Three conclusions can be drawn from the available information
concerning Uzbekistan’s approach to border security: (i) Uzbekistan receives
substantial financial, material and logistical support for its national
security programs from a diverse party of benefactors, (ii) Uzbekistan
selectively seeks to bolster its national security apparatus through multiple multilateral
and bilateral partnerships, and (iii) Uzbekistan, despite some measured success
in combating transnational terrorist and narcotics trafficking activity, still
struggles to effectively prevent and prosecute trafficking in human
beings. Recognizing these trends, where
in this equation is the United States currently factoring, and what should be
considered as we move into the future?
As has been
noted, Uzbekistan receives a considerable amount of support from a multitude of
state and international organizations for its national security apparatus. The UNODC has contributed a substantial
amount of resources and organizational effort, especially with the
establishment of the Central Asian Regional Information and Coordination Center
(CARICC). Even Uzbekistan’s northern
neighbor of Kazakhstan contributed over $8 million [1] to the establishment of
CARICC’s infrastructure and operations, while Uzbekistan is not recorded to
have donated anything. In addition to the UNODC's efforts in Central Asia, the OSCE has contributed to Uzbekistan's new biometric passport system and human trafficking prevention training.
Although
there was much speculation on Uzbekistan’s suspension of activities with the
Russian-backed Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), Uzbekistan is
pursuing bilateral arrangements with Russia which include arms sales through
2020 [2]. While it should be noted that
Mr. Karimov signed the deal in a pledge to Russian Foreign Minister Sergei
Lavrov that there would be no future US bases allowed on Uzbek territory, there
is no guarantee that Uzbekistan will apply these parameters to its national
security policy. Even if Karimov’s
administration does maintain the agreement to not allow any US bases in
Uzbekistan, it could still appeal to the United States and other benefactors
for other forms of support.
Indeed, that
seems to be the latest trend. In 2013,
Karimov appealed to Washington for military armaments, insisting he preferred
them over the date Soviet stockpiles [3].
It’s fair to say that Mr. Karimov will pursue similar requests. In fact, he is already requesting used
equipment from the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) as the
International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) prepares for its 2014 withdrawal
from Afghanistan [4].
Uzbekistan
is also seeking stronger partnerships and benefits from its relationship with
the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and its Regional Anti-Terrorist
Structure (RATS). Uzbekistan is still
committed to fighting the “3 evils” of terrorism, separatism, and extremism,
and is pursuing further military and logistical collaborations with the SCO
RATS [5]. SCO members also recognize a
mutual intra-organizational treaty on extradition, which expedites the transfer
of suspected criminals between member states.
It’s safe to say that Uzbekistan is collaborating extensively with the
SCO RATS, and plans to continue to increase this level of collaboration.
Despite all
of this overlap in military and law-enforcement donations from numerous
international partners, Uzbekistan’s performance in prosecuting and preventing
human trafficking is still suspect and at low levels [6]. Recognizing the duplicity in law-enforcement
and military support and the opacity in Uzbekistan’s reports on human
trafficking, the United States should consider reducing its military and
technical contributions to Mr. Karimov’s regime. The OSCE, which aims to
increase civil democratic reforms throughout Europe and now Eurasia, should
work with the United States to change the Western focus of foreign policy in
Central Asia from technical projects and military assistance towards the
direction of funding and protecting groups dedicated to improving civil democratic
society. This, in turn, would cause a
push for transparency in reporting the results of law enforcement operations,
thus providing an uncensored assessment of the performance of Uzbekistan’s
national security apparatus.
11.
Central Asian Regional Information and
Coordination Center
33.
Regnum
Informatsionnoye Agentstvo, Mar. 04, 2013.
44.
RP Defense,
Mar. 24, 2013.
55.
Samarkhan Kurmat, Kazinform, Feb. 04, 2011.
66.
US Trafficking in Persons Report 2013
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