"No words, no language"

Brawl in Ukrainian Parliament (courtesy of The New York Times)

Ukrainian political discussions are currently dominated by the proposed constitutional reforms to raise Russian to a second official language in the regions. According to the Eurasia Daily Monitor Russian speakers make up approximately 10% of the population in each of Ukraine's regions. To call the zakonoproekt divisive is an understatement; albeit the reform is one that political officials believe would improve the lives of millions of citizens in Ukraine's eastern provinces. Ukrainian nationalists believe that the law would remove any incentive for Eastern Ukrainians to learn the state language, and create a voter-base of nearly 37% of the population that does not speak Ukrainian. Put simply, Ukrainian nationalists fear another round of Russification policies that would threaten the existence of the Ukrainian language, a language which fortunately survived its colonial, genocidal, and totalitarian experiences of the 20th century.

President Yanukovych hopes to use the law to improve bilateral trade relations with Russia, which have soured since Moscow joined in the condemnation of ex-Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko's imprisonment. The memories of the Orange Revolution and then-president Viktor Yushchenko's plans to strengthen the country and its sense of "Ukrainianness" remain today, but little has changed since the collapse of the Soviet Union. Regional identities have perhaps become stronger than ever in the wake of Soviet language policy and the failure of the Orange Revolution to introduce wide-sweeping changes in Ukraine, yet regionalism is doing little to strengthen Ukraine's position in the region or in its geo-political contacts with Europe and other Western states. The language debate taking place in the Ukrainian government creates an arena for highlighting contending issues of regional and national identity in present-day Ukraine. A number of regional protests (photos below) shed light on ordinary citizens' perspectives on identity and its importance in the future of the country.

"No words, no language" (courtesy of tyzhden.ua)

In a recent lecture given by historian Ivan Fedyk, of L'viv National University, the question was raised how post-Soviet Ukraine continues to exist despite regional cleavages concerning identity. Prof. Fedyk contends that the otherwise divided country of Ukraine and nation of Ukrainians is unified by the shared idea of Ukrainian statehood. Is the population actually willing to sacrifice its identity to preserve the state? It's doubtful, but the law could come up for referendum in the near future.

"I'm Russian and I don't ask for protection" (courtesy of tyzhden.ua)

Debates in government and among citizens suggest that neither side is considering backing down. Images from protests, as shown above, also suggest that Russian-speaking or native Russians living in Ukraine do not unanimously support the decisions of Yanukovych's government (it is this observer's intent to find more concrete figures and reporting about the breakdown of Russophone Ukrainian's opinions on the current debate in weeks to come).

The immediate future holds more of the same for Ukraine, perpetually suspended between East and West, as the European Union demands democratic reforms and the release of political prisoners while Russia continues to draw Ukraine closer to membership in its Customs Union. The revitalization of Ukraine's protest culture over language reforms could spread into other spheres as election season draws nearer. Some observers argue that another revolution on par with the 2004 Orange Revolution is necessary to transform the current system of governance in Ukraine, which is dominated by small families or clans. Ukrainians continue to be hugely invested in the dominant discussions in the country so there is no lack of political participation in the country.

Articles referred to in this post:

Zenon Zawada, "A political threat to Ukraine’s language," http://www.kyivpost.com/opinion/op-ed/a-political-threat-to-ukraines-language.html#.T-cyA2thiK0

"James Sherr: Ukraine's Relationship with the EU is Destructive", http://www.kyivpost.com/content/ukraine/james-sherr-ukraines-relationship-with-the-eu-is-d.html#.T-cDyVxhiSN

"Party of Regions Plays Russian Language Trump Card Again," Eurasia Daily Monitor, Vol. 9, Issue 105

"Ukraine's Opposition Program Requires Another Revolution," Eurasia Daily Monitor, Vol. 9, Issue 101, http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews%255Btt_news%255D=39430.

Tatiana Zhurzhenko. Borderlands into Bordered Lands: Geopolitics of Identity in Post-Soviet Ukraine. Stuttgart: Ibidem-Verlag, 2010 [full review forthcoming]

«Всє на защіту русского язика!»: чому вітчизняні політики ігнорують національні почуття українців? ("All in defense of the Russian Language!": Why do domestic politicians ignore national feelings of Ukrainians?), http://tyzhden.ua/Politics/52929

"Мовний законопроект – поклони Кремлю за підтримку на виборах," (Language Law: Bowing to the Kremlin for Support in the Elections), http://www.radiosvoboda.org/content/article/24618065.html

 

"Creating History Together"

The European Football Championship is underway in Ukraine and Poland, and already a number of issues regarding nationalism and identity have manifested themselves. Two first-hand experiences from L'viv shed some light on Ukrainian national perspectives. The first occurred during the Russia v. Czech Republic match, which I watched in the "Fan Zone" in the center of L'viv.

Throughout the match Ukraine supporters chanted in favor of the Czech team, frequently booed Russia's players as they appeared on the big screen, and led Ukrainian football chants in favor of Czech Republic. It is worth noting that these actions did not lead to any violence between Ukrainian and Russian football fans in the crowd.

The second experience came after Ukraine defeated Greece in its first match of the Euro Cup. As fans left the viewing area in L'viv they chanted "Ukraine is Europe!" When discussing these displays of Ukrainian nationalism the next morning one professor provided a similar anecdote: When the Soviet Union faced off against Canada in the Summit Series in the early 1970s spectators in Ukraine were rooting in favor of the Canadian national team (!).



In co-hosting the Euro Cup Ukraine hoped to strengthen its relations with neighboring European Union (EU) countries and improve its image. In the months and years leading up to the 2012 tournament observers took aim at Ukraine for being a semi-authoritarian government controlled by a corrupt cadre of politicians under the aegis of President Viktor Yanukovych. The strengthening of Ukraine's security forces since Yanukovych's election also contributes to the growing concern within the EU, the United States, and NGOs observing human rights violations around the globe.

