Vallance,
Brenda J. “Shaping Society’s Demands: Russian Soldiers’ Mothers and Military
Reform,” Conflict Studies Research Centre,
December 1996.
Vallance’s article outlines the
various methods used by SOMO to convey their message to civilians. What this
article emphasizes above all else is the legality of SOMO and the way in which
they conformed to the legal structure in order to gain legitimacy. It seems
that this practice definitely made SOMO more appealing to western nations, but
I’m unsure how Russian civilians viewed this strategy. Considering the tension
between people and state, I wonder I SOMO was conflated with governmental
structures, and if this alienated potential support.
Здравомыслова,
Е. “ОТ СОЦИАЛЬНОЙ ПРОБЛЕМЫ - К КОЛЛЕКТИВНОМУ ДЕЙСТВИЮ: ПРАВОЗАЩИТНАЯ ОРГАНИЗАЦИЯ ‘СОЛДАТСКИЕ
МАТЕРИ РОССИИ,’” 25-26.02.95 г. http://www.indepsocres.spb.ru/zdrav3.htm
Zdravomislova speaks to the prior invisibility
of dedovshchina and the Sakalauskas case that made the public aware of problems
in the military. This raises the question; is dedovshchina confined to military
origins, or is it a manifestation of pre-existing cultural trends? As of now it’s
difficult to see dedovshchina as not having roots in cultural trends. Many
authors discuss how the military was considered the institution of male
socialization, and most of these authors point to the apparent lack of male
role models in young men’s lives as the reason for the necessity of this
institution. I’m curious if young conscripts go into service with certain
expectations of masculinity and violence- or they conflate the two. I want to
find a study on this.
The Russian military is often
considered a “state within a state” due to its isolationism, and I think this
may be the root of the problem. For too long the military was seen as “off
limits” to civilians. Zdravomislova argues that SOMOs biggest accomplishment
should be that people started talking about military service.
Elkner,
Julie. “Dedovshchina and the Committee of Soldiers’ Mothers under Gorbachev,”
in The Journal of Power Institutions in
Post-Soviet Societies, iss. 1, 2004.
SOMO largely served in a watchdog
position which was met with scorn from the military. This in itself isn’t
surprising, but Elkner explains some of the methods the military used to
discredit SOMO.
1) Referred to women as hysterical and
characterized them as incapable of viewing information objectively and without
emotion.
2) Claimed that women knew nothing of
military service, and thus could only contribute ignorant ideas to the
conversation.
3) Claimed that women were
overemphasizing the dedovshchina crisis, and that women would actually make up
cases in order to get their son discharged.
Podrabinek,
Kirill. “Vozvrashchaias’ k teme,” Index,
no. 19, 2003.
Podrabinek explains the historical
basis for military hazing (world-wide) and concludes that switching to a
contract based military provides the only hope of ending the practice. For the
most part, Podrabinek paints a very bleak picture about the nature of
individuals serving in the military. Since commanding officers benefit from
hazing, there is no chance of reaching them or changing their behavior. Even
though hazing would still exist (to perhaps a lesser extent) in a volunteer
force, at least soldiers would know what they signed up for, explains
Podrabinek.
Podrabinek ultimately raises more
questions than he answers. He asks the reader to consider whether or not just
abolishing the military altogether would be better for the course of the country
since Russia has caused more harm to itself than any external country ever
could. This was the first I’ve read calling for the abolishment of the military,
and I’m somewhat surprised I haven’t found SOMO at some point entertaining the
same idea. I’m curious as to if it just seemed to radical an idea that it would
have alienated potential support.
Dedovshchina
in the Post-Soviet Military: Hazing of Army Conscripts in a Comparative
Perspective
Ed.
Francoise Dauce and Elisabeth Sieca-Kozlowski
Ibidem-Verlag:
Stuttgart, 2006.
Bannikov,
Konstantin. “Regimented Communities in a Civil Society,” 2002.
Bannikov investigates how dedovshchina
spreads beyond military service to pervade civil society. His main argument is
that young men go from wielding power and being feared (by men only a few years
younger) and inevitably attempt to transfer that new sense of self onto their
new social life. He describes three main approaches:
1. Ex-military tend to gravitate towards
policing/security positions which require experience with violence. In this
way, these men seek to maintain the validation of their authority through civil
society.
2. Some men will seek to transform
societal structures around their past experience with authority and violence.
The workplace becomes a new arena for drastic hierarchical orders.
3. The family becomes a unit to
dominate. Hazing is used to socialize children and wives.
