Friday, February 22, 2013

The correlation between Intellectual property rights and Foreign Direct Investment

                Russia’s recent accession to the WTO has obligated it sign and ratify the Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property agreement (TRIPS). This will provide for great intellectual property protection within Russia for both foreigners and locals alike. According to the Intellectual Property Rights Index Russia currently, ranks 97 out of 130 countries ranked. This is an astonishingly low number for an economy that ranks as the ninth largest in the world – even though much of the economy runs on the extraction of natural resource. Russia’s adopting of the TRIPS agreement will obligate the country to set minimum standards for it IP protections such as ensuring that copyrights and patents are protected for at least 20 years and impose more effective enforcement mechanism such as preliminary injunctions. Recently I have been evaluating the correlation between foreign direct investment in a country and the IP protections that are in place.
                High levels of FDI in a particular country will help a country to grow economically since the inflow of capital will increase the marginal productivity of labor in the sector the money is invested. An increase in efficiency and output will typically result in higher wages for the workers of a specific sector, putting pressure on the other sectors to increase wages as well. In turn this will be positive for both income and output. The increase in FDI is one of the forces that bring new and existing technologies to developing countries. As I have discussed in previous posts one of Russia’s biggest challenges is the lack of productivity in many of its key sectors. For example the steel sectors – one of Russia most products areas – operates at a mere 30% of American productivity in that sectors. As such, it is imperative that Russia be able to attract new investors to make its productivity more efficient.
                In order to attract new FDI it is necessary to give investors the confidence that its technologies will be protected. Russia has taken some serious stride to implementing stronger protections. This year the United States will work closely with Russia to enhance bilateral coordination on IPR enforcement and protection. This will include the organization of the United States – Russian Intellectual Property Working Group according to the USTR. We can already see evidence of Russia’s commitment to enforce IPR in the VKontakte v. Gala Records case; there the 13th Commercial Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the Arbza Court of St. Petersburg. They ruled that Russia’s leading social networking web site, VKontaket – translated it means you are in contract – was liable for copyright infringement for the distribution of unlicensed music through its web site.  
                While this is only a small example of the commitment to enforce IP rights there are many more examples that can be found. One of the important commitments Russia made when it joined the WTO was to ensure that its government and courts would be more transparent. This can already be seen as the Supreme Arbitration Court of the Russian Federation makes all of their rulings available of their web site. As I continue to stress throughout my posts, Russia has a long way to go in order to ensure its future growth and raise investor confidence, but they are constantly taking strides in the right direction. I will continue to examine the correlation between IPR and FDI and perhaps take a look at a few other countries to provide some survey analysis and see how it will apply to Russia.
Tim Felix A. Bruecher, Development of Foreign Direct Investment and Intellectual Property Protection, 5th September 2008, Winterbach, Germany.

Security in the Black Sea Region: Annotated Bibliography

D'Anieri, P. (2012). Ukrainian foreign policy from independence to inertia. Communist and Post-Communist Studies.

The paper provides a historical overview of Ukrainian foreign policy, and claims that the passivity of Ukrainian foreign policy results from the combination of three factors: the external balance between the pulls of Russia and the West; an internal balance between Ukraine’s regions, and an internal balance between forces of democracy and authoritarianism. The paper makes a prediction that Ukraine might experience a drift towards Russia as a result of the change in balance between domestic political forces or between international forces (since the change in regional divisions is unlikely to happen). 