The taming of the democratic opposition in Ukraine, the imprisonment of former Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko and former Minister of Internal Affairs Yuri Lutsenko, ongoing charges of corruption in Ukraine's political life, and allegations of the country's unpreparedness to co-host such a large event marred what is otherwise a beneficial opportunity for Ukraine to solve these and other post-Soviet social, political, and economic issues. Condemnations from EU leaders about Yanukovych's handling of Tymoshenko's trial and imprisonment, which is regarded by most Western observers as strictly if not blatantly political, have done little to change things, so much so that it is safe to say that the regime has used the time to construct a stronger base of power in the regions.



Reports have also come out regarding racist remarks lobbed at players during matches but, at least in L'viv, relations between locals, football fans and players are cordial and welcoming. Emotions run high and tempers flare during matches, but their excited release in cheering and chanting is far better than war.



Articles referred to in this post:



"Goal! Dictators Score in International Sports," http://www.freedomhouse.org/blog/goal-dictators-score-international-sports



"Ukraine today: a guide for digging deeper," http://www.opendemocracy.net/od-russia-debates/euro-2012



"Євро-2012 і права людини поза футбольною грою" (Euro-2012 and Human Rights Outside the Football Game), http://www.radiosvoboda.org/content/article/24608570.html



"Про владу в Україні і українську владу" (On Power in Ukraine and Ukrainian Power), http://www.pravda.com.ua/articles/2012/06/12/6965706/

 

Arrest of Yulia Tymoshenko Draws Moscow’s Interest; Opposition Actors Continue to Face State Scrutiny in Former Soviet Union

This week Ukraine’s most visible opposition actor and ex-prime minister Yulia Tymoshenko was removed from a Kyiv courtroom after her arrest was ordered by Judge Rodion Kireyev for “repeatedly disrupting courtroom proceedings” during her trial on abuse of power during her tenure as prime minister. Facing as much as 10 years in prison on charges of striking a politically profitable but financially crippling deal with Russian energy company Gazprom in 2009, Tymoshenko’s trial has drawn considerable attention from outside observers, largely condemnations from the British and United States governments. Many observers have called Tymoshenko’s trial and arrest a political move by her 2010 opponent and current president Viktor Yanukovych in an attempt to combat oppositional civil and political actors and consolidate his power base by squeezing Tymoshenko out of politics. The most unlikely reaction to Tymoshenko’s arrest came from the Kremlin. Despite his Party of Regions affiliation, Yanukovych has fallen out of favor with the Medvedev-Putin tandem, and his recent actions taken to curb dissent in the Ukrainian press and public sphere have only worsened the situation. News agency REGNUM reported that “the best people are afraid of the Party of Regions – Akhemtov, Firtash, others whose business is substantially linked to the price of gas.” Gas wars between Russia and Ukraine seem inevitable and, as REGNUM continues, the relationship between the Party of Regions and Russia is not as easy as it had been before. REGNUM reported that a source in Medvedev’s administration stated “the arrest will cause an international resonance and is unlikely to have positive implications for Yanukovych.” The myth of “fast friends” has been dispelled by recent developments in Ukraine, and Russia seems to be distancing itself from its man in Kyiv.

Supporters of Tymoshenko’s opposition party bloc, All-Ukrainian “Fatherland” (Vseukrayinsk’e Obyednannya Bat’kivshchyna), have also come under the scrutiny of the Ukrainian authorities. Activists immediately set up tent cities in Kyiv after Tymoshenko’s arrest was announced. In the following days, Ukrainian police forces announced they would dismantle the camps, therefore bringing another round of crackdowns on civil unrest and protest (supported by a court order by the District Administrative Court of Kyiv). Fortunately for the protestors, their fears of a night assault by Ukrainian security forces never materialized. The results have not been in Yanukovych’s favor thus far as protests have spread beyond Kyiv. Political scientist Aleksandr Medvedev believes that if the protests continue and the government continues to take a heavy-handed approach to silencing the protestors, August 24 will see ten times more supporters on Independence Square than the Independence Day festivities on August 23. Political analyst Dmitri Tulchinsky believes, however, that while the rallies may continue the number of opposition supporters will reach its peak within the next week or two.

Articles referred to in this post:

«Крещатик зачистят: от сторонников Юлии Тимошенко» (“Cleaning the Kreshchatyk [capital]: from supporters of Yulia Tymoshenko”) http://www.kommersant.ru/doc/1693939?isSearch=True

«Спасет ли Путин Тимошенко?» (“Will Putin Save Tymoshenko?”) http://news.rambler.ru/10706797/?utm_source=regnum&utm_medium=tiser&utm_campaign=main

«Сторонниками Тимошенко позволили переночевать в палатках» (“Tymoshenko Supporters allowed to spend night in tents”) http://lenta.ru/news/2011/08/09/camp/

«Тимошенко: Я не ожидала такой реакции России на мой арест» (“Tymoshenko: I never expected Russia’s reaction to my arrest”) http://www.regnum.ru/news/polit/1433155.html

“Britain, U.S. Concerned over Ex-Ukraine Prime Minster Arrest” http://www.rferl.org/content/britain_us_concern_arrest_ex_prime_minister_tymoshenko_ukraine/24289203.html

“Former Ukrainian Prime Minister Tymoshenko Arrested” http://www.rferl.org/content/ukraine_tymoshenko_detention_arrest_court_trial_kyiv/24288010.html

“Tymoshenko Protests Continue In Ukraine, as Interested Moscow Looks On” http://www.rferl.org/content/tymoshenko_trial_continues_in_ukraine_as_moscow_looks_on/24290585.html

“U.S. Calls for Ukraine Review of Tymoshenko Arrest” http://www.rferl.org/content/united_states_yulia_tymoshenko_ukraine/24291000.html

This Week in the News

In a new poll by the Razumkov Center (a Kyiv-based think tank which occasionally carries out various sociological polls), more Crimean residents identify Ukraine as their homeland. Over the past three years, this percentage has increased almost 40%, from 32% in 2008 to 71.3% in this most recent poll. While this is a significant rise, the national average (that is, in the other regions of Ukraine) is 93%. This could signify a decrease in Russian separatist feelings and I believe that Kyiv should take this as a sign that Crimeans in general might be willing to support measures from the central Ukrainian government of direct benefit to Crimea--although this reinforces a relationship with Kyiv at the center and Crimea at the periphery (meaning a forfeiture of some autonomy). In that same three year span, the poll shows that the amount of people who believe that "there was an acute possibility of conflict" has more than halved, from 24.4% to 10.2%.

