Putin’s Civil Society and the “Foreign Agent” Law

During this post, I would like to focus on Putin’s conception of civil society and how it relates to the application of the “foreign agent” law.  While researching, I found an insightful policy memo recently published by PONARS Eurasia that advances arguments related to Putin’s speech at the meeting of the Valdai International Club and the most popular news stories covered in the print press. 

Professor James Richter’s memo entitled “Civil Society and the Second Putinshchina” emphasized Putin’s desires to foster a Russian identity through the construction of a civil society that maintains Russia’s “‘national and spiritual identity.’”   His argument reinforced President Putin’s statements at the recent meeting of the Valdai International Club.  Putin remarked:

 “Local governments and self-regulated citizens’ organizations serve as the best school for civic consciousness. Of course, I’m referring to non-profits…A true civil society and a true, nationally-focused political elite, including the opposition with its own ideology, values and standards for good and evil – their own, rather than those dictated by the media or from abroad – can only grow through effective self-governing mechanisms. The government is prepared to trust self-regulating and self-governing associations, but we must know whom we are trusting. This is absolutely normal global practice, which is precisely why we have passed new legislation to increase the transparency of nongovernmental organizations.”

The speech reveals Putin’s belief that a Russian-oriented political elite should work with trusted Russian NGOs to promote civil involvement and growth.  Recent activities surrounding the application of the “foreign agent” attest to Putin’s strategy in the achievement of his idea of civil society.  This strategy entails more restrictions and inspections of NGOs, little opposition to the NGO bill from the Russian public, expanded government oversight through appropriations, and increased collaboration with the Russian Orthodox Church.  

First, the government shows no signs of easing the enforcement of the “foreign agent law.” In mid-September, the parliamentary committee for public unions and organizations recommended the passage of a Russian bill which authorizes more unannounced checks on NGOs.  The bill will authorize inspections of NGOs who have not addressed specific complaints against them in a timely fashion.  Another visible sign that the government has no intention of relaxing its stance on NGOs occurred this past Monday when the Ministry of Justice forced a regional branch of Golos to close for three months because it did not register as a foreign agent. The election monitoring organization has been plagued with problems, including inspections and fines, since the passage of the foreign agent law.  In his memo, Professor Richter argued that, thus far, the foreign agent law was “…designed more to intimidate and harass than to punish.”  While I agree with his initial argument, I think that the recent closure of Golos indicates that a shift is occurring in the law’s application; a shift from intimidation to punishment.  I predict that observers will see more closures in the future.  

The Russian government also appears to have gathered more support for its enforcement of the foreign agent law.  In the future, I believe this newly found support will contribute to the Russian government’s ability to punish NGOs who don’t adhere to the foreign agent law.  In a previous post, I discussed the surprising results of a Levada Center poll which revealed that 53% of Russian supported the government’s sanctioning of NGOs who violate the foreign agent law.  According to officials, that number has risen.  Sergei Ivanov, the head of the Russian Presidential Administration stated that roughly 80-90% of the population supports the NGO law.

 

This lack of support of NGOs is further complicated by trends in Russian volunteerism.  The Moscow News recently published an article which cites statistics from Center for Studies of Civil Society and the Nonprofit Sector (CSCSNS) at Russia's Higher School of Economics.  According to CSCSNS, only 3% of Russians engaged in volunteer activities with NGOs.  A Levada Center survey from last year reports that the percentage of volunteers is actually 1%. The article cites several possible reasons for the dearth of volunteers including public distrust of NGOs and overbearing local and federal government bureaucracies.  One NGO organizer commented that “"Volunteer work, where one man wants to help another, is the cornerstone [of civil society]…But we see how the government destroys this public trust." Perceived American involvement in Russian domestic affairs also challenges this trust.  According to Denis Volkov, a representative from the Levada Center, “…the moment there's any [suspicion of] American funding, then that's it.”  This creates an inherent dilemma—how do Russians—who have statistically low levels of volunteerism—become interested in building civil society through NGOS when they inherently distrust them and are fearful of persecution?  

