Security in the Black Sea Region: Annotated Bibliography

D'Anieri, P. (2012). Ukrainian foreign policy from independence to inertia. Communist and Post-Communist Studies.

The paper provides a historical overview of Ukrainian foreign policy, and claims that the passivity of Ukrainian foreign policy results from the combination of three factors: the external balance between the pulls of Russia and the West; an internal balance between Ukraine’s regions, and an internal balance between forces of democracy and authoritarianism. The paper makes a prediction that Ukraine might experience a drift towards Russia as a result of the change in balance between domestic political forces or between international forces (since the change in regional divisions is unlikely to happen). 

Ukraine’s relations with NATO started when the country joined NATO’s Partnership for Peace, after it negotiated denuclearization with Russia and the U.S. in 1994. The policy of close interaction with NATO and the U.S. started by the first president of Ukraine Leonid Kravchuk was continued by the second president Leonid Kuchma, who also rejected any form of political or economic integration with Russia or the CIS. Additionally, Kuchma signed a Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, and Partnership between Ukraine and Russia, thus recognizing the sovereignty of Ukraine, including the sovereignty over the city of Sevastopol, home of the Black Sea Fleet. However, several domestic policy issues and well as Ukraine’s selling Kolchuga anti-aircraft systems to Iraq in violation of the UN arms embargo slowed down the process of Euro-integration. After the Orange Revolution, Ukraine’s foreign policy gained new  traction towards the West, however, failures of the coalition government in the domestic policy arena and the inability to carry out effective reforms, failed to advance the formal status of Ukraine-EU and Ukraine-NATO relations. Victor Yanukovych, who became the president of Ukraine in 2010, has moved Ukraine toward a more Russian model of politics. He also signed an extended lease on the Sevastopol naval base to Russia, thus signaling his foreign policy preferences.

Overall, Ukraine’s relations with NATO have always been a subject of counter-pressure from Russia, although Russia has been less strident regarding Ukrainian relations with the European Union. At the same time, Ukraine has been a low priority in the West, and the combination of these two factors slowed down Ukraine’s integration intentions. The regional divisions exacerbate this problem, since there is no consensus between Ukraine’s East and West regarding the aims of the foreign policy. Moreover, the Ukrainian public, although generally favorable towards the EU, has quite a negative perception of the idea of joining NATO. Thus, public opinion polling showed that only a minority of Ukrainians support NATO membership, meaning that a move toward membership would have to be enacted by the leadership over the objection of most Ukrainians – that does not seem a very realistic policy scenario. D’Anieri adds that these factors, combined with the underdeveloped state institutions, prevalent corruption, and energy dependence upon Russia, are unlikely to result in successful foreign policy direction towards NATO or EU. Thus, although Ukraine has committed itself to  military reform, and there is some evidence of efforts in this direction (such as the appointment of a civilian defense minister), generally speaking, deeper reforms such as improving transparency in military procurement, developing a non-commissioned officer corps, and moving toward a professional military, remain stalled. Hence, Ukraine’s own passivity leaves the country’s foreign policy at the mercy of other external actors. 

Tokar, L. (2010). The Ukrainian Perspective on Security in the Black Sea Region: International Cooperation and Counter-Trafficking in the Black Sea Region. In W. D. W. Fiona Houston, Derek M. Robinson (Ed.), Black Sea Security (pp. 75-79): IOS Press.

The paper argues that Ukraine has a particularly important place in the Black Sea security. Thus, Ukraine’s geographical position between East and West and its proximity to Turkey make it a territory for the illegal transmission of narcotics, weapons and explosive devices. Hence, Ukraine should be included in all regional counter-trafficking initiatives. The paper also argues that none of the frozen conflicts in the Black Sea region could be solved without Russia’s constructive participation, and the regional collaboration is the key for coordinating regional transportation and communications, as well as countering the illicit trafficking. 