Razumkov released the poll data on the same day that Prime Minister Azarov spoke to the effect that the Ukrainian government will continue to allot funds for national minorities, especially mentioning the Crimean Tatars. He added that each year, he intends to allocate additional money each year to this fund. Azarov also mentioned that because of this fund and the support of the state, "there is not a single Tatar without a roof over their head." Though roofs there may be, Azarov knows that there are tens of thousands of Tatar families living in temporary or crude housing on contested ("seized" in Crimean head Dzharty's language) land. Even if his claim that there is no Tatar homelessness were true (and I am in no position to refute it), I would not think that Azarov would want to take responsibility for the actual living conditions of many of these worse-off Crimean Tatar families. Nevertheless, perhaps with more of a mandate--evidenced from the above poll--and therefore a tighter control of where these funds actually end up, we may begin to see real improvements in the quality of life for many of the Crimean Tatars.

Articles referenced in this post:

Poll: Most Crimean residents consider Ukraine their motherland

http://www.kyivpost.com/news/nation/detail/102113/

Azarov promises to increase financing to improve life of Crimean Tatars

http://www.kyivpost.com/news/nation/detail/102161/

This Week in the News

On April 7, President Viktor Yanukovich signed a bill which alters the Ukrainian constitution in regards to the central government's relationship to the ARC, including land reform and allotments. This, the President said, is in agreement with his personal politics--i.e., regionalism--and the constitution of the ARC; the Kyiv Post mentions that this was against the advice of "some experts." I looked for more references to this act and unfortunately I could find none. As such, I cannot comment on the types of reforms that this new bill will introduce. This does, however, come after a speech by the President wherein he has announced his plans to return to a mixed electoral parliamentary system in order to modernize the system and to cut down on election fraud.

Analyst and blogger Paul Goble has issued a review-cum-response of an article by Anna Steshenko in RosBalt.ru, the original on the "hidden Islamization of Ukraine" appearing on 31 March. Steshenko attests in a hostile and frankly islamophobic manner that in the past twenty years, over a million Slavs in Ukraine have converted to Islam, and that Kyiv's policies toward Islam foster radical Islamic movements. She also criticized Ukraine for not supporting Russian efforts in Chechnya by allowing Chechen refugees asylum, ridicules the idea that Ukraine can be a model of any kind to Russia, and closes her article on a note of condescension and derision. It was clear from her attacking tone that the article was intended to drum up fear and religio-racial strife. Goble picks up on this too, and criticizes her article because of it. He surmises that Steshenko has probably distorted her statistics (attributed to Gennady Udovenko of Narodny Rukh) and additionally exaggerated the numbers further to push her agenda. However, that is Goble's main critique. He leaves her argumentative tone alone and does nothing to rebuff Steshenko's fearmongering. Because Steshenko did not provide any sources besides Udovenko, her allegations especially into Kyiv's policies on Muslims and Islam and the Muslim group "Alraid" ring hollow and specious. This kind of malicious journalism helps no one resolve conflicts or issues--in this case, the treatment of Muslims and Islam--it only serves to polarize the debate, devolving it into a series of ad hominem attacks which betray any attempts at successful negotiation. I applaud Mr. Goble for holding Ms. Steshenko accountable for her trumped-up statements, but I criticize him for not going far enough.

Articles referenced in this post:

Yanukovych backs Crimean autonomy

http://www.kyivpost.com/news/nation/detail/101835/

Ukraine should return to mixed electoral system of parliamentary elections, says president

http://www.interfax.com.ua/eng/main/65607/

Window on Eurasia: Have ‘More than a Million Slavs in Ukraine’ Become Muslims Since 1991?

http://windowoneurasia.blogspot.com/2011/04/window-on-eurasia-have-more-than.html

Скрытая исламизация Украины (The Hidden Islamization of Ukraine)

http://www.rosbalt.ru/ukraina/2011/03/31/834517.html

This Week in the News

On Monday, the court case against Vitaly Khramov, leader of the Don Cossack group "Sobol" continued. Khramov is charged with inciting ethnic and religious hatred after showing an inflammatory video presentation at the funeral of Vitaly Shemyakin, whom Khramov attests was killed by Islamic extremists. "Sobol" is a Russian-nationalist and separatist group, and Khramov has been known for his anti-Ukrainian, -Muslim, and -Jewish views and outbursts.

The article states that the prosecution has hit a snag as Khramov's lawyers attest that the evidence against him was obtained illegally. Present at the trial were members of many Cossack and Russian groups in support of Khramov. This situation presents a difficulty for the central government in Kyiv and the Crimean minorities. The support shown by various groups is alarming enough, but should Khramov win the case, that sends the message that hate speech and inciting ethnic and religious hatred is permissible: it is only a short step from hate speech to hate crimes. Should Khramov lose, however, there is also a possibility that the Cossack and Russian groups in support of Khramov might rise up in protest and retaliate against Crimean Ukrainians, Tatars, and Jews. While it appears to be a lose-lose situation, I do not know enough about the case and its proceedings--and the Ukrainian legal system in general--to completely rule out a resolution to this case that would deter future violence and hate speech.

Also, former Mufti of Crimea Nuri Efendi Mustafaiev has passed away. He served as mufti from 1995 to 1999 and was influential in creating Azizler, a group whose aim is to examine and preserve Crimean Tatar culture. The Mufti of Ukraine Sheikh Akhmed Tamim has expressed his condolences but I have yet to find an official statement from either the Kurultay or the Mejlis. Given the tension between Tamim and the Crimean Tatars, this too could be the cause of continued tension.