Ukraine’s relations with NATO started when the country joined NATO’s Partnership for Peace, after it negotiated denuclearization with Russia and the U.S. in 1994. The policy of close interaction with NATO and the U.S. started by the first president of Ukraine Leonid Kravchuk was continued by the second president Leonid Kuchma, who also rejected any form of political or economic integration with Russia or the CIS. Additionally, Kuchma signed a Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, and Partnership between Ukraine and Russia, thus recognizing the sovereignty of Ukraine, including the sovereignty over the city of Sevastopol, home of the Black Sea Fleet. However, several domestic policy issues and well as Ukraine’s selling Kolchuga anti-aircraft systems to Iraq in violation of the UN arms embargo slowed down the process of Euro-integration. After the Orange Revolution, Ukraine’s foreign policy gained new  traction towards the West, however, failures of the coalition government in the domestic policy arena and the inability to carry out effective reforms, failed to advance the formal status of Ukraine-EU and Ukraine-NATO relations. Victor Yanukovych, who became the president of Ukraine in 2010, has moved Ukraine toward a more Russian model of politics. He also signed an extended lease on the Sevastopol naval base to Russia, thus signaling his foreign policy preferences.

Overall, Ukraine’s relations with NATO have always been a subject of counter-pressure from Russia, although Russia has been less strident regarding Ukrainian relations with the European Union. At the same time, Ukraine has been a low priority in the West, and the combination of these two factors slowed down Ukraine’s integration intentions. The regional divisions exacerbate this problem, since there is no consensus between Ukraine’s East and West regarding the aims of the foreign policy. Moreover, the Ukrainian public, although generally favorable towards the EU, has quite a negative perception of the idea of joining NATO. Thus, public opinion polling showed that only a minority of Ukrainians support NATO membership, meaning that a move toward membership would have to be enacted by the leadership over the objection of most Ukrainians – that does not seem a very realistic policy scenario. D’Anieri adds that these factors, combined with the underdeveloped state institutions, prevalent corruption, and energy dependence upon Russia, are unlikely to result in successful foreign policy direction towards NATO or EU. Thus, although Ukraine has committed itself to  military reform, and there is some evidence of efforts in this direction (such as the appointment of a civilian defense minister), generally speaking, deeper reforms such as improving transparency in military procurement, developing a non-commissioned officer corps, and moving toward a professional military, remain stalled. Hence, Ukraine’s own passivity leaves the country’s foreign policy at the mercy of other external actors. 

Tokar, L. (2010). The Ukrainian Perspective on Security in the Black Sea Region: International Cooperation and Counter-Trafficking in the Black Sea Region. In W. D. W. Fiona Houston, Derek M. Robinson (Ed.), Black Sea Security (pp. 75-79): IOS Press.

The paper argues that Ukraine has a particularly important place in the Black Sea security. Thus, Ukraine’s geographical position between East and West and its proximity to Turkey make it a territory for the illegal transmission of narcotics, weapons and explosive devices. Hence, Ukraine should be included in all regional counter-trafficking initiatives. The paper also argues that none of the frozen conflicts in the Black Sea region could be solved without Russia’s constructive participation, and the regional collaboration is the key for coordinating regional transportation and communications, as well as countering the illicit trafficking. 

Minchev, O. (2009). Security in the Black Sea Region. Retrieved from

The paper argues that the security environment of the Black Sea region is directly subjected to the strategic balance between Russia and Euro-Atlantic West in their efforts to promote their competing interests within the region. The paper looks at the security infrastructure of the Black Sea region through two dimensions: the border between the Euro-Atlantic security system and the Russian infrastructure of security, and the Black Sea as part of the border between Europe and the Middle East. The author argues that despite a number of controversial issues in the region,  military conflict in the region is unlikely since neither Russia, nor the West are ready to resume a military arms race, or any other kind of armed hostilities in the observable future. Thus, Transdnietrsia is the only territory of the eastern Black Sea region, where Russia has indirect military presence. Another key player in the Black Sea region is Turkey, whose presence has been ensuring the counterweight to the Russian Black Sea Fleet.
The paper also argues that the issue of energy security in the region represents a major conflict of interest between Russian and most other countries of Central and Eastern Europe (including the Black Sea region). Therefore, the main strategic task for the countries in the region affected by this conflict is to seal the route of Caspian-Central Asian energy to the European market, and possibly to re-direct this energy through the channels of Russian monopoly supplies. In this regard, the strategic control over the Black Sea region is the key element in the success of such a plan. 

