main threats coming from abroad. Pavel Felgenhauer, independent Moscow-based defense analyst and contributor to the Eurasia Daily Monitor of the Jamestown Foundation, wrote at the end of June 2011 that “if drastic social/political reforms that may defuse the situation are not introduced immediately, a violent rebellion in Moscow seems highly probable, and, as in the recent ‘Arab spring’ revolutions, virtually any pretext may become the trigger.” Considering that the pretext is likely in the opinion of the Russian populace to come from within, the Kremlin must take action against subversive elements that might foment revolution against the ruling tandem and the current system of governance employed by the Kremlin. Unfortunately, in recent months, weeks, and days the state authorities’ actions against ‘subversive’ elements has targeted civil activists protesting for environmental preservation, historical preservation, and human rights. While a threat to the image of the authority of the Kremlin these civil activists do not represent the greatest threat to the Russian state. Dialogues rather than crackdowns could prove more beneficial for the tandem and civil society’s relationship with the Kremlin, especially if the Putin-led All-Russia People’s Front is, in fact, constructing its electoral program on “liberal” issues.
The state of fear and disenfranchisement Russian civil society feels is further precipitated by the unwillingness of either Medvedev or Putin to formally announce their intents to run for (re-) election in 2012. To some observers, this unwillingness is producing greater fear in society and political institutions that there is disorder in the tandem. Igor Jurgens and Eugene Gontmakher of Vedomosti posed what sounds like a troubling question for greater numbers of Russian citizens: “What happens if Dmitri Medvedev, for some unknown reason, refuses to publicly lay claim to the presidency in 2012?” In response they wrote, “It is safe to assume that the mere failure of the current president to continue his operation would cause large-scale crisis in the country.” Jurgens and Gontmakher continue, noting that the resignation of Medvedev would inevitably lead to the emergence of another candidate; however, they note that the candidate would “inevitably emerge from the prime minister’s cage.” While Jurgens and Gontmakher cast their votes for Medvedev’s reelection, viewing it as a positive and beneficial event for the future of Russia, they believe Putin will maintain a position of primacy in the Kremlin due to his maintenance of stability during his tenure as prime minister. Gleb Pavlovsky is less keen on Putin, and critical of the tandem’s silence about the future. He questions the tandem as a model for modern political governance, calling it an “involuntary agreement in a society where ‘everyone can agree about everything.’” Pavlovsky seems to be calling for Russian citizens to more closely scrutinize local government and Kremlin activities so passivity does not undermine participatory democratic institutions that might emerge after the 2012 elections. Pavlovsky identifies the inherent problem of silence in civil society and from political actors, “[The involuntary social contract] is captured, to usurp the space of a forced agreement, where it is impossible to formulate any interest out loud, or to offer a compromise, or even just to provide guarantees. The symbol of this: two people who keep silent in front of the whole country” [emphasis added].
What are Medvedev and Putin waiting for? Is the matryoshka doll model (evidenced by Pavlovsky) for the structure of power and property keeping the tandem at bay, relegating their actions to the directives of Aleksei Ulyukayev and the Bank of Russia and, ergo, creating a less transparent regime? Or is the tandem waiting to find more suitable replacements that could serve as a tabula rasa for Russia, dusting away the allegations of corruption and poor policy-making that have marred the tandem’s reputation with certain civil and political groups? From early observations one thing is certain: the 2012 presidential elections are representative of the major changes made in Russia since 1991, a fitting recent-history lesson for the anniversary of the fall of the Soviet Union. The question remains whether Russia will face its domestic challenges with democratic reforms or continue to address civil social and political concerns with a heavy hand. Serious evaluation from all levels of Russian society is a necessity otherwise jokes such as Kommersant correspondent Oleg Kashin’s, “We’re all going to die under Putin [My vsem umrem pri Putine],” that tend to materialize more frequently than serious assessments, might become a reality.
Articles referred to in this post:
«Мы хотели стабильности – мы её получили» (“We wanted stability – we got it”), http://www.kommersant.ru/doc/1682929
«Партстроительство: Вхождение в народ» (“Party Building: Engaging the people”), http://gazeta.ru/politics/2011/07/25_a_3708789.shtml
«Президент должен заявить о себе» (“President should declare himself”), http://www.vedomosti.ru/opinion/news/1326592/medvedevu_pora_perejti_rubikon
«Путин готов стать президентом?» (“Putin ready to become president?”), http://www.regnum.ru/news/polit/1429769.html
«Расстройство тандема» (“Disorder of the tandem”), http://www.ng.ru/politics/2011-07-28/1_tandem.html
«Тандем как фактор риска» (“Tandem as a risk factor”), http://www.vedomosti.ru/opinion/news/1328552/zabyt_tandem
Pavel Felgenhauer, “The Majority of Russians Feel Disenfranchised,” http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=38086
“Russia Readies 2012 Pres Elections, but Who is Running?” http://blogs.forbes.com/kenrapoza/2011/07/21/russia-readies-2012-pres-elections-but-who-is-running/
“The Power Vertical: The 2012 Shadowboxing Intensifies,” http://www.rferl.org/content/the_2012_shadowboxing_intensifies/24280112.html
“The Power Vertical: The Popular Front’s Liberal Platform,” http://www.rferl.org/content/the_popular_fronts_liberal_platform/24277672.html
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