Book Review

Zayavka na samoubiystvo. Zachem Ukraine NATO?/An Application for Suicide. Why Ukraine needs NATO?/Dmitriy Tabachnik, Petr Simonenko, Sergey Grinevetskiy, Georgiy Kryuchkov. - Dovira, Kyiv: Folio, ?Kharkiv, 2009. – 445 pages. (ISBN 978-966-5-0-249-2 and 978-966-03-4735-9. (In Russian).

      The book is a collection of analytical articles composed by five Ukrainian academics and politicians representing a range of political parties of the left and central orientation. The main subject is Ukraine’s relations with NATO and the broader outcomes of a potential NATO membership for Ukraine’s foreign policy identity and its relations with Russia. In addition to the main collection of in-depth articles composed by five main contributors, the book also contains the Russian translation of the North-Atlantic Treaty (Washington DC, April 1949), and several smaller commentaries by other Ukrainian scholars, journalists, and politicians. When reading the book it is important to consider the political context in which it was published, -  a year before the upcoming presidential election of 2010, and several years after the Orange Revolution and the election of Victor Yuschenko as the President of Ukraine in 2004. Hence, the tone of the discussions and analysis is often too politicized and propagandist. Nevertheless, the book offers a good perspective regarding the political views of a significant part of the Ukrainian political community and, perhaps, a significant part of the Ukrainian population. After the 2010 presidential and parliamentary elections that followed the publication of the book, most of the political forces whose opinions are presented obtained political representation and direct access to power. Not surprisingly, as of today, many of the foreign and domestic policy proposals discussed in the book have been implemented.

The title of the book “An Application for Suicide. Why Ukraine needs NATO?” speaks for itself. Hence, all the expert opinions portray a very negative opinion about NATO as an organization of international security and a very negative view regarding Ukraine’s potential membership in the Alliance. All the authors seem to agree that not only would Ukraine not benefit from such a step, but NATO membership would also jeopardize Ukraine’s political future, violate its territorial and political integrity, and fundamentally worsen relations with Russia. The latter seems to be the most important argument against membership. Instead, the book recommends that Ukraine should seek for a policy of non-alignment that would imply improving the relations with its most strategic partner (Russia) as well as keeping good relations with the West. This balanced position is considered the most appropriate foreign policy vector for Ukraine. Additionally, of particular concern for many of the book authors, is the involvement of the United States in Ukrainian domestic and foreign affairs, which in their opinion has had negative outcomes for Ukraine.

The first major contributor is Georgiy Krychkov – the member of the Communist Party of Ukraine. His analysis starts by criticizing Ukraine’s distancing itself from Russia and other Soviet Republics after the collapse of the Soviet Union. It was an unwise political choice. Moreover, Ukraine’s foreign policy and its relations with Russia were proscribed by the U.S. House Committee Resolution 120 “In support of Ukraine’s independence” adopted in 1996. The resolution focused on Ukraine’s sovereignty and its distancing from the former Soviet satellites as well as distancing from Soviet-style political institutions. In Mr. Kryuchkov’s opinion the very fact of such a resolution is the example of the outright interference of another state in the internal and external affairs of independent Ukraine. Hence, further actions of Ukraine’s government, such as the dismantling of Ukraine’s nuclear arsenal, only weakened the country’s military capacity and did not produce any of the desired political outcomes. The development of the Ukraine own military has also suffered from the repeated economic crises and worsening social problems. Hence, current conditions of the Ukrainian military complex are unsatisfactory.

Mr. Kryuchkov argues that Ukraine has special significance for Russia-U.S. relations, and President Yuschenko’s pro-NATO position on this issue appears to have been very harmful for Ukraine. Moreover, it does not reflect the opinion of the majority of the Ukrainian population that has held a generally negative perception of NATO. Alternatively, Mr. Kryuchkov argues, Ukraine should develop a more balanced foreign policy approach. The closest foreign policy model was under former Ukraine’s president, Leonid Kuchma. At the same time, president Yuschenko’s policies significantly worsened Ukraine-Russia relations, as evidenced by gas conflicts, the situation with the Russian Black Sea Fleet, and the worsening of Ukraine’s exports to Russia.

According to Mr. Kryuchkov, NATO’s interest in Ukraine includes using Ukraine’s soldiers for the Alliance’s military operations; using Ukrainian military aviation; and taking advantage of Ukraine’s territory and its geopolitical position. At the same time, Ukraine’s benefits are unclear. Since the Ukraine-NATO ten-year partnership has not really resulted in substantial achievements in the military sphere, the question is whether we can expect anything to change in the long-run. Moreover, although the government has spent significant amounts of time and efforts for pro-NATO propaganda, public opinion remains negative. Finally, Mr. Kryuchkov argues that Ukraine’s membership in the Alliance will not strengthen its independence. If anything, it will worsen Ukraine’s relations with Russia, which will negatively impact Ukraine’s economy. Hence, instead of partnering with NATO, Ukraine should take a closer look at its internal affairs and concentrate on such issues as the deterioration of industry and scientific research;  energy dependence; environmental issues; utilization of  old military equipment; and too much foreign investment in the strategic sectors of Ukraine’s economy and  large-scale privatization.