Over the past two weeks, there has also been more evidence to suggest that Russian government is finding creative ways to weaken foreign influence in Russian civil society.  The most widely reported story in the Russian print press related to NGOs was the government’s decision to expand the definition of “socially oriented NGOs” to include private drug rehabilitation centers in Russia.  Professor Richter’s memo details the history of the “social oriented NGOs” program noting that it they began in 2010 under the presidency of Medvedev to provide “…direct financial support for individual NGOs and substantial subsidies to regional governments to provide logistical support and some financial support to local organizations.”    Prior to September 25, 2013, the government did not provide any financial support to private rehabilitation centers—many of which have religious affiliations.  According to the Russian government, there are nearly 8.5 million drug users in the country, but only 25,000 of these users are receiving rehabilitation services. The government states that it is trying to reach more addicts through the extension of federal support, but some observers working in NGOs claim that the government is trying to reduce foreign influences, especially those of protestant denominations who have traditionally taken a more active role in Russia’s rehabilitation sector.  The liberal-oriented newspaper, Novye izvestiya, reported that “…experts surmise that NGOs loyal to the government or the Russian Orthodox Church who has been opening rehabilitation centers will receive the funds.”  This development supports one of Professor Richter’s observations that President Putin has been working with the Orthodox Church to construct his ideal civil society.  Richter noted that President Putin has publically urged Orthodox leaders to become more involved in society, and that Orthodox organizations did not experience the surprise inspections that their Muslim, Catholic, and Protestant denominations experienced last spring.

Journalists and NGO leaders aren’t the only ones concerned with the government’s additional funding of NGOs.  Former Ministry of Finance, Aleksei Kudrin, warned that limiting NGOs solely to government funding will nationalize civil society and may contribute to the politicization of NGOs. He stated:  “I am absolutely positive about the idea of allocating state grants to non-government organizations…But these funds should be complementary to what is done by businessmen. If financing is completely from the government funds, it will mean that these organizations would be dependent.”  In order to combat the complete dependency of NGOs to the government, his think tank, the Committee of Civil Initiatives, intends to award 200,000 rubles to the country’s best NGO.  His organization is also helping NGO leaders and the Presidential Human Rights Council to better define the terms “political activities” and “foreign agent” in the current version of the law.

It appears that Putin’s ideal civil society is on the road to becoming a reality in Russia.  This reality is supported by more restrictive measures placed on NGOs, minority opposition to these restrictions, low levels of social engagement, more government appropriations to NGOS, and increased collaboration with traditional Russian institutions.  Whether Kudrin’s initiatives fits Putin’s calls for a “nationally-focused political elite” to build civil society will be determined in the future as challenges to the law’s wording remain unresolved.  It also remains to be seen how organizations opposed to the foreign agent law, such as Golos, will be welcomed into civil society (as Putin said they would be), if they are punished for their acts of opposition.  

Sources

“90% of Russians Support NGO Law – Official.”  Russian Legal Information Agency. September 28, 2013.  http://rapsinews.com/legislation_news/20130918/268871269.html

Arutunyan, Anna.  Russian Volunteerism: An Uphill Battle.  The Moscow News.  September 26, 2013.  http://themoscownews.com/russia/20130926/191945280/Russian-volunteerism-An-uphill-battle.html

Bulanova, Nadezhda.  “Kolkii vzgliad.”  Novye izvestiya.  September 18, 2013.  http://www.newizv.ru/society/2013-09-18/189150-kolkij-vzgljad.html

Gritsok, Marina.  “Tsentram reabilitatsii narkozavisimykh pomozhet federal’nyi biudzhet.”  Rossiiskaya gazeta.  September 17, 2013.  http://www.rg.ru/2013/09/17/narkocentri-site-anons.html

Gorodetskaya, Natalia.  “Inostannym agentam utochili zadanie”  Kommersant.  September 17, 2013.  http://www.kommersant.ru/doc/2280786

