Uzbekistan and the United States: Authoritarianism, Islamism & Washington’s Security Agenda
Shahram Akbarzadeh. Zed Books. 2005
In this
book, Shahram Akbarzadeh provides a comprehensive historical narrative of the
rise to power of Uzbekistan’s President Islam Karimov. In it, he provides a detailed explanation of
the extent to which the Uzbek President has been able to preserve his executive
authority in a post-Soviet space. The
author includes a thorough analysis of the manifestations of political Islam
and their fate in Uzbekistan, as well as a thoughtful insight into Tashkent’s
foreign policy objectives with Russia, China, and the United States. I would recommend this book to anyone
interested in learning more of President Karimov’s authoritarian rise to and
preservation of power in a domestic and international context.
Akbarzadeh
devotes the first chapter of the book to provide a historical background of the
contemporary political structure of Uzbekistan.
Emerging from the aegis of the Soviet Union, Uzbek President Islam
Karimov sought to immediately consolidate his executive position and legitimize
it through elections. Akbarzadeh
provides a detailed description of this transition, effectively reporting on
this evolution toward a presidential system of government. The chapter includes the enumerated powers
given to the President by the 1992 Constitution, followed by an analysis of how
President Karimov was able to use these powers to make and regulate regional
and local political appointments. The abolition
of the office of the vice-president, in addition to the extensive control of
local and regional appointments, are highlighted by Akbarzadeh to show the
extent to which President Karimov has pursued a distinct style of authoritarian
power consolidation under a constitutional framework. The challenge which arose, however, was the
emergence of a strong political mobilization of Uzbek Muslims. Akbarzadeh describes how President Karimov
was able to simultaneously co-opt, assimilate, and suppress the emerging
activity of political Islam by justifying these measures are critical to the security
and stability of the state.
In
chapter two, however, Akbarzadeh shows that the initial reaction made by
President Karimov was not enough to neutralize Islamic political
organization. In response to the
development of the Islamic Renaissance Party (IRP) of Uzbekistan, President
Karimov extended his executive authority to the realm of political party
organization by adopting a law against the formation of religiously inspired
political parties. Akbarzadeh describes the
ensuing conflict between President Karimov’s secular state approach and the
emergence of determined, defiant organizations such as Adolat (Justice) in the
Fergana Valley. Akbarzadeh provides a
historical narrative of President Karimov’s response to the de facto
sovereignty of Adolat in Fergana and to the militant Islamic Movement of
Uzbekistan (IMU) which followed it.
Akbarzadeh effectively illustrates the severity of the contention for
power which existed in the 1990’s between President Karimov and political Islam
in Uzbekistan.
Akbarzadeh
proceeds to map Tashkent’s foreign policy decisions in chapter three. He describes Tashkent’s role in the Tajik
civil war as one which was absolutely opposed to the National Reconciliation
Government, out of fear of the potential mobility of political Islam in
Tajikistan under such a tolerant democratic alliance. A description of Tashkent’s early
indifference of the emergence of Taliban control in Afghanistan is followed by an
insistent appeal to the West for intervention against Taliban forces. Akbarzadeh illustrates Tashkent’s mercurial
relationship with Russia in pursuing a security agenda within the region,
emphasizing Tashkent’s fear of growing Russian influence running parallel to a
frustration of Moscow’s inability to guarantee safety from militant Islam. Akbarzadeh suggests that, while Uzbekistan
sought closer ties with the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) in response
to this frustration with Russia and the Commonwealth of Independent States
(CIS), Uzbekistan appears to be viewing the SCO with the same accusations of
inability.