The second contributor is Dmitriy Tabachnik, a historian and the current Minister of Education and Science of Ukraine. Dr. Tabachnik starts his essay by analyzing early relations between Ukraine and NATO established by Leonid Kuchma. Thus, a balanced foreign policy and partnership with NATO were justified at the early stages of Ukraine’s independence because Yeltsin’s Russia was a politically unstable partner. However, the situation changed when Russia got a new president, who managed to achieve political, economic and military supremacy in the region. As a result, Russia stopped being a threat to Ukraine. Therefore, in his last months of office, Leonid Kuchma removed Ukraine’s goal of NATO membership from the country’s military doctrine. At the same time, NATO itself, mainly the United States, had started displaying growing interest in Ukraine.

Dr. Tabachnik argues that from then on, both Ukrainian politicians and their Western partners have been covering Ukraine-NATO relations with numerous lies. This includes the massive campaign to discredit the image of Leonid Kuchma, the substitution of the goal of European integration with the goal of joining NATO, and spreading wrong information about NATO’s goals. The latter misinformation includes portraying NATO not as a military organization but as a humanitarian organization; portraying the Alliance as a club that each country needs to join if it wishes to join the European Union; falsifying NATO’s impact on military expenses and exaggerating military benefits; portraying NATO as an instrument for democracy and anti-corruption reforms; denying the fact that NATO will eventually locate its military bases in Ukraine (and thus denying NATO’s impact on Ukraine’s relations with Russia); denying Russia’s right to express its opinion; and saying that NATO would guarantee the destiny of Crimea, as a territory that would otherwise be captured by Russia. Dr. Tabachnik attempts to refute these stereotypes, by showing that if anything it is the United States, not Russia that tries to exert a destructive political influence on Ukraine by involving the country in political and military conflicts and worsening its relations with its immediate neighbor. Like the previous author, Dr. Tabachnik says that NATO membership benefits for Ukraine would be minimal; however, negative outcomes would be significant. He further uses the example of France and its relations with the satellite countries on the eve of World War II. While France supported the formation of the Small Entente, when it came to the real German threat, the country did not stand for its smaller European satellite countries. Thus, the destiny of small satellites (like Ukraine) is not necessarily determined by their alliance with the bigger partner (NATO). Additionally, Tabachnik uses the example of the expansion of Nazi Germany, and shows how this analogy could be applicable to the expansion of NATO – the dangerous process that might have negative long-term outcomes.

Finally, the author discusses the role of Sevastopol, as a strategic city that ensures control over the Black Sea Region and access to the Caucasus. Control over Sevastopol is important not only because of its naval capacities but also as a symbol of independence, freedom, and Ukraine-Russia unity – the symbolic role that Sevastopol gained over the course of its history. Particularly, the Russian Black Sea Fleet is the only capable naval agent that protects Ukraine’s security (Ukraine’s own fleet is weak). One potential threat comes from Romania, and in this regard the role of the Russia Fleet is crucial. Moreover, Sevastopol’s economy is so dependent on the Russian Fleet that it would completely collapse in case of its permanent withdrawal. Lastly, Dr. Tabachnik argues that Ukraine’s involvement in Georgia-Russia conflict in 2008, including both the political support of Georgian president and supplying the military equipment, significantly worsened Ukraine-Russia relations. Overall, Ukrainian foreign policy carried out by all its Presidents had been the policy of lost opportunities – a tendency that is both harmful and dangerous.

The third contributor is Petr Simonenko- the leader of the Communist Party of Ukraine. He starts his essay by discussing the events of Russia-Georgia War of 2008, as an event that should force Ukrainian society to think more carefully about the historical roots of the war and its modern causes. Learning a lesson from Georgia’s negative example is important for Ukraine. Simonenko’s analysis is based on the premise that the presence of too strong nationalist political forces in any country is likely to lead to negative and even dangerous outcomes. One such example was the triumph of the National Socialist Party in Germany. Another example is the case of the Soviet Union dissolution, where radical nationalist movements made sure to destroy the strong political, economic, and cultural ties existing between the Soviet Republics. Hence, Mr. Symonenko is not surprised that the United States and the transnational corporations are supportive of the nationalist right-wing movements in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe.