Articles referenced in this post:

В Симферополе продолжается суд над лидером казачьей общины «Соболь» по обвинению в разжигании межнациональной и религиозной вражды (In Simferopol, the case against the leader of the Cossack group "Sobol" continues on charges of inciting ethnic and religious hatred)

http://www.religion.in.ua/news/ukrainian_news/9158-v-simferopole-prodolzhaetsya-sud-nad-liderom-kazachej-obshhiny-sobol-po-obvineniyu-v-razzhiganii-mezhnacionalnoj-i-religioznoj-vrazhdy.html

Mufti of Crimea Nuri Efendi Mustafaiev Passed Away

http://risu.org.ua/en/index/all_news/other_confessions/islam/41550/

This Week in the News

The April 2011 issue of National Geographic contains an article by Cathy Newman on Crimea. In it, she gives a general historical overview of the peninsula and the current issues of identity, perceptions of governance, and land issues of the various groups in the ARC. She interviewed a staunch Russian nationalist whose entire family--or at least the male members of it--has worked in the Black Sea Fleet. For her, like many others, Crimea will always be Russian. Newman also includes statements from Ukrainians and Crimean Tatars, displaying the various perspectives of the other two major ethnic groups in Crimea, before culminating in a quote from Leonid Kravchuk, the first president of Ukraine, on the problem that the ARC presents for Ukraine as a whole. Whereas Potemkin called Crimea the "wart on Russia's nose," Kravchuk considers it a "festering carbuncle."

This article, in a relatively short space, covers all of the major angles of Crimea-as-problem: Crimean Tatar land issues, Russian nationalism, separatist movements, ethnic tension between Crimean Russians and Tatars, etc. In exchanging depth for breadth, Newman provides a succinct and knowledgeable piece on the Crimean issue. That said, nothing is too damning or shocking, and she seems to be above taking sides in the matter. This makes sense, especially considering that as summer approaches, the Crimean tourist season is about to enter full swing and it is in no one's interest to diminish one of Crimea's major sources of revenue.

The Kyiv post reports that this summer, Crimean tourism is expected to rise 5% more than last year, to 6 million vacationers. Crimean Resorts and Tourism Minister Heorhiy Psariov stated that this means that the Crimean government will need to increase infrastructure spending and money for hotel development. To do this, the government is auctioning off several land plots for private investment to spark economic growth, especially in the tourism sector. Selling land plots seems to me to be a dicey move, especially since a sizable chunk of an ethno-religious minority--the Crimean Tatars--has been petitioning for government land to resolve the squatting problems and providing homes for tens of thousands of families. Should the Crimean government auction off hectares and hectares of land without adequately providing for the needs of the Tatars, it is possible that may serve as the tipping point to violent conflict.

Radio Free Europe, in their continuing coverage of the Crimean Tatars, this week posted the video below, again highlighting the very poor conditions that many Tatars face daily.



Articles referenced in this post

Crimean Tatar Repatriates Fight For Land Rights

http://www.rferl.org/video/16798.html

Crimean Tourism Minister: Crimea expects to host 6 million tourists this summer

http://www.kyivpost.com/news/nation/detail/100849/

A Jewel in Two Crowns: Russia’s paradise lost belongs to Ukraine—and that’s where the trouble begins

http://ngm.nationalgeographic.com/2011/04/crimea/newman-text

This Week in the News

While on an official visit to Turkey, Prime Minister Mykola Azarov stated that the Ukrainian government is prepared to begin a dialog with the Crimean Tatars to address their needs. This policy is in continuation of the Yanukovich's efforts of negotiation with the Tatars as Prime Minister and governor of Donets'k, Azarov added. The Prime Minister is committed to resolving the Tatars' complaints exclusively through negotiation. Turkish ambassador to Ukraine Ahmet Bülent Meriç commented that there is no "hidden agenda with respect to Crimea" on the part of Turkey. The Turkish government is likewise committed to help the Crimean Tatar population preserve their cultural identity and language in their homeland. Hopefully this means that the Ukrainian government in Kyiv will take a stronger approach in protecting the Tatars especially in light of the determined efforts of Istanbul.

Meanwhile, various Crimean Tatar groups picketed the headquarters of the Mejlis, expressing dissatisfaction with the Mejlis' failure in satisfying the needs of the Tatars and in not securing land for the Tatar population. Server Kerimov, a member of the Координационный совет общественно-политических сил крымско-татарского народа (Coordinating council of socio-political forces of the Crimean Tatar people) accused the Mejlis and Dzhemilev of corruption and of assuming too much power. After the speeches and picketing, the protesters entered the Mejlis building, but no one was in there. Dzhemilev, in response, was displeased with the protest, stating that the protesters were putting on a show, not actually trying to resolve any issues or problems. He also criticized the protesters for being angry with the Mejlis for not solving the land issue when the Mejlis has no jurisdiction over it.

Релігія в Україні (Religion in Ukraine) reported that these protests are an outgrowth of the confrontation between the Muftiat of Crimea--aligned with the Kurultay and Mejlis of the Crimean Tatars--and the Spiritual Administration of Ukrainian Muslims (DUMU) in Kyiv. At the end of February, the DUMU sent a mufti from Kyiv to Crimea. This sparked an immediate angry response from Crimean Tatar muftis, calling the followers of the DUMU's mufti cultists and directly attacked Ridwan Veliyev (the DUMU mufti sent to Crimea) as a cowardly opportunist and without any authority to even call himself mufti. At the very least, the move by the DUMU in Kyiv to send down their own religious representative displays a lack of knowledge of the Crimean Tatar religious culture and political situation. At the worst, this is an intentional schismatic move. Regardless, this issue is laden with conflict. Although none of the articles I read expressly linked the protesters to the DUMU or Veliyev, the implied relationship between them is problematic. If Azarov intends to keep his promise, getting the Mejlis and the DUMU to have talks should be of high priority.