What is so striking to me about
dedovshchina is the relatively small age gap between perpetrator and victim. Bannikov
explains that there is a sense of reciprocity at work; even though new soldiers
may not have done anything to warrant hazing (to any degree), older soldiers want
to repay the damage done to them. This cycle, unfortunately, seems
impenetrable.
Bannikov also talks about the societal
expectation for military service, which is something I’ve definitely seen
differing accounts of. Bannikov explains that generally middle aged and older
men generally felt in favor of conscription, whereas the majority of women and
young men opposed compulsory service. While for some it may be easy to explain
this by characterizing women as the “weaker sex”, Bannikov sides in favor of
SOMO as the emergence of strong women, capable of risking everything for the
well-being of their children.
Yet what stands out most is Bannikov’s
tacit assertion that boredom is at the root of dedovshchina. It seems that
soldiers at posts with little to do, and few resources among them, would turn
to treating each other violently as opposed to any other alternative. This is
something work exploring.
Lebedev,
Anna Colin. “The test of reality. Understanding Families’ Tolerance faced with
mistreatment of conscripts in the Russian Army.”
Of everything I’ve read, Lebedev’s
article is the only which seeks to explain parental acceptance of the practice
of dedovshchina. Several authors talk about apathy and lack of faith in the
government to make reform, but none so far go beyond a defensive position.
Similar to Maya Eichler’s argument (and
the inspiration for my research) that “the waging of war depends on
women’s and men’s acceptance of their militarized identities as patriotic
mothers and soldiers,” Lebedev demonstrates the role women can play to support conscription
and traditional forms of militarized patriotism. One mother expressed regret
for getting her son out of the military service because she fears it made him
weak. Contrary to Bannikov’s claims above, Lebedev considers women to have had
a stronger hand in pushing militarized masculinity, or at least expressing
regret for taking that opportunity from their sons.
Some parents recognized the potential dangers of military
service but felt that these dangers were less than those of staying at home. Unemployment
and alcoholism awaited young men, whereas some parents believed the military
could offer a better/disciplined life for their sons. A corollary to this was the
sense of pride some parents felt for their sons not evading military service.
One letter from a mother of a dead soldier expressed anathema for mothers who
tried to take their sons out of service, claiming that SOMO let sons “stay tied
to mother’s apron strings.”
While most parents seem to have taken more moderate
positions on conscription evasion, there is again a sense of powerlessness.
Many felt that the job of the family was to serve as a watchdog, but not to
have the responsibility of fixing societal problems. Again, responsibility is
relegated to the government, even though they expressed doubt about its ability
to enact reform.
Lebedev also brings to light the
economic politics of military service. Several letters from mothers contacting
SOMO speak to the high cost of bribing officials and allude to the idea that
their sons were fighting the rich man’s war.
Though admittedly anecdotal evidence,
Lebedev questions to what extent society actually considered conscription
necessary for the socialization of young men. In one letter, the author argues
it didn’t matter whether one went to university or the military in terms of
their masculinization, which was actually dependent on their prior character. Another
author spoke to the importance of attending university as a better tool for
socialization than military service.
Obraztsov,
Igor V. “The Reasons for Dedovshchina and Ways to Prevent it: A Retrospective
Analysis.”
Obraztsov spends the first half of the
article defining dedovshchina, explaining it in relation to the technical term “relations
violating the regulations.” Though RVR is a wider term to encompass “any negative
phenomenon taking place between conscripts,” the term seems sterile and
detached. I discovered that while dedovshchina is commonly used in the media,
RVR is the preferred term for military reports.
Obraztsov then discusses the modern
roots of dedovshchina in the Russian army. He finds two main roots; 1) in the
late 1960s military service decreased by
one year, and those who were conscripted before the cut off took their
aggression out on those able to serve less time and 2) Khrushchev’s general
loosening of discipline in conjunction with the conscription of those with
previous criminal records allowed for violence to go unpunished. The point
Obraztsov is trying to make is that dedovshchina did not exist in the Imperial
army because 1) soldiers were conscripted for much longer amounts of time,
making them functionally career servicemen and 2) older soldiers played a more
active part in training of young conscripts.
The article also seeks to expel the
notion that dedovshchina is an inherently Soviet legacy, instead arguing its spread
in any country that does not engage in contract service. Ending conscription,
then, would be the first necessary step reversing the cycle. Overall, Obraztsov
is optimistic that improving material conditions of soldiers and providing
better training would go a long way in ending the practice.
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