Aron, L. (2008). Russia’s Next Target Could Be Ukraine. Wall Street Journal.

The article explores the thesis of whether the Russian occupation of Georgian territories after the 2008 war  was a singular event, or a military precedent that could be replicated in Ukraine. Thus, according to the author, Ukraine has already ‘angered’ Russia by pursuing the course of democratic reforms and moving towards the European-style politics. Thus, during the NATO summit in Bucharest, when both Ukrainian and Georgian NATO MAPs were rejected, Mr. Putin made a speech in which he questioned the very sovereignty of Ukraine. Additionally, in 2006 pro-Russia protests caused the cancellation of Ukraine-NATO Sea Breeze military exercises, setting Ukraine apart from NATO.
Similarly to Georgia, Russia has a vested interest in Ukraine because nearly one in five Ukrainian citizens is ethnically Russian, especially in the Eastern part and in Crimea. In fact, the article claims, a number of Russian politicians travelled to Crimea to show their support to the ethnic Russian population of the peninsula, and it is not a rare occurrence of handing out Russian passports through the Russian consulate in Simferopol. Thus, the article asks, could Ukraine be the next target for Russia, following their recent success in Georgia?  

Simon, J. (2009). Ukraine Against Herself: To Be Euro-Atlantic, Eurasian, or Neutral? : Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University.

The article discussed Ukraine’s dual orientation in its foreign policy agenda: the desire to be part of the Euro-Atlantic community (EU and NATO) and gravitating towards Eurasia (Russia and CIS). Considering these divisions and the lack of national consensus on the issue, the author calls the new U.S. administration to keep open the possibility of Ukraine’s membership in NATO but for the time being encourage Ukraine to follow the model of Finland – a nonaligned Partner for Peace. The author argues that by nurturing political stability in Ukraine, the United States will enhance the country’s value to the Alliance in the long-term. 

The paper argues that during the time of Ukraine’s independence the country did not gain popular support for NATO integration, as evidenced by public opinion polls showing that while 45 per cent of Ukrainians support EU integration, only 20 per cent support NATO integration. The author also analyzes the political support of NATO membership for Ukraine by looking at the political platforms of the major Ukrainian political parties represented in the Ukrainian Parliament. He finds that in the 1998 parliament only the People’s Movement of Ukraine (with less than 10 per cent of seats in the Parliament) supported NATO integration, in the 2002 parliament only Our Ukraine (that gained 23.6 per cent of seats) was in favor of NATO integration, and in the 2006 parliament only Our Ukraine again was supporting NATO (however, this time it gained only 18 per cent of the seats). Thus, although Ukraine was the first country in the CIS to join NATO’s Partnership for Peace in 1994, it has not made substantial progress or sufficient political commitment to NATO. 

At the same time, the levels of actual military and technical collaboration between Ukraine and NATO are very high, and Ukraine participated in many UN peacekeeping missions. These collaborations result in greater defense and military capacity of Ukraine, and in some cases, also bring substantial revenues for the Ukrainian armed forces. Hence, it is plausible that for professional reasons a higher percentage of Ukrainian servicemen support NATO integration than is found in the wider population. Overall, the article concludes that the prospects of Ukrainian membership in Euro-Atlantic structures would remain uncertain, in part because of Russia’s opposition, in part because of ambivalence among NATO and EU members, and in part because of divisions within Ukraine itself. Hence, the most promising and adequate task for the U.S. would be not to foster  NATO membership but to nurture Ukraine’s political stability while keeping its Euro-Atlantic options open.

Cohen, A., & Irwin, C. (2006). US Strategy in the Black Sea Region. The Russian and Eurasian Studies, Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis International Studies Center.