Articles referenced in this post:

Azarov: Kyiv ready for dialog with Crimean Tatars

http://www.kyivpost.com/news/nation/detail/99752/

Азаров в Турции пообещал продолжать помогать крымским татарам (Azarov in Turkey promises to continue to help the Crimean Tatars)

http://www.religion.in.ua/news/foreign_news/8853-azarov-v-turcii-poobeshhal-prodolzhat-pomogat-krymskim-tataram.html

Оппозиционные Меджлису крымско-татарские организации выразили недовольство его деятельностью (Crimean Tatar opposition groups expressed dissatisfaction with the Mejlis' work)

http://www.religion.in.ua/news/ukrainian_news/8865-oppozicionnye-medzhlisu-krymsko-tatarskie-organizacii-vyrazili-nedovolstvo-ego-deyatelnostyu.html

Между муфтиятом Крыма и Духовным управлением мусульман Украины разгорелось противостояние (Conflict erupts between the Muftiat of Crimea and the Spiritual Administration of Ukrainian Muslims)

http://www.religion.in.ua/news/ukrainian_news/8570-mezhdu-muftiyatom-kryma-i-duxovnym-upravleniem-musulman-ukrainy-razgorelos-protivostoyanie.html

Reading the MAR Assessment of the Crimean Tatars

The Minorities at Risk (MAR) program at the University of Maryland's Center for International Development and Conflict Management tracks 283 non-state communal groups with "political significance" in the world and the state(s) they are located in. Included among these 283 are the Crimean Tatars. Their data sets are gleaned from secondary sources, statistics, the census, and news reports, cited on the webpage. The assessment of the Crimean Tatars (which I urge you to open and read along with this blog post) was completed in 2006, yet it provides a good starting point for examining the conflict potential on the peninsula.


Risk
The initial risk assessment establishes that there is a very high conflict potential regarding the Crimean Tatars, particularly between the Crimean Tatars and the Crimean Russians. The report states that the Tatars exhibit "four of the five factors that encourage rebellion: persistent protest; territorial concentration; high levels of group organization and cohesion; and recent regime instability during the Orange Revolution of November 2004 - January 2005." The one missing factor is current rebellion.


The MAR data also suggests that any conflict will like be over socioeconomic issues, such as land, housing, and jobs, and political representation and control in the ARC. The importance of Kyiv's political influence is stressed more than once. Because of the growing number of Crimean Tatars through continues resettlement and a growing birthrate--while the number of Crimean Russians is declining, as much of that population is made up of retirees--the potential for conflict also grows.

Reading the Assessment
Assessments in the MAR are coded; because a reading of these codes is meaningless without references or a knowledge of the codes, I will go through the assessment of the Crimean Tatars and explain what the codes and their values mean using the MAR codebook. As a general rule, higher values represent higher risk to the minority groups (although some values are merely markers and do not necessarily correlate to risk factors).

Because the Crimean Tatars are concentrated in Crimea and not spread across Ukraine, the group spatial distribution (GROUPCON) is 3, concentrated in one region (highest value). As the report states, the "Crimean Tatars differ from the majority Ukrainians racially, religiously, and linguistically," although two of these coded values conceal some very contested issues. RACE = 1 means that the group in question is a physically distinguishable subtype of same racial stock of the majority; because the MAR follows the concept of continental or geographic race, there are only 5 "racial stocks:" Asiatic, African, Europoid, Indio, and Oceanic. These groups are too large of supertypes and can potentially hide any racial tension. The Europoid supertype, for example, includes "European peoples, indigenous peoples of North Africa (Berbers, Egyptians), Middle Eastern peoples (Arabs, Persians), some Central and South Asian peoples (Pashtuns, Baluchis)." Therefore, even though the Crimean Tatars are only given a value of 1 for RACE, that is by no means an empty value. For LANG, or different language group, the Crimean Tatars are given a 1 as well, signifying that the group speaks multiple languages, at least one different from plurality group. Here also, one must not write off a value of 1, because language rights are one of the most heated issues between the Tatars and the Crimean government. The BELIEF value of 2 (highest value) indicated that the minority group has a different religion than the plurality group.

AUTLOST, or the index of lost political autonomy, is a formula comprised of three separate values and equated thusly: AUTLOST = (MAGN+PRSTAT-1)/YEARWT, where MAGN stands for magnitude of change on a 0-3 scale; PRSTAT is group status prior to change, a scale of 0-4, from no history of autonomy to full statehood; and YEARWT, a scale of 0-5 based on how long ago autonomy was lost. From the narrative of the assessment and to the best of my abilities, I have arranged the following values to complete the formula above: 1 = (3 + 3 -1) / 5 (MAGN = 3: loss of long-term autonomy, owing to the long-standing history of Crimea as its own space; PRSTAT = 3: traditional centralized authority and autonomous people under colonial rule, because although there was a short-lived independent Tatar state in the 15th century, Crimea has been since the Ottoman takeover of the peninsula an autonomous region under colonial rule; YEARWT = 5: >100 years ago, owing to Crimea's 600+ years as an autonomous region). To be sure, this is only one configuration, as there are many other solutions to that formula.

The various PROT, protest, values are separated by years, hence the 60X, 65X, 70X, and 99-00, etc. The values range from none, 0, to large demonstrations, 5. Since all values in between are represented, I will reproduce the full entry on PROT:

Protest
0 None reported
1 Verbal opposition
Requests by a minority-controlled regional group for independence (public letters,
petitions, posters, publications, agitation, court action, etc.).
2 Symbolic resistance
Sabotage, symbolic destruction of property OR political organizing activity on a
substantial scale (e.g. sit-ins, blockage of traffic).
3 Small demonstrations
A few demonstrations, rallies, strikes, and/or riots, the largest of which has total
participation of less than 10,000
4 Medium demonstrations
Demonstrations, rallies, strikes, and/or riots, the largest of which has total participation
between 10,000 and 100,000
5 Large demonstrations
Demonstrations, rallies, strikes, and/or riots, the largest of which has total participation
over 100,000
-99 No basis for judgment

ECDIS and POLDIS stand for economic and political discrimination respectively. The ECDIS value of 1 means that "significant poverty and under-representation in desirable occupations due to historical marginality, neglect, or restrictions. Public policies are designed to improve the group's material well being." While there have been remedial policies passed for the benefit of the Crimean Tatars, their effectiveness is another matter altogether, but effectiveness is not a part of this particular value. POLDIS = 1 carries a similar definition to the previous one, recognizing that there is substantial under-representation in political office and participation, but there are remedial public policies in place. Again, I have the same reservations about the effectiveness of these policies that I do concerning the economic ones.