Akbarzadeh
elaborates on Uzbek-U.S. relations prior to 11 September 2001 in chapter
four. Akbarzadeh identifies an overlap
between Uzbekistan and the U.S. concerning Middle East foreign policy. This overlap refers to the refusal to
recognize statehood of Palestine, the support of punitive economic sanctions
against Iran and Iraq, and membership of the “Coalition of the Willing” in the
2003 invasion of Iraq. The author
suggests that Uzbekistan’s move for association with the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO), and Russia’s subsequent disapproval, provided grounds for
Uzbekistan’s departure from CIS Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO)
membership. Akbarzadeh also touches upon
a shift in U.S. policy toward Uzbekistan away from solely what is referred to
as “dollar diplomacy” toward a more “realist” strategic partnership which
emphasized Uzbekistan’s importance for Central Asian regional security as a
whole. Summarizing this policy,
Akbarzadeh includes the key points of the U.S. Silk Road Strategy Act of 1998,
which stressed intra-regional economic cooperation, economic assistance,
security and military assistance, and pressuring for democratic and free-market
institutions. Akbarzadeh’s claim is that,
at that time, U.S. policy placed less of an emphasis on human rights measures in
Uzbekistan, as the U.S. became more focused on strategic development with the
country. All of this coincided, as
Akbarzadeh suggests, with President Karimov’s self-preserving,
security-oriented preferences.
Akbarzadeh
focuses on the evolution of U.S.-Uzbek relations following the 11 September 2001
attacks in chapter five. The author
emphasizes that President Karimov’s deepening ties with the U.S. prompted
Tashkent to mindfully articulate foreign policy objectives to three audiences:
the domestic, the U.S., and the Russian.
While Uzbekistan enjoyed closer diplomatic ties with the United States,
the U.S. government still expressed a concern for human rights abuses in the
country. These concerns, however, are
claimed to be marginal. Abkarzadeh also
thoroughly illustrates Russia’s frustration and concern of Tashkent’s bilateral
partnership with the United States, as well as the Russian anxiety of a U.S.
military presence in the region.
Abkarzadeh adds that Washington has been cautious in this approach,
insisting that it does not seek to replace Russia, and that both Russia and the
U.S. enjoy mutual benefit in fighting militant Islam in the region. Abkarzadeh concludes the chapter by
suggesting that President Karimov has enjoyed both regional strengths and
domestic self-preserving power advantages in its diplomatic partnerships with
the U.S.
Akbarzadeh
dedicates chapter six to assess the conditions of human rights and democracy
within Uzbekistan vis-à-vis its relationship with the U.S. The author suggests that while Tashkent makes
and agrees to promises of political reform and human rights guarantees, these
promises do not seem to produce much in the way of results. Akbarzadeh asserts that there is simply an
illusion of a multiparty democratic system, which isolates and excludes Islamic
political organizations, claiming that they are tied with Wahhabism and Islamic
extremism. The author notes that
President Karimov is able to pursue this repression without limit, under the
guise of the “war on terror”. Akbarzadeh
illustrates the inhibited agency of Human Rights Non-governmental
Organization(NGO)s, which is limited to advocating any issue or problem which
does not openly accuse the regime. Those
who do not comply with these conditions, according to Akbarzadeh, are
threatened, jailed, or tortured.
Akbarzadeh suggests that Tashkent is able to carry out these policies
without reprisal from the U.S., as the U.S. ultimately views Uzbekistan as a
vital strategic partner in the “war on terror” and security within the region.
In the
final chapter, Akbarzadeh defines the Uzbek authoritarianism as “adaptive and
self-generating” in its approaches following the disintegration of the Soviet
Union. President Karimov insists on a “slow
transition” of gradualism in state policies.
Akbarzadeh suggests that the indigenized leadership of aqsaqals (white beards, the community
authorities) and mahallas (Uzbek
communities) are not likely to possess a capacity to challenge authoritarianism,
as their leadership has been carefully co-opted and controlled by the executive
state apparatus. Akbarzadeh claims that
Tashkent is more likely to adopt minor economic policies of liberalization
before it will adopt any sort of meaningful political reform. Akbarzadeh concludes with the claim that an
imminent crisis of legitimacy looms on the horizon as Tashkent pursues
repression under the tacit approval of the United States.