This paper addresses a broad scope of the U.S. interests in the Black Sea region including energy transit, security, counterterrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and the traffic in drugs, weapons, and people. Particularly, the Black Sea region is viewed as a launching platform for military, reconstruction, and stabilization operations in Afghanistan, Iraq, and possibly Iran, as well as for the protection of energy transfers between the Caspian region and the West. Hence, despite the importance of other foreign policy issues, the Black Sea question deserves proper attention from the U.S. At the same time, international collaboration in the Black Sea region in all these strategic areas is complicated by the fact that the Black Sea region is a patchwork of overlapping civilizations and spheres of influence; it is also a nexus of cultures, international trade, various ideas and influences. Additionally, the U.S. presence in the Black Sea region currently has the support of Bulgaria and Romania, but U.S. relations with Russia, Turkey, and Ukraine are on shaky ground. 

The paper calls for specific policy measures conducive to the improved security and collaboration environment in the region including coordinating U.S. and EU foreign policy in the region and increasing NATO cooperation with non-NATO countries through the Partnership for Peace (including offering technical and training assistance in security areas and strengthening bilateral military ties with Ukraine); conducting trilateral military exchanges Bulgaria-Romania-Turkey; encouraging multilateral regional collaboration through the regional security organizations; including regional security structures in NATO military and disaster preparedness exercises; strengthening U.S. alliances with Bulgaria and Romania; urging Russia to lift sanctions against Georgia; and expanding bilateral trade agreements with the Black Sea States. 

Stephen J. Blank. (2010). Wanted: A Strategy for the Black Sea.

This article is a warning to U.S. policymakers regarding potentially missed opportunities in the Black Sea region. The author points our attention to the U.S. mistakes in Iran and Kyrgyzstan, when the U.S. focused too much on the reigning government and overlooked the opposition forces in the case of Iran, and did not provide crucial support in a timely manner for the democratic revolutionary movement in Kyrgyzstan. Hence, the U.S. should learn from these strategic defeats by looking seriously at the multitude of policy issues arising in the Black Sea region, and getting itself involved in such issues as the energy transfer from Central Asia to the West, Ukraine’s potential subordination to Russia’s foreign policy goals by allowing Russian Black Sea fleet on Ukrainian territory until 2042, unresolved frozen ethnic conflicts in the region, and other pressing issues altering the geopolitical balance in the region.

Shelest, H. (2009). Threats to the National and European Security in the Black Sea Region: Comparison of the Black Sea Synnergy and Reality. Presentation at the General Assembly of the CPMR Balkan and Black Sea Commission. Retrieved from

The paper recognizes the Black Sea region as having a unique potential for prosperity, economic development, and energy related collaborative projects. At the same time, the instability resulting from regional conflicts (South Ossetia, Abkhazia, Transdnistria, Nagorno-Karabakh) undermines the security in the region by fostering all kinds of criminal activity, terrorism and illegal migration. Hence, these conflicts need to be addressed collectively and in a timely manner. Aside from ‘frozen conflicts’, the Black Sea region suffers from such issues as the increasing number of refugees and displaced persons, Russia’s interventions in the internal affairs of GUAM states, threats of undermining the territorial integrity of Ukraine, trans-border organized crime, impossibility to guarantee the security of the energy resources transportation from Caspian region and other collaborative projects, drugs and human trafficking, illicit arms trade, among others. Finally, the paper cautions the insufficient involvement of the European Union in the security matters in the Black Sea region, with only exception of the 2007 Black Sea Synergy – the first official document dedicated to the security issues in the region. However, greater collaboration at the international level is needed to tackle the multitude issues in the region. 

Sanders, D. (2007). US Naval Diplomacy in the Black Sea. Sending Mixed Signals. Naval war college review, 60(3), 61-72.

Naval diplomacy is an institutional mechanism for signaling national interests in a particular region by supporting allies, deterring potential enemies, protecting interests, and upholding international law. The article is dedicated to discussing the role of US naval diplomacy in the Black Sea region by presenting the results of a case study of American naval involvement in the region during the preparation for a joint U.S.-Ukrainian multinational Sea Breeze exercise in summer of 2006. The author argues that in this specific case naval diplomacy was counterproductive by failing to produce the desired outcomes, and instead producing unintended and unforeseen damage by exacerbating already poor relations between Russia and Ukraine. 