GOJPA measures the group organization for joint political action. The value of 1 signifies that "group interests promoted by one or more conventional political parties or movements." This is evidenced by the effectiveness of the Kurultay and Mejlis of the Crimean Tatars in representing the community as a whole. The value is not higher because of the lack of militant Tatar groups.

The final three codes--POLGR, ECGR, and CULGR--deal with the highest levels of political, economic, and cultural grievances of the minority group. The definitions of the values are: POLGR = 3, the political grievances focused on creating or strengthening autonomous status; ECGR = 2, the economic grievances focused on creating or strengthening remedial policies (highest value); and CULGR = 1, the cultural grievances focused on ending discrimination. These values represent the Crimean Tatar's desires for Crimean Autonomy. It is interesting to note, however, that the focus of these grievances is increasingly being moved toward Kyiv rather than Simferopol in reaction to the local government's ineffective policies.

Conclusion
The report concludes with the following statement: "in the long run, the situation of the Crimean Tatars in Ukraine will depend to a large degree on the economic situation in the country, so that economic funds can be freed up to better their living conditions without taking resources away from Russians and Ukrainians, and on the political leadership in Kiev and Simferopol." I fully agree with this sentiment. Kyiv and Simferopol must work together in addressing first the economic concerns of the Crimean Tatars, especially considering that in 2004, 35,995 Crimean Tatar families were living in unfinished or temporary housing. That will significantly diminish the conflict potential of the ARC and will allow for more discussion on the political and cultural grievances the Crimean Tatars hold.

This Week in the News

In two interviews this last week, Mejlis head Mustafa Djemilev repeated his disappointment and lack of confidence in the Crimean, Ukrainian, and Russian governments. As reported on RusNavy.com, Dzemilev said--on День защитника Отечества, or Defender of the Fatherland Day, the day of the first drafts into the Red Army--that Russia's Black Sea Fleet, stationed in Sevastopol', is weak and poses no military threat, stating that it is several times weaker than the Turskish fleet. It does however, Dzhemilev said, constitute a political threat. He noted the separatist feelings from various polls, that a majority of the Russian-speaking Crimeans see their future with Russia, and the 23,000-person strong Russian Navy only fosters such feelings. The majority presence of ethnic Russians in the peninsula is also the major cause of conflict in Crimea, both with the Tatar population and the Ukrainian government. Dzhemilev contends in an interview with Kyiv Post that in the course of the last year--Victor Yanukovich's first as president--the situation has only worsened. This is not just because of the personal and personnel issues the Tatars have with the Yanukovich administration, but because of the perceived "fifth column" the Russian population presents. He draws connections with the armed conflict in Georgia over Abkhazia and South Ossetia and the situation in Crimea, commenting on the number of Ukrainian-Russian dual citizens (illegal in Ukraine) and the fact that should Russia move to overtake Crimea militarily, Russia already has a significant armed force in the form of the Black Sea Fleet.

Dzhemilev also stated that he is skeptical of the recent land allocation for the central mosque in Simferopol', is still unsatisfied with the lack of participation of Tatars in local government bodies, and that he is interested in stepping down as head of the Mejlis. I found this third point to be the most interesting, as Dzhemilev has been the vanguard for Crimean Tatar rights since the 60s. He has headed the Mejlis since its inception in 1991 and states that it has become "undemocratic" because the Tatars have been conditioned to look to him for leadership. Jokingly, he even threatened to have himself taken out like Mubarak in Egypt. All humor aside, the issue of succession in the Mejlis is a very important one.

In other news, the Young Leader's Club has announced a new youth program in Crimea entitled "Многонациональный Актив Крыма (Multinational Asset of Crimea)." It is a three-month program, March-April of this year, wherein the young participants will be introduced to the multiethnic history and culture of Crimea and will learn the "origins of nationalism and chauvinism." The information provided was scant, but as more news comes out on this program, I will be following it.


Articles referenced in this post:

Crimean Tatars: Russian fleet poses no threat; it is much weaker than Turkish Navy

http://rusnavy.com/news/navy/index.php?ELEMENT_ID=11566

Life 'changed for the worse' under Yanukovych, says Crimean Tatar leader

http://www.kyivpost.com/news/politics/detail/98553/

АНОНС: молодежная программа «Многонациональный Актив Крыма» (март-май) (Annoucement: youth program "Multinational Asset of Crimea" [March-May])

http://www.religion.in.ua/news/ukrainian_news/8576-anons-molodezhnaya-programma-mnogonacionalnyj-aktiv-kryma-mart-maj.html

У Черноморского флота деловые отношения с Севастополем и стабильные с Крымом (The Black Sea Fleet's business relationship with Sevastopol' and Crimea is stable)

http://www.nr2.ru/sevas/321788.html

This Week in the News

Major steps this week have been taken to introduce chaplains into the Ukrainian Army. President Yanukovich issued a statement on the spiritual well-being of soldiers and other military personnel allowing their participation in religious services and rituals, and access to chaplains. This builds on work done by the Council for Pastoral Care (part of the Ministry of Defense) in conjunction with representatives from the major religious groups in Ukraine. President Yanukovich expects a concrete proposal to sign off on by May. This announcement comes on the heels of a statement issued by religious leaders to Prime Minister Azarov to restore the work of Council for Pastoral Care, which only met twice in 2009 and did not meet at all in 2010. Introducing the chaplaincy to the army is a major win for religious organizations as this will at once increase the churches' influence in the government and legitimizes the collective lobbying power of the religious sector. This also works to increase cohesion between the religious groups involved as this was a joint effort, and not a unilateral approach.