“Kurdin vystupil protiv ogosydarstvleniia NKO I preduprdil o vozmozhnosti ikh politizatsii”  ITAR-TASS.  September 26, 2013.   http://www.itar-tass.com/c95/891987.html

“Meeting of the Valdai International Discussion Club” Russian Presidential Executive Office. September 19, 2013. http://eng.kremlin.ru/transcripts/6007

“Negosudarstvennye reabilitatsionnye tsentry dlia narkozavisimykh vkliucheny v chislo prioritetov podderzhki sotsial’no orientirovannykh NKO”  Nezavisimaya gazeta.  September 17, 2013.  http://www.ng.ru/news/443442.html

“NKO ‘Golos’ zakryli na tri mesiatsa”  Interfax.  September 30, 2013. http://www.interfax.ru/russia/txt.asp?id=331856

“Postanovlenie Pravitel’stva Rossiiskoi Federatsii ot 12 sentiabria 2013 g. n 801g. Moskva.  Rossiiskaya gazeta. September 18, 2013. http://www.rg.ru/2013/09/18/nark-nko-site-dok.html.

Richter, James. “Civil Society and the Second Putinshchina”  PONARS Eurasia Policy Memo No. 276.  September 2013.  http://www.ponarseurasia.org/memo/civil-society-and-second-putinshchina

 

“Russia’s Committee of Civil Initiatives to Award 200,000-Ruble Prize to Best NGO.”  ITAR-TASS.  September 26, 2013.  http://www.itar-tass.com/en/c154/892445_print.html

“Russian Parliamentary Committee Approves NGO Snap-Check Bill” RIA Novosti.  September
18, 2013.  http://en.rian.ru/russia/20130918/183569581/Russian-Parliamentary-Committee-Approves-NGO-Snap-Check-Bill.html

Forced Labor in the Uzbek Cotton Harvest

                Uzbekistan has one of the poorest records in the region on addressing human trafficking. The US State Department’s Trafficking in Persons Report 2013 states that due to a lack of “significant efforts to comply” with the minimum standards set forth in the Trafficking Victims Protection Act, passed by the US Congress in 2000, Uzbekistan has been recently downgraded to the lowest tier, three, after being on the tier two watch list for the last six years (Russia was also recently downgraded for the same reason). Within this report, it is also mentioned that “the Government of Uzbekistan remains one of only a handful of governments around the world that subjects its citizens to forced labor through implementation of state policy.” However, the government of Uzbekistan denies that forced labor exists in the country. I found this very interesting and pursued it further.[1]

                The International Labor Organization defines forced labor as “work or service exacted from a person under threat or penalty, which includes penal sanctions and the loss of rights and privileges, where the person has not offered him/herself voluntarily.”[2] In Uzbekistan the issue is centered on the cotton harvest. The Uzbek economy is heavily dependent on cotton, and has its roots in the mid-1800s with attempts by the Russian Empire to develop a source of cotton not dependent on the United States. While Tashkent has attempted to diversify crops since independence, agriculture is still focused on cotton production. Uzbekistan is currently the world's fifth largest cotton exporter and sixth largest producer.[3] Agriculture itself provides employment for around one-third of overall employment.[4]

Several factors have been attributed to the current reliance on forced labor during the cotton harvest. Critically, there is a limited window that farmers have to harvest their crop, generally from September through October. To bring in the harvest farmers have also had to deal with the “demechanization” of the harvest in Uzbekistan that has resulted in a heavy reliance on manual labor. Moreover, this reliance is constrained by the increase in labor out-migration to countries such as Russia. However, the main driver has been the structure of the national economy and direct involvement of the government. The Uzbek government, “despite a number of high-profile reforms”, has continued a command economy approach reminiscent of the Soviet-era. Quotas are established and demanded of cotton farmers and prices are set artificially low for the cotton produced. Prices have been historically set below the world market price, making it difficult for farmers to attract labor with decent pay.[5]