The main purpose of the US presence in the Black Sea region is the coalition building intended to secure foreign policy objectives (not by threatening the potential adversaries but by influencing the behavior of allies and friendly bystanders). Since 1997, Sea Breeze has been an important vehicle for such coalition building activity. While the main goal of the 2006 exercises was to improve cooperation between countries in the region, the other purpose was to politically support the legitimacy of Ukrainian post Orange Revolution government and its policy objective with regard to NATO membership. However, both the U.S. European Command and the U.S. embassy in Kyiv ended up overlooking the political context – Ukrainian parliamentary elections that were held in spring of 2006. The elected parliament resembled a newly adopted coalition form of government, where major political parties elected to the parliament had to form a coalition and agree on the prime minister and other major cabinet appointments. Due to the inability to form such coalition, Ukrainian politicians put the Ukrainian parliament and government in stalemate. As a result, the Parliament failed to authorize the Sea Breeze drills, although the U.S. ship with materials and equipment had already arrived to Crimea. This failure was used by the Ukrainian opposition forces who called governmental actions in question, thus undermining the legitimacy of the post Orange Revolution regime. Hence, although later in the summer of 2006 the Parliament finally managed to meet and authorize the exercises, the political atmosphere had already been poisoned. 

The situation also caused the spread of mass protests by people living in Crimea against an attempt by NATO to establish a presence in the Black Sea. In fact, the public perceived the exercises as a NATO rather than a multilateral project, and a U.S. operation that took hold rather than a mutual project by several states. This had a negative effect on already suspicious views of many Ukrainians regarding NATO and Ukraine’s membership in the organization. The opposition party immediately used this incident to slow down Ukraine’s course towards NATO. In the end, the Ukrainian policy towards NATO membership had been fundamentally altered. Moreover, the failure of the Sea Breeze 2006 exacerbated already difficult relations between Ukraine and Russia. 

The article concludes by suggesting that future preparations for military exercises in the Black Sea region must consider cultural, social, and political factors existing in the countries involved, the changing political environment, and a broader geopolitical context. Being aware of these factors would help preventing the problem from occurring in the first place. Finally, developing and implementing vigorous informational and public awareness campaigns to support the exercises would be particularly useful in the region where such exercises face significant public opposition. 

Lada Roslycky and Jos Boonstra. (2007). Ukraine: Changing Governments and Persistent Security Concerns in the Region. In B. T. Pieter Marius Emile Volten (Ed.), Establishing Security and Stability in the Wider Black Sea Area: IOS Press.

The book chapter discusses the position of Ukraine as a crucial country in the affairs of the Wider Black Sea Area (WBSA), the country that is at the center of a number of international disputes and tensions that relate to the Black Sea and its immediate neighbors - Russia, Romania and Moldova. The disputes discussed in this work include: the Tuzla-Kerch-Azov Affairs; Ukraine and its role as the major energy transition country in the region; the status of the Russian Black Sea Fleet; territorial disputes with Romania over Serpents Island and the Danube; and Ukrainian involvement in the Moldovan Transdnistrian conflict. Considering the time of publication, the chapter is dedicated to discussing the changes in Ukrainian foreign policy after the Orange Revolution and the country’s course towards EU and NATO memberships. The authors acknowledge the importance of Ukraine-NATO relations but they also mention negative public sentiments towards NATO, and call such perceptions the result of an outdated, Soviet perception of international security institutions as hampering friendly relations with Russia. Many of the themes discussed in this chapter are no longer relevant because of the more recent political changes in Ukraine. Nevertheless, the security issues outlined in the chapter are still crucially important, and the analysis presented is a very valuable historical overview of these issues and the role of Ukraine in their resolution.