In an interview with Радіо Свобода (Radio Liberty) this week, Crimean Chairman Vasil' Dzharty acknowledged that the land problem in Ukraine is in a terrible state, calling it a "Bacchanalia," admitting wide-spread corruption in the buying and selling of land by both governmental and private entities. He also stated that he wishes to work with the Mejlis and the Kurultay of the Crimean Tatars in trying to meet their needs. He also intoned that if they could not come to an understanding on this land issue, that he would have to enforce the laws in his capacity as head of the ARC. When probed by the interviewer, Dzharty stated that he is in full support of teaching Ukrainian in schools and laments the fact that the only Crimean newspaper in Ukrainian is published by a high school. A couple days later a story broke on the state radio station that tri-lingual education--Russian, Tatar, and Ukrainian--was being considered by the Crimean administration. Whether lip service or not, Ukrainian language-learning is a hot topic, with protests in the Donbas, for example, to not close the only Ukrainian-language school in Luhansk. Strengthening the importance of Ukrainian education is a major path to greater unity between the regions.

Ruslan Gereyev, a researcher at Makachkala’s Center for Islamic Research studying radical Islamic movements in the North Caucasus presented a thesis in a lengthy interview that these movements are a form of social protest when other paths are blocked. When people, young people especially, cannot find an outlet for their frustrations within the normal modes of society--i.e. appealing to government officials--Wahabbism is attractive because it provides an alternative value system. Gereyev also said that combating radicalism with economic incentives, laws, and force will not solve the problem: there must be a constructive dialog between the government and the religious sector. He commented on the "ridiculous" situation in Daghestan where, with a population that is 96.5% Muslim, there is no government agency assigned to religious affairs. His solution is that governments must take the initiative in reaching out to religious groups and work in tandem with them to resolve issues. This thesis is terribly applicable to the situation in Crimea where the Tatar Mejlis and Kurultay have been trying with relatively little success over the past 20 years to open a dialog with Crimean officials and have mostly been sidelined.

Articles referenced in this post:
Рада у справах душпастирської опіки при Міноборони продовжує роботу із запровадження в Україні військового капеланства (Council for pastoral care of the Ministry of Defense continues to work on introducing chaplains into the Ukrainian Army)

http://www.irs.in.ua/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=815%3A1&catid=34%3Aua&Itemid=61&lang=uk

Президент Янукович доручив створити умови для реалізації військовослужбовцями права на свободу віросповідання (President Yanukovich orders the creation of conditions for the implementing freedom of religion for soldiers)

http://www.irs.in.ua/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=816%3A1&catid=34%3Aua&Itemid=61&lang=uk

Конфесії закликають Уряд відновити роботу Комісії по забезпеченню реалізації прав релігійних організацій (Denominations urge the government to restore the Commission to ensure the rights of religious organizations)

http://www.irs.in.ua/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=817%3A1&catid=34%3Aua&Itemid=61&lang=uk

Василь Джарти: земельна проблема в Криму – це вакханалія (Vasil' Dzharty: the land problem in Crimea is a "Bacchanalia")

http://www.radiosvoboda.org/content/article/2313992.html

Сoncept of trilingual education in schools developed in Crimea

http://www.nrcu.gov.ua/index.php?id=148&listid=140280

Makachkala’s Center for Islamic Research: Radical Islam ‘a form of social protest’ when other channels are blocked

http://www.kyivpost.com/news/opinion/op_ed/detail/97761/

This Week in the News

Perhaps the local celebration (with the help of Turkish television) of Mawlid an-Habi, the celebration of the Prophet Mohammad's birth, was especially auspicious this year on the peninsula: a major breakthrough in Tatar-Crimean negotiations occurred this week as the Crimean government has agreed to a plan that will grant land to the thousands of squatters, many of which are Crimean Tatars, although the administration was quick to point out that among this population are members of other displaced groups. In the news stories that I came across no details were given as to exactly how many hectares these squatters will be granted, so perhaps those details will be hashed out in the days to come. This story has garnered quite a bit of attention, I might add, as it was picked up by national and international news sources, both in online print and radio.

This week it was also announced that the Simferopol government will allocate land for a new, central mosque located at 22 Yaltynska Street. I followed up on the exact location, wanting to see how "central" this location actually was; the address is almost 11km from the center of the city (click here for the map). Regardless, this is also a major concession towards the Crimean Tatar population. These two events in conjunction might lead down a couple of different paths: perhaps there is a shifting sentiment towards the plight of the Tatars as more international eyes turn towards the situation, or perhaps the administration has legitimate fears of a major protest and are acting out of self-preservation.

In other news, a new poll has revealed that over the past decade the number of people who self-identify as religious has risen 13%, and following heated debate over the control of St Sophia's cathedral in Kyiv, there is now discussion as to the possible inclusion of the Khan's palace in Bakhchirasay as a UNESCO World Heritage Site.

Articles mentioned in this post:

Віруючих українців за десятиріччя побільшало на 13% – опитування (Believing Ukrainians over the past decade has risen 13% - survey)

http://www.irs.in.ua/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=804%3A1&catid=34%3Aua&Itemid=61&lang=uk

Українські мусульмани відзначать Мавлід ан-Набі (Ukrainian Muslims celebrate Mawlid an-Habi)

http://islam.in.ua/3/ukr/full_news/8910/visibletype/1/index.html

Турецький телеканал вестиме пряму трансляцію святкування Мавлід із головної мечеті Сімферополя (Turkish TV station will provide the live broadcast of the Mawlid celebrations form the main mosque of Simferopol)

http://islam.in.ua/3/ukr/full_news/8901/visibletype/1/index.html

Khan's Palace in Crimea could be included on UNESCO list

http://www.kyivpost.com/news/nation/detail/97229/

Simferopol Authorities Allocate Land for Mosque

http://risu.org.ua/en/index/all_news/other_confessions/islam/40741/

Crimea allocating land plots to repatriates for private construction

http://www.kyivpost.com/news/nation/detail/97412/

This Week in the News

The announcement that Major Archbishop of Kyiv-Galicia Lyubomyr Husar of the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church (UGCC) would be retiring due to health issues dominated the Ukrainian news service. His Beatitude is one of the leading ecclesiastical voices in Ukraine and is the spiritual leader for one of Ukraine's traditional churches. At the press conference announcing his resignation, His Beatitude exhorted the Ukrainian government to resume discussion with the nation's minority religions. He mentioned that, despite many requests, no government officials had any "serious discussions" with the UGCC in all of 2010, which is a problem that many other religious minorities share. He also mentioned the complaints of favoritism towards the Ukrainian Orthodox Church-Moscow Patriarchate (UOC-MP) on the part of the government because President Viktor Yanukovich is numbered among its ranks. He did not make any accusations, however, only stating that he was glad the president was a religious man. Husar also touched on the problems and persecutions that other Ukrainian churches are facing, specifically mentioning the pressure put on priests of the UOC-Kyiv Patriarchate to switch to Moscow. The Cardinal also left a stinging rejoinder for the current administration, stating that in the realm of church-state relations, the Ukrainian authorities "are doing nothing but repeating (sic) the mistakes of centuries."