The government’s precise role in cotton production is murky. Uzbek farmers are required to sell their quota to a state-controlled company (Uzkhlopkoprom) that operates all of Uzbekistan's cotton gins. Uzkhlopkoprom itself is 51 percent owned by the national government; however, the owners of the remaining 49 percent are officially unknown but “investigative reports by journalists and human rights groups suggest the privately held shares are controlled by [President] Karimov's political allies and their relatives.”[6]

The lack of harvest machinery is also relatively puzzling. A teacher from the Karauzyak district was quoted exclaiming, “In the Soviet Union our kolkhoz was among the leaders by machine collection, 80 percent of the harvest was collected by machines. Now there is not a single combine in entire Karakalpakstan!”[7] A 35 percent drop in cotton production since 1991 could be attributed to a lack of modern agriculture machinery.[8] In 2005, the Uzbek Agriculture Ministry stated that 10 percent of the harvest that year had been collected by combines, which was down from 20 percent in 2000. Sources quote farmers who claim that there is a large shortage of agricultural machinery, such as tractors and combines. This may be due to a significant drop in production, from 35,000 to 2,000 tractors per year in 2007, at the Soviet-era Tashkent Tractor Plant and Tashkent Agricultural Vehicles Plant.[9] In 2009 the government started a program to reequip several agricultural machinery production plants, but machinery still remains hard to come by. Even if machinery is located, fuel and repairs can be prohibitively expensive for many farmers. [10]

Internationally, there has been push back against the forced labor of children in Uzbekistan. The issue of child labor in the cotton harvest has not been limited to Uzbekistan. It has also been widely reported in Tajikistan, but appears to not take precedence over schooling there.[11] Intense lobbying by international NGO’s led to 25 Western retail companies boycotting the use of Uzbek cotton in 2010. In response, a decree was issued by the Uzbek government for the 2012 cotton harvest that banned school children up to 15 years of age being used as labor. The government has also made the argument that “cotton picking was in the context of family farms, and as such did not count as child labor but was in line with generally recognized family values and traditions of Uzbek society that supported the participation of elder children in creating the family well-being.”[12] A UNICEF report on the 2012 harvest confirmed that children under the age of 15 were not seen picking cotton.[13] However, additional reports claim that the government has pushed for greater participation from other age groups to fill the gap.[14]

The labor shortage has led to increased demand for participation across many sectors of the Uzbek economy. An estimated “16% of all government employees, including doctors, nurses and other essential service providers” and “60% of educators from each school were sent out of the classrooms to pick cotton.”[15] Additional reports describe instances where “bus and city shuttle passengers heading out of town have been redirected to the fields. Public transport drivers say that buses and city shuttles leaving Tashkent are often “rolled off” to the cotton fields.”[16] Even the military has not been spared, “These days the soldiers in the fields of Kasan district pick cotton” and “the soldiers of the Termez unit also work in cotton fields.”[17] It is possible for civilians called up to exempt themselves by paying for the daily quota they would have been expected to pick, or by paying another to take their spot. 2012-2013 prices have ranged from 12,000 Uzbekistani soms ($5.50) for a daily quota, to 250,000 ($116) for a doctor in Jizzakh to buy a full exemption or 500,000 soms ($232) for a teacher to pay another to take 25 days of assigned duty. A significant cost for workers whose pay “does not often go above 12,000 per day.”[18]

These workers are ‘forced’ to participate through several methods. Provincial mayors and governors are held personally responsible for meeting quota requirements in their districts, and they in turn pressure local officials to organize labor in the fields. [19] Arrangements are made between farmers and schools to get children over the age of 15 and college students into the fields. A “call to patriotic duty, peer pressure, visits to families” are used, but if necessary they have “punitive measures” available. Payment is then made to the school directly, who disburses it to the students.[20] There are a few reports of residents being forced to pick cotton without receiving compensation, albeit low, but this appears to be atypical. Punitive measures are reported to be threats to take away electricity, retirement payments, childcare benefits, or even employment. [21] To monitor participation it appears that passport numbers, official residence registration details, phone numbers and a photograph are collected by officials. [22] In the fields, there have even been reports of men in military uniforms acting as “supervisors” to ensure quotas are met. [23]