Tuesday, February 5, 2013

Russia and FDI

This semester my research will focus on Russia’s need for foreign direct investment (FDI) and what policy measures the nation has implemented and how they can be enhanced to increase investor confidence. Russia currently relies on its production of oil and gas to fuel its economy; those commodities constitute 25 percent of its GDP and 75 percent of its exports. The need to diversify the economy magnified during the financial crisis, which saw its GDP drop, by 7.9 percent in 2009. An article published in Forbes Magazine cited Russia’s overdependence on oil and gas as being the main factor in its inability to weather the crisis. The article went on to list other factors such as corruption, government interference in the private sector, the erosion of civil liberties as other factors as to why Russia preformed so poorly during the crisis. Those same factors will continue to hamper the growth of Russia’s economy in the future. Russia has been able to bounce back in the past few years, developing at a rate of 4.3% in both 2010 and 2011, but with the widely predicted drop in the price of oil and natural gas in the medium term diversification is necessary.
            Russia has the capabilities to become a world leader in a wide variety of industries but holding it back are problems in infrastructure and inefficiency. Moreover, Russia seems to be suffering from the “Dutch Disease”- this occurs when a country is overly reliant on natural resources for its exports, consequently resulting in a dramatic increase in the value of its currency, resulting in losses for the manufacturing sector as goods become more expensive for other nations to purchase. An increase in investment can allow for collaboration and greater quality of infrastructure as foreign firms build factories and provide training for Russian workers.
            My research will examine the current legal and regulatory barriers existing in Russia, namely the law entitled “Foreign Investment in the Russian Federation” first passed by the Duma in 1999 and since amended. I will also examine some of the informal barriers such as corruption, administrative barriers, bureaucracy and selective interpretations of the law. It is also essential to consider the political implications and the threat of a loss of economic sovereignty as foreign acquire and play a dominant role in Russian economy. When evaluating a former Soviet nation one should be mindful that privatization was not always a norm and many still look upon foreign investors with suspicion.
            Finally, I will consider some steps that Russia can take in order to strengthen consumer confidence and achieve Putin’s goal of breaking into the top 20 countries in regards to east of doing business- Russia is currently at 120. It is also worth examining how American equity and direct investors can protect themselves from the dangers of investing in Russia. While Russian corporate law is very similar to the international norm, enforcement of such laws can be problematic. One way to protect ones investment is to utilize a mandatory arbitration clause in a contract to ensure that Russian courts do not interfere. Russia is a member of the New York Convention, which governs international arbitration enforcement and practices. Russia is a nation with tremendous potential, yet to realize its goals it will have to attract foreign cash flows to diversify its economy.         
Andreas Woeller, Note,  Private Equity in the BRICS, 17 Fordham J. Corp. & Fin. L. 1307 (2012).
Jesse Heath, Notes, Strategic Protectionism? National Security And Foreign Investment in the Russian Federation”, 41 Geo. Wash.Int’s L. Rev. 465 (2010).
Elliot Glusker, Arbitration Hurdles Facing Foreign Inverstors In Russia: Analysis of Present Issues and Implications”, 10 Pepp. Disp. Resol. L.J. 595 (2010).
Lukas I. Alpert, Russia’s Business Climate Imporves, Foreign Investment Slows. The Wall Street Jounral, Feb. 2, 2012, 6:32 PM),
Anastasiya Savinykh, Investorov Puskayut Parami, Izvestiya, Oct. 13, 2008,
Jesse Heath, Strategic Protectionism? National Security and Foreign Investment in the Russian Federation, 41 Geo. Wash. Int'l L. Rev. 465, 501 (2009)

Rasporiazhenie Pravitel'stva Rossiiskoi Federatsii Sostav Pravitel'stvennoi Komissii po Kontroliu za Osushchestvleniem Innostrannykh Investitsii v Rossiiskoi Federatsii, Ros. gaz., July 6, 2008, available at [hereinafter Rasporiazhenie].

Monday, February 4, 2013

Aleksandrov, O.S. Ukraine-NATO: New Conditions and Realities of Collaboration, 2011. Analytical Report, National Institute of Strategic Studies, 56 pages.