Minchev, O. (2009). Security in the Black Sea Region. Retrieved from http://www.iris-bg.org/

The paper argues that the security environment of the Black Sea region is directly subjected to the strategic balance between Russia and Euro-Atlantic West in their efforts to promote their competing interests within the region. The paper looks at the security infrastructure of the Black Sea region through two dimensions: the border between the Euro-Atlantic security system and the Russian infrastructure of security, and the Black Sea as part of the border between Europe and the Middle East. The author argues that despite a number of controversial issues in the region,  military conflict in the region is unlikely since neither Russia, nor the West are ready to resume a military arms race, or any other kind of armed hostilities in the observable future. Thus, Transdnietrsia is the only territory of the eastern Black Sea region, where Russia has indirect military presence. Another key player in the Black Sea region is Turkey, whose presence has been ensuring the counterweight to the Russian Black Sea Fleet.

The paper also argues that the issue of energy security in the region represents a major conflict of interest between Russian and most other countries of Central and Eastern Europe (including the Black Sea region). Therefore, the main strategic task for the countries in the region affected by this conflict is to seal the route of Caspian-Central Asian energy to the European market, and possibly to re-direct this energy through the channels of Russian monopoly supplies. In this regard, the strategic control over the Black Sea region is the key element in the success of such a plan. 

Aron, L. (2008). Russia’s Next Target Could Be Ukraine. Wall Street Journal.

The article explores the thesis of whether the Russian occupation of Georgian territories after the 2008 war  was a singular event, or a military precedent that could be replicated in Ukraine. Thus, according to the author, Ukraine has already ‘angered’ Russia by pursuing the course of democratic reforms and moving towards the European-style politics. Thus, during the NATO summit in Bucharest, when both Ukrainian and Georgian NATO MAPs were rejected, Mr. Putin made a speech in which he questioned the very sovereignty of Ukraine. Additionally, in 2006 pro-Russia protests caused the cancellation of Ukraine-NATO Sea Breeze military exercises, setting Ukraine apart from NATO.

Similarly to Georgia, Russia has a vested interest in Ukraine because nearly one in five Ukrainian citizens is ethnically Russian, especially in the Eastern part and in Crimea. In fact, the article claims, a number of Russian politicians travelled to Crimea to show their support to the ethnic Russian population of the peninsula, and it is not a rare occurrence of handing out Russian passports through the Russian consulate in Simferopol. Thus, the article asks, could Ukraine be the next target for Russia, following their recent success in Georgia?  

Simon, J. (2009). Ukraine Against Herself: To Be Euro-Atlantic, Eurasian, or Neutral? : Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University.

The article discussed Ukraine’s dual orientation in its foreign policy agenda: the desire to be part of the Euro-Atlantic community (EU and NATO) and gravitating towards Eurasia (Russia and CIS). Considering these divisions and the lack of national consensus on the issue, the author calls the new U.S. administration to keep open the possibility of Ukraine’s membership in NATO but for the time being encourage Ukraine to follow the model of Finland – a nonaligned Partner for Peace. The author argues that by nurturing political stability in Ukraine, the United States will enhance the country’s value to the Alliance in the long-term. 

The paper argues that during the time of Ukraine’s independence the country did not gain popular support for NATO integration, as evidenced by public opinion polls showing that while 45 per cent of Ukrainians support EU integration, only 20 per cent support NATO integration. The author also analyzes the political support of NATO membership for Ukraine by looking at the political platforms of the major Ukrainian political parties represented in the Ukrainian Parliament. He finds that in the 1998 parliament only the People’s Movement of Ukraine (with less than 10 per cent of seats in the Parliament) supported NATO integration, in the 2002 parliament only Our Ukraine (that gained 23.6 per cent of seats) was in favor of NATO integration, and in the 2006 parliament only Our Ukraine again was supporting NATO (however, this time it gained only 18 per cent of the seats). Thus, although Ukraine was the first country in the CIS to join NATO’s Partnership for Peace in 1994, it has not made substantial progress or sufficient political commitment to NATO. 

At the same time, the levels of actual military and technical collaboration between Ukraine and NATO are very high, and Ukraine participated in many UN peacekeeping missions. These collaborations result in greater defense and military capacity of Ukraine, and in some cases, also bring substantial revenues for the Ukrainian armed forces. Hence, it is plausible that for professional reasons a higher percentage of Ukrainian servicemen support NATO integration than is found in the wider population. Overall, the article concludes that the prospects of Ukrainian membership in Euro-Atlantic structures would remain uncertain, in part because of Russia’s opposition, in part because of ambivalence among NATO and EU members, and in part because of divisions within Ukraine itself. Hence, the most promising and adequate task for the U.S. would be not to foster  NATO membership but to nurture Ukraine’s political stability while keeping its Euro-Atlantic options open.

