The Minorities at Risk (MAR) program at the University of Maryland's Center for International Development and Conflict Management tracks 283 non-state communal groups with "political significance" in the world and the state(s) they are located in. Included among these 283 are the Crimean Tatars. Their data sets are gleaned from secondary sources, statistics, the census, and news reports, cited on the webpage. The assessment of the Crimean Tatars (which I urge you to open and read along with this blog post) was completed in 2006, yet it provides a good starting point for examining the conflict potential on the peninsula.
Risk
The initial risk assessment establishes that there is a very high conflict potential regarding the Crimean Tatars, particularly between the Crimean Tatars and the Crimean Russians. The report states that the Tatars exhibit "four of the five factors that encourage rebellion: persistent protest; territorial concentration; high levels of group organization and cohesion; and recent regime instability during the Orange Revolution of November 2004 - January 2005." The one missing factor is current rebellion.
The MAR data also suggests that any conflict will like be over socioeconomic issues, such as land, housing, and jobs, and political representation and control in the ARC. The importance of Kyiv's political influence is stressed more than once. Because of the growing number of Crimean Tatars through continues resettlement and a growing birthrate--while the number of Crimean Russians is declining, as much of that population is made up of retirees--the potential for conflict also grows.
Reading the Assessment
Assessments in the MAR are coded; because a reading of these codes is meaningless without references or a knowledge of the codes, I will go through the
assessment of the Crimean Tatars and explain what the codes and their values mean using the MAR codebook. As a general rule, higher values represent higher risk to the minority groups (although some values are merely markers and do not necessarily correlate to risk factors).
Because the Crimean Tatars are concentrated in Crimea and not spread across Ukraine, the
group spatial distribution (GROUPCON) is 3, concentrated in one region (highest value). As the report states, the "Crimean Tatars differ from the majority Ukrainians racially, religiously, and linguistically," although two of these coded values conceal some very contested issues. RACE = 1 means that the group in question is a
physically distinguishable subtype of same racial stock of the majority; because the MAR follows the concept of continental or geographic race, there are only 5 "racial stocks:" Asiatic, African, Europoid, Indio, and Oceanic. These groups are too large of supertypes and can potentially hide any racial tension. The Europoid supertype, for example, includes "European peoples, indigenous peoples of North Africa (Berbers, Egyptians), Middle Eastern peoples (Arabs, Persians), some Central and South Asian peoples (Pashtuns, Baluchis)." Therefore, even though the Crimean Tatars are only given a value of 1 for RACE, that is by no means an empty value. For LANG, or
different language group, the Crimean Tatars are given a 1 as well, signifying that the
group speaks multiple languages, at least one different from plurality group. Here also, one must not write off a value of 1, because language rights are one of the most heated issues between the Tatars and the Crimean government. The BELIEF value of 2 (highest value) indicated that the minority group has a
different religion than the plurality group.
AUTLOST, or the
index of lost political autonomy, is a formula comprised of three separate values and equated thusly: AUTLOST = (MAGN+PRSTAT-1)/YEARWT, where MAGN stands for
magnitude of change on a 0-3 scale; PRSTAT is
group status prior to change, a scale of 0-4, from no history of autonomy to full statehood; and YEARWT, a scale of 0-5 based on how long ago autonomy was lost. From the narrative of the assessment and to the best of my abilities, I have arranged the following values to complete the formula above: 1 = (3 + 3 -1) / 5 (MAGN = 3:
loss of long-term autonomy, owing to the long-standing history of Crimea as its own space; PRSTAT = 3: traditional centralized authority and autonomous people under colonial rule, because although there was a short-lived independent Tatar state in the 15th century, Crimea has been since the Ottoman takeover of the peninsula an autonomous region under colonial rule; YEARWT = 5:
>100 years ago, owing to Crimea's 600+ years as an autonomous region). To be sure, this is only one configuration, as there are many other solutions to that formula.
The various PROT,
protest, values are separated by years, hence the 60X, 65X, 70X, and 99-00, etc. The values range from none, 0, to large demonstrations, 5. Since all values in between are represented, I will reproduce the full entry on PROT:
Protest
0 None reported
1 Verbal opposition
Requests by a minority-controlled regional group for independence (public letters,
petitions, posters, publications, agitation, court action, etc.).
2 Symbolic resistance
Sabotage, symbolic destruction of property OR political organizing activity on a
substantial scale (e.g. sit-ins, blockage of traffic).
3 Small demonstrations
A few demonstrations, rallies, strikes, and/or riots, the largest of which has total
participation of less than 10,000
4 Medium demonstrations
Demonstrations, rallies, strikes, and/or riots, the largest of which has total participation
between 10,000 and 100,000
5 Large demonstrations
Demonstrations, rallies, strikes, and/or riots, the largest of which has total participation
over 100,000
-99 No basis for judgment
ECDIS and POLDIS stand for
economic and
political discrimination respectively. The ECDIS value of 1 means that "significant poverty and under-representation in desirable occupations due to historical marginality, neglect, or restrictions. Public policies are designed to improve the group's material well being." While there have been remedial policies passed for the benefit of the Crimean Tatars, their effectiveness is another matter altogether, but effectiveness is not a part of this particular value. POLDIS = 1 carries a similar definition to the previous one, recognizing that there is substantial under-representation in political office and participation, but there are remedial public policies in place. Again, I have the same reservations about the effectiveness of these policies that I do concerning the economic ones.
GOJPA measures the
group organization for joint political action. The value of 1 signifies that "group interests promoted by one or more conventional political parties or movements." This is evidenced by the effectiveness of the Kurultay and Mejlis of the Crimean Tatars in representing the community as a whole. The value is not higher because of the lack of militant Tatar groups.
The final three codes--POLGR, ECGR, and CULGR--deal with the
highest levels of political, economic, and cultural grievances of the minority group. The definitions of the values are: POLGR = 3, the political grievances focused on creating or strengthening autonomous status; ECGR = 2, the economic grievances focused on creating or strengthening remedial policies (highest value); and CULGR = 1, the cultural grievances focused on ending discrimination. These values represent the Crimean Tatar's desires for Crimean Autonomy. It is interesting to note, however, that the focus of these grievances is increasingly being moved toward Kyiv rather than Simferopol in reaction to the local government's ineffective policies.
Conclusion
The report concludes with the following statement: "in the long run, the situation of the Crimean Tatars in Ukraine will depend to a large degree on the economic situation in the country, so that economic funds can be freed up to better their living conditions without taking resources away from Russians and Ukrainians, and on the political leadership in Kiev and Simferopol." I fully agree with this sentiment. Kyiv and Simferopol must work together in addressing first the economic concerns of the Crimean Tatars, especially considering that in 2004,
35,995 Crimean Tatar families were living in unfinished or temporary housing. That will significantly diminish the conflict potential of the ARC and will allow for more discussion on the political and cultural grievances the Crimean Tatars hold.