This analytical report provides an overview of the recent changes in Ukrainian foreign policy and Ukraine-NATO relations. In particular, the report examines the main areas of military and technical collaboration between Ukraine and NATO, as they are affected by Ukraine’s recently adopted policy of non-alignment. In addition to the analytic report, the book includes abstracts from the round-table discussion “Ukraine-NATO: New Conditions and Realities of Collaboration” organized by the National Institute of Strategic Studies and the J. Marshall European Center of Security Studies, that was funded by the NATO Communications Office in Ukraine. According to the report, the recent changes in Ukraine-NATO collaboration have resulted from several factors, and these factors are analyzed through the following sections of the report: the non-alignment policy adopted by Ukraine; the adoption of the new Strategic Concept by NATO itself; the contemporary dynamic of Ukraine-NATO relations; the main directions of collaboration between Ukraine and NATO; current problems in Ukraine-NATO collaboration; and conclusions.
In terms of the non-alignment policy, it involves looking at two aspects – internal and external. The former considers the non-alignment policy as a stabilizing tool for Ukraine, considering its social divisions and heated political discussions regarding conflicting foreign policy objectives. The latter considers the non-alignment policy as an effective tool for finding a more balanced foreign policy model that accounts for the interests of the entire range of foreign countries – both NATO member-states and Russia. According to the report, non-alignment is a more strategic and forward-looking choice for Ukraine that offers a better balance between Eastern and Western foreign policy vectors. In particular, the report acknowledges the successful demarcation of the Ukraine-Russia border and solving the issue of the Russian Black Sea fleet as particularly successful steps in improving the security of Ukraine and the European region in general.
The new Strategic Concept developed by NATO establishes the Alliance as a dominant regional security structure in Europe, and it also identifies the main prospective threats, including international terrorism, cyber crime, trafficking, drugs and weapons trade, as well as the energy–related security. Along with this, NATO’s primary goals are not limited to defense; they rather focus on the search of non-military tools, such as improved diplomacy and intelligence, to improve regional security. In this respect, Ukraine’s interests fit well into all of these areas, however, Ukraine is particularly interested in the collaboration and development of its energy-related infrastructure (as a transit country that had a negative previous experience of being in the middle of an energy crisis in Eurasia). The other issue of Ukraine’s concern is the country’s indirect involvement in NATO’s operations that are not authorized by the Security Council. This issue needs further development since Ukraine is concerned about maintaining good relations with third countries involved in international security conflicts. The other important aspect of the new NATO collaborative security doctrine is Ukraine’s participation in creating a pan-European missile defense system (PRO).    
Regarding the contemporary dynamic of Ukraine-NATO relations, the report claims that NATO approves the current foreign policy choices of Ukraine, and in fact, some of the member-states are “thankful to the Ukrainian leadership for refusing the Euro-Atlantic intentions Ukraine that were “dividing” the organizational unity and were creating problems in the process of normalizing the relations with Russia” (p. 6). At the same time, NATO is interested in more specific policy collaborations with Ukraine, such as military collaboration. Hence, the report claims that NATO has officially recognized the non-alignment policy of Ukraine while leaving the security door open, depending on the development of the foreign political situation.  In support, some Ukrainian experts say that the non-alignment policy has, in fact, intensified Ukraine-NATO collaborations as evidenced by the adoption of the Presidential law from 2011 on the free movement of foreign policy forces on the territory of Ukraine with the purpose of joint military training; the adoption of the Presidential law in 2010 regarding the new system of the coordination of Ukraine-NATO collaborative projects; the adoption of the annual governmental program “Ukraine-NATO” by the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine for 2011; and the 2011 Presidential law approving the implementation of the aforementioned annual governmental program.