Cohen, A., & Irwin, C. (2006). US Strategy in the Black Sea Region. The Russian and Eurasian Studies, Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis International Studies Center.

This paper addresses a broad scope of the U.S. interests in the Black Sea region including energy transit, security, counterterrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and the traffic in drugs, weapons, and people. Particularly, the Black Sea region is viewed as a launching platform for military, reconstruction, and stabilization operations in Afghanistan, Iraq, and possibly Iran, as well as for the protection of energy transfers between the Caspian region and the West. Hence, despite the importance of other foreign policy issues, the Black Sea question deserves proper attention from the U.S. At the same time, international collaboration in the Black Sea region in all these strategic areas is complicated by the fact that the Black Sea region is a patchwork of overlapping civilizations and spheres of influence; it is also a nexus of cultures, international trade, various ideas and influences. Additionally, the U.S. presence in the Black Sea region currently has the support of Bulgaria and Romania, but U.S. relations with Russia, Turkey, and Ukraine are on shaky ground. 

The paper calls for specific policy measures conducive to the improved security and collaboration environment in the region including coordinating U.S. and EU foreign policy in the region and increasing NATO cooperation with non-NATO countries through the Partnership for Peace (including offering technical and training assistance in security areas and strengthening bilateral military ties with Ukraine); conducting trilateral military exchanges Bulgaria-Romania-Turkey; encouraging multilateral regional collaboration through the regional security organizations; including regional security structures in NATO military and disaster preparedness exercises; strengthening U.S. alliances with Bulgaria and Romania; urging Russia to lift sanctions against Georgia; and expanding bilateral trade agreements with the Black Sea States. 

Stephen J. Blank. (2010). Wanted: A Strategy for the Black Sea.

This article is a warning to U.S. policymakers regarding potentially missed opportunities in the Black Sea region. The author points our attention to the U.S. mistakes in Iran and Kyrgyzstan, when the U.S. focused too much on the reigning government and overlooked the opposition forces in the case of Iran, and did not provide crucial support in a timely manner for the democratic revolutionary movement in Kyrgyzstan. Hence, the U.S. should learn from these strategic defeats by looking seriously at the multitude of policy issues arising in the Black Sea region, and getting itself involved in such issues as the energy transfer from Central Asia to the West, Ukraine’s potential subordination to Russia’s foreign policy goals by allowing Russian Black Sea fleet on Ukrainian territory until 2042, unresolved frozen ethnic conflicts in the region, and other pressing issues altering the geopolitical balance in the region.

Shelest, H. (2009). Threats to the National and European Security in the Black Sea Region: Comparison of the Black Sea Synnergy and Reality. Presentation at the General Assembly of the CPMR Balkan and Black Sea Commission. Retrieved from niss.od.ua

The paper recognizes the Black Sea region as having a unique potential for prosperity, economic development, and energy related collaborative projects. At the same time, the instability resulting from regional conflicts (South Ossetia, Abkhazia, Transdnistria, Nagorno-Karabakh) undermines the security in the region by fostering all kinds of criminal activity, terrorism and illegal migration. Hence, these conflicts need to be addressed collectively and in a timely manner. Aside from ‘frozen conflicts’, the Black Sea region suffers from such issues as the increasing number of refugees and displaced persons, Russia’s interventions in the internal affairs of GUAM states, threats of undermining the territorial integrity of Ukraine, trans-border organized crime, impossibility to guarantee the security of the energy resources transportation from Caspian region and other collaborative projects, drugs and human trafficking, illicit arms trade, among others. Finally, the paper cautions the insufficient involvement of the European Union in the security matters in the Black Sea region, with only exception of the 2007 Black Sea Synergy – the first official document dedicated to the security issues in the region. However, greater collaboration at the international level is needed to tackle the multitude issues in the region. 

Sanders, D. (2007). US Naval Diplomacy in the Black Sea. Sending Mixed Signals. Naval war college review, 60(3), 61-72.