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[1] US State Department, Trafficking in Persons Report 2013, available at: http://www.state.gov/j/tip/rls/tiprpt/2013/

[2] Ruwanpara, Kanchana and Pallavi Rai. 2004. Forced Labor: Definitions, Indicators and Measurements. International Labor Organization, Geneva. Available at: http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---ed_norm/---declaration/documents/publication/wcms_081991.pdf

[3] CIA World Factbook. 2013. Central Intelligence Agency. Available at: https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/uz.html

[4] School of Oriental and Asian Studies, University of London. 2010. What Has Changed? Progress in Eliminating the Use of Forced Child Labour in the Cotton Harvests of Uzbekistan and Tajikistan. Centre for Contemporary Central Asia and the Caucasus, University of London. Available at: http://www.cottoncampaign.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/07/2011_SOAS_WhatHasChanges.pdf

[5] Ibid; Trafficking in Persons Report 2013

[6] Synovitz, Ron. 2013. For Exploited Uzbek Farmers, High Cotton Prices Only Enrich Overlords. RFE/RL. Available at:

http://www.rferl.org/content/For_Exploited_Uzbek_Farmers_High_Cotton_Prices_Only_Enrich_Overlords/2202878.html

[7] Ferghana News. 2009. Uzbekistan: News from the Fields. Ferghana News Information Agency. Available at: http://enews.fergananews.com/articles/2581

[8] CIA World Factbook

[9] UZNews. 2007. Uzbek Cotton Industry Based on Manual Labor. UZNews.net. Available at: http://www.uznews.net/news_single.php?lng=en&sub=&cid=2&nid=2226

[10] UZNews. 2007. Uzbekistan to Revive Production of Outdated Cotton Combines. UZNews.net. Available at: http://www.uznews.net/news_single.php?lng=en&cid=2&nid=11831

[11] School of Oriental and Asian Studies, University of London, 2010.

[12] Ibid.

[13] UZNews. 2013. UNICEF Did Not See Children Picking Cotton in Uzbekistan. UZNews.net. Available at: http://www.uznews.net/news_single.php?lng=en&cid=30&nid=23900

[14] Ferghana News. 2012. Uzbekistan: Parents Sent to the Cotton Fields Instead of their Children. Ferghana News Information Agency. Available at: http://enews.fergananews.com/articles/2776

[15]Ferghana News Information Agency. Available at: http://enews.fergananews.com/articles/2805

[16] Ferghana News. 2012. Uzbekistan: Parents Sent to the Cotton Fields Instead of their Children

[17] Ferghana News. 2009. Uzbekistan: News from the Fields

[18]Ferghana News. 2012. Uzbekistan: Parents Sent to the Cotton Fields Instead of their Children; [18] UZNews. 2013. Cotton Pickers in Angren on the Fields with a Badge. UZNews.net. Available at: http://www.uznews.net/news_single.php?lng=en&cid=2&nid=23810; UZNews. 2013. Doctors, Artists and Railway Workers – All are Cotton Pickers in Jizzakh Province. UZNews.net. Available at: http://www.uznews.net/news_single.php?lng=en&cid=2&nid=23937

[19] Trafficking in Persons Report 2013

[20] School of Oriental and Asian Studies, University of London, 2010.

[21] UZNews. 2013. Residents in Zaaminskiy Forced to Pick Cotton for Free. UZNews.net. Available at: http://www.uznews.net/news_single.php?lng=en&cid=2&nid=23795

[22] UZNews. 2013. Cotton Pickers in Angren on the Fields with a Badge.

[23] Ferghana News. 2012. Uzbekistan: Parents Sent to the Cotton Fields Instead of their Children