The consultations regarding Ukraine-NATO collaborations encompass a wide range of issues, including Ukraine’s participation in NATO’s missions of various purposes (Kosovo, Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya); the collaboration in reforming the defense sector as well as military and military-technical collaboration; and the collaboration in research and environmental projects. Of particular significance is the program for disposing excessive military equipment and leftover ballistic missiles equipment in Ukraine that is being implemented in two stages: the period of 2006-2010 that resulted in the prevention of potential ‘technogenic’ catastrophes, the creation of new employment opportunities as well as the introduction of new technologies; and the second stage that started in 2010 and will last for 3 years.
Regarding the current problems in Ukraine-NATO collaboration, the major issues include the implementation of the administrative reform in Ukraine that slows down the Ukraine-NATO collaboration, the lack of coordination among Ukrainian Ministries with regard to NATO issues, the developing of alternative security alliances by Ukraine (such as considering to join the Collective Security Treaty Organization - CSTO) at the expense of the relations with NATO. For instance, some Ukrainian politicians advocate for the enhanced collaboration with the CSTO, as a way to maintain the foreign policy neutrality position. Hence, they argue, Ukraine has developed numerous formal programs of collaboration with NATO, while similar programs are absent in Ukraine-CSTO relations, and should be developed to balance out the foreign security vector. However, the majority of Ukrainian politicians believe that there is no need to improve the balance of foreign policy vectors by developing additional collaborations with the former Soviet Union countries. Particularly, they criticize the ability of CSTO to ensure security in the region, and acknowledge the lack of its military capacities as compared to NATO.
Overall, the report concludes that there is a need to conduct intensive educational campaigns regarding the benefits and reasons of Ukraine-NATO collaboration, which would include conferences, round-table discussions, public speeches of Ukrainian governmental officials, politicians and experts. The major current and prospective directions in Ukraine-NATO collaboration should include military and technical collaboration as well as reforming the military and defense sector in Ukraine. Of particular importance is the participation of Ukraine in a three-way missile defense system “USA-NATO-Russia” that could utilize Ukrainian missile detection equipment. Finally, the major inhibitor of Ukraine-NATO relations is the pressure from other military and security unions such as the CTSO.
The second part of the report includes abstracts from the conference participants’ speeches, and I will provide the translation of the presentation topics to give a general sense of the topics covered:  
·         Introductory speeches by Andriy Yermolayev (National Institute of Strategic Studies), Pavlo Klimkin (Foreign Affairs Ministry of Ukraine), John Tefft (U.S. Ambassador to Ukraine), Marcin Koziel (NATO Communications Office in Ukraine).
·         Oleh Oleksandrov, “Current Aspects of Military and Technical Collaboration between Ukraine and NATO in Consideration of the Non-Alignment Doctrine and a New Strategic Concept by NATO.”
·         Leonid Holopatyuk, “Main Directions of Military Collaboration between Ukraine and NATO, Considering the Change in Foreign Policy Priorities by Ukraine.”
·         Kersti Kelder, “The Potential Military and Technical Collaboration between Ukraine and NATO.”
·         Vasyl Lytvynchuk, “The Project “Partnership for Peace” in Ukraine (disposing light and medium capacity military equipment): Potential Directions of Collaboration.”
·         Valentyn Badrak, “The Broadening of Defense Collaboration with NATO Member-States as a Factor in Ukrainian Defense Capacity and the Catalyst of the Defense Industry Development.”
·         Final summarizing comments by Oleksiy Melnyk, the military expert in the Ukrainian Center of Economic and Political Studies names after Oleksandr Razumkov.
Overall, the report is doing a good job in providing the analysis of the multiple vectors of Ukraine-NATO collaboration and providing some factual information regarding Ukraine’s participation in various military and military-technical projects. It also gives a good sense of the state of Ukrainian scholarship on Ukraine-NATO collaboration, and would be a useful reading for anyone interested in a general survey of Ukraine-NATO relations. At the same time, although this report presents a useful attempt to analyze the dynamics of Ukraine-NATO relations, it also presents a narrow point of view, which reflects the general confusion of Ukrainian political leaders regarding Ukraine’s foreign policy identity and prospective foreign policy priorities.