Naval diplomacy is an institutional mechanism for signaling national interests in a particular region by supporting allies, deterring potential enemies, protecting interests, and upholding international law. The article is dedicated to discussing the role of US naval diplomacy in the Black Sea region by presenting the results of a case study of American naval involvement in the region during the preparation for a joint U.S.-Ukrainian multinational Sea Breeze exercise in summer of 2006. The author argues that in this specific case naval diplomacy was counterproductive by failing to produce the desired outcomes, and instead producing unintended and unforeseen damage by exacerbating already poor relations between Russia and Ukraine. 

The main purpose of the US presence in the Black Sea region is the coalition building intended to secure foreign policy objectives (not by threatening the potential adversaries but by influencing the behavior of allies and friendly bystanders). Since 1997, Sea Breeze has been an important vehicle for such coalition building activity. While the main goal of the 2006 exercises was to improve cooperation between countries in the region, the other purpose was to politically support the legitimacy of Ukrainian post Orange Revolution government and its policy objective with regard to NATO membership. However, both the U.S. European Command and the U.S. embassy in Kyiv ended up overlooking the political context – Ukrainian parliamentary elections that were held in spring of 2006. The elected parliament resembled a newly adopted coalition form of government, where major political parties elected to the parliament had to form a coalition and agree on the prime minister and other major cabinet appointments. Due to the inability to form such coalition, Ukrainian politicians put the Ukrainian parliament and government in stalemate. As a result, the Parliament failed to authorize the Sea Breeze drills, although the U.S. ship with materials and equipment had already arrived to Crimea. This failure was used by the Ukrainian opposition forces who called governmental actions in question, thus undermining the legitimacy of the post Orange Revolution regime. Hence, although later in the summer of 2006 the Parliament finally managed to meet and authorize the exercises, the political atmosphere had already been poisoned. 

The situation also caused the spread of mass protests by people living in Crimea against an attempt by NATO to establish a presence in the Black Sea. In fact, the public perceived the exercises as a NATO rather than a multilateral project, and a U.S. operation that took hold rather than a mutual project by several states. This had a negative effect on already suspicious views of many Ukrainians regarding NATO and Ukraine’s membership in the organization. The opposition party immediately used this incident to slow down Ukraine’s course towards NATO. In the end, the Ukrainian policy towards NATO membership had been fundamentally altered. Moreover, the failure of the Sea Breeze 2006 exacerbated already difficult relations between Ukraine and Russia. 

The article concludes by suggesting that future preparations for military exercises in the Black Sea region must consider cultural, social, and political factors existing in the countries involved, the changing political environment, and a broader geopolitical context. Being aware of these factors would help preventing the problem from occurring in the first place. Finally, developing and implementing vigorous informational and public awareness campaigns to support the exercises would be particularly useful in the region where such exercises face significant public opposition. 

Lada Roslycky and Jos Boonstra. (2007). Ukraine: Changing Governments and Persistent Security Concerns in the Region. In B. T. Pieter Marius Emile Volten (Ed.), Establishing Security and Stability in the Wider Black Sea Area: IOS Press.

The book chapter discusses the position of Ukraine as a crucial country in the affairs of the Wider Black Sea Area (WBSA), the country that is at the center of a number of international disputes and tensions that relate to the Black Sea and its immediate neighbors - Russia, Romania and Moldova. The disputes discussed in this work include: the Tuzla-Kerch-Azov Affairs; Ukraine and its role as the major energy transition country in the region; the status of the Russian Black Sea Fleet; territorial disputes with Romania over Serpents Island and the Danube; and Ukrainian involvement in the Moldovan Transdnistrian conflict. Considering the time of publication, the chapter is dedicated to discussing the changes in Ukrainian foreign policy after the Orange Revolution and the country’s course towards EU and NATO memberships. The authors acknowledge the importance of Ukraine-NATO relations but they also mention negative public sentiments towards NATO, and call such perceptions the result of an outdated, Soviet perception of international security institutions as hampering friendly relations with Russia. Many of the themes discussed in this chapter are no longer relevant because of the more recent political changes in Ukraine. Nevertheless, the security issues outlined in the chapter are still crucially important, and the analysis presented is a very valuable historical overview of these issues and the role of Ukraine in their resolution.