He further analyzes two major vectors of the American foreign policy (Pax Americana endorsed by Republicans and Pax Globalist endorsed by Democrats). He says that although these doctrines have slight differences, they nevertheless have the same goal – the construction of a new world order. Symonenko uses the example of the color revolutions in Eurasia and their failings to illustrate the weakness of the American doctrine and the problem of foreign influence on domestic political affairs. In fact, recent frozen conflicts in Kosovo, Tibet, Georgia are not single events; they are rather a system of well-planned actions aimed at supporting the economic and political dominance of the American system. Thus, like the previous author, Mr. Symonenko condemns Ukraine’s political and military support of the Georgian government during the war of 2008. In summary, he offers several suggestions from the Communist Party of Ukraine on what to do in order to improve Ukraine’s domestic situation and foreign positions. These include: changing the foreign policy approaches by reducing the power of one leader –the President – in making all important foreign policy decisions; to adapt the comprehensive law “On the Foundations of Foreign and Domestic Policy of Ukraine”; to once and for all ‘close’ the issue of NATO membership and to adapt  a non-alignment doctrine; to rely on Ukrainian military forces for  defense needs versus  a foreign military; to strengthen and develop Ukrainian military capacity; to advance the idea of “new socialism” by creating a global socialist organization; and finally, to publicly condemn the politics of nationalism.

The fourth contributor is Sergey Grinevetskiy, the representative of a centrist party Lytvyn’s Block. He also starts his essay by drawing  the reader’s attention to the Georgian conflict. The main argument of Mr. Grinevetskiy’s essay is about the value of the non-alignment philosophy as the best foreign policy doctrine for Ukraine. He first analyzes the history of the non-alignment doctrine as an institution of international law and discusses particular cases of non-alignment (such as Belgium, Austria, Moldova). Then, he talks about three types of non-alignment: permanent, war-related, and internationally sanctioned and only later domestically instituted non-alignment – like in the case of Turkmenistan. The author further discusses specific political conditions conducive to the permanent non-alignment of Ukraine. Of particular importance is Ukraine’s position in the Black Sea Region and the presence of ‘frozen’ conflicts in that region. Mr. Grinevetskiy recognizes that Russia has crucial interests in the region, and therefore is interested in keeping her influence by all means possible, including military actions. Hence, Ukraine as a country is captured between Western and Russian interests in the region, and therefore, for its own best interests, Ukraine should adopt a non-alignment doctrine. Mr. Grinevetskiy further analyzes public opinion polls that signify Ukraine’s public general disapproval of a particular alliance (either with NATO or with Russia), with 36.6 per cent of people directly supporting non-alignment. Hence, there are objective preconditions for adopting this doctrine at the political level. Among other, Mr. Grinevetskiy mentions the negative impact of Ukrainian politics on Ukraine-Russia relations, particularly evidenced by Ukraine’s military support of Georgia that directly violated the Ukraine-Russia partnership agreement signed in 1997.

The fifth contributor is Petr Tolochko – a former member of Tymoshenko Block and a current member of the independent civic organization “New Ukraine” since 2009. Dr. Tolochko’s essay is dedicated to the social and humanitarian issues pertinent to Ukraine’s relations with NATO. He starts by discussing a negative portrayal of Russia and Russian interests in Ukraine by the Ukrainian media, which sounds more like anti-Russian propaganda rather than objective information. Then he moves to discuss the issue of the Russian language in Ukraine that is spoken by 8.5 million people, and yet is being forced out of the public schools, media and other social institutions. The other problem described by Dr. Tolochko is the situation with history textbooks used in Ukrainian public schools. In his opinion, these new textbooks deliberately misinterpret several important historical events to form negative perceptions about Russia and its role in Ukrainian history. Finally, the separation of the Ukrainian Orthodox church and the idea of granting this church a special national status, as suggested by the President, contradicts the flow of history.

Dr. Tolochko argues that independence is good for Ukraine; however, he also supports stronger ties with Russia, as a brother country that shares with Ukraine common history, language, culture and other important social attributes. In fact, he argues, in some aspects the histories of Ukraine and Russia are inseparable, and it is not wise to push the boundaries. In fact, the push of Ukraine towards NATO is another problem caused by Yuschenko and the Orange government. It only worsened Ukraine’s relations with both Russia and West. He concludes by saying that national radicalism is the worst ideology for Ukraine, and Ukrainian leftist parties are the only political forces in Ukraine that would support a right policy towards NATO and protect the interests of all Eastern Slavs. Therefore, Dr. Tolochko is hoping that Ukrainian public support of the leftist parties would grow in the future.

Generally speaking, the book “An Application for Suicide. Why Ukraine needs NATO?” is a good read for scholars interested in the internal political dynamics in Ukraine, and the relationship between domestic forces and foreign policy outcomes. It does not offer insights regarding political theories; however, it does provide some good historic analysis and a pretty accurate portrayal of the leftist and some centrist Ukrainian ideologies. The major weakness of the book is its political bias due to the absence of representation of various political opinions outside of the left-central political spectrum. Although the arguments presented have merit, the analysis is very much one-sided. Therefore, although the book is meant to serve the educational purposes for the Ukrainian public, political elites and academics, the lack of critical analysis and unbalanced arguments make it more suitable for political propaganda. Part of what explains this is that the book was sponsored by the opposition parties (when the Orange Coalition was in office); hence, the opposition’s opinion of the Ukrainian governmental relations with NATO was particularly negative. Since the return of opposition parties to the political mainstream, these parties have managed to alter Ukraine’s foreign policy objectives including the adoption of a non-alignment status and a significant reduction of Ukraine’s relations with the NATO Alliance.