In what was His Beatitude's last official function as head of the UGCC, Husar sat at the annual roundtable held by the Razumkov Center* on the topic of church-state relations. This roundtable is attended by heads and representative of many of Ukraine's religious organizations, government officials, religious scholars, and some members of the public, and is a valuable resource for gauging the relationship between spiritual and secular leaders. At the roundtable, Husar stated that the state tries to control the church because it is afraid of the church because the church raises "mature, thinking, and responsible citizens which is not convenient for the state power." He also went on to state that both the government's use of the church in its support structure and the church imposing its will on government officials to control the people produce negative consequences. The group as a whole decided that the state and religious organizations should be cooperative, since both serve the same people, yet remain separate entities.

As a result of the roundtable, those in attendance signed a document putting forth the outcome of their discussion. This document includes statements as to the aforementioned separation of church and state, a rejection of attempts to turn religion into a political ideology, a call against official favoritism or having a state religion, an elimination of pressure from the government in regards to church internal affairs, and a restitution of church property currently in possession of the state. The Institute of Religious Freedom also provided a summary of major points from several speakers at the 3-day event.

* The Razumkov Center is a non-governmental think tank that carries out sociological surveys and researches public policy in a number of areas, including religion, security, state administration, and energy.

Articles referenced in this post:

In Ukraine, a 'Major' Exit

http://risu.org.ua/en/index/monitoring/society_digest/40631/

Patriarch Lubomyr: State Wants ot Control Church as it is Afraid of it

http://risu.org.ua/en/index/expert_thought/comments/40589/

Lubomyr Husar: State and church in Ukraine should resume dialog

http://www.kyivpost.com/news/nation/detail/96828/

Звернення учасників постійно діючого Круглого столу «Релігія і влада в Україні: проблеми взаємовідносин» до Президента, Верховної Ради, Кабінету Міністрів України (Address of the Members of the Roundtable "Religion and Power in Ukraine: Problems of Relations" to the President, Supreme Rada, and Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine)

http://www.irs.in.ua/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=801%3A1&catid=50%3Azv&Itemid=78&lang=uk

Парламентарі, представники Церков та експерти обговорили наявні проблеми у державно-церковних відносинах (Parliament Members, Religious Leaders and Experts Discuss the Current Problems in State-Church Relations)

http://www.irs.in.ua/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=803%3A1&catid=62%3Ainterv&Itemid=85&lang=uk

This Week in the News

Disagreement between the Crimean Tatar population and the government of the Autonomous Republic are heating up and may come to a head soon. After last week's pronouncement from Prime Minister Dzharty to Mustafa Dzhemilev regarding the 'illegally seized land,' national attention has once again turned to the Tatar situation. The Kyiv Post reports that as the Tatars, returning from exile, found that their lands had been seized and given to Russian and Ukrainian resettlement populations. Unofficial bans on dealing with the Tatars prevented them from even buying back their land. This led to the Crimean Tatar population settling where they could, some in tents, some in shacks, some on what appeared to be open land. Of course, this caused friction 20 years ago, and because the issue was never resolved, the tension remains.

In the face of all of this, Dzharty claims that there has been no discrimination towards the Tatars, stating that because of some Tatars making a living out of selling seized land, it is time for them to get off the seized land. This, coupled with enormous land sales--into the thousands of hectares--by companies to rich investors and developers. Both sides are hoping to come to some sort of a consensus on the issue by the end of the month, when an official investigative report will be finished.

The following is a video form Al Jazeera explaining the situation:



I, however, do not see these problems going away soon. There is too much money to be had in selling the land for a profit, and for the businessmen and politicians selling the land, it is a lose-lose situation to provide land for the displaced Tatars. The only real solution is for a mandate to come from Kyiv with an effort to enforce any land reforms. Kyiv, however, is reluctant to do this also because of the Autonomous status of Crimea and the Russian majority on the peninsula. Enforcing land grants would be a mess, and would probably precipitate conflict, which could easily involve either Russia's Black Sea Fleet, which is already there, and UN/NATO peacekeeping forces, or both. I do not think that any side wishes this issue to devolve into violence.

In an interview marking the 20th anniversary of the collapse of the USSR, Dzhemilev, who this week was nominated for the Nobel Peace Prize for his tireless work on behalf of the Crimean Tatars, again decried the Crimean and Ukrainian governments for failing to assist the Tatar population. He stated that "nothing good" has happened on behalf of his people on the peninsula, noting the failed representation reform. The interview is linked below.

Following on the heels of Dzhemilev's trip to Turkey where he arranged an agreement for using Turkish money to build schools and houses in Crimea, many in international newsmedia are suggesting that the recent revolutions and protests in the greater Muslim world will bode well for Turkey, which could mean trouble for Crimea. Some economists predict that Turkey and Saudi Arabia will emerge this year as twin poles of the Muslim world, and that Turkey especially will profit from disrupted tourist dollars to the Mediterranean. Greater political influence and economic weight will change the power balance between Turkey and France--and thereby the EU. France, who has a vested but not disrupted presence in North Africa, was a vocal opponent of Turkey's rapprochement into the EU, but with a larger hand to play, Turkey may have a chance to reopen negotiations for getting into the Union. Should that happen--a long shot at this point, to be sure--Ukraine's chances of joining the EU take a real jump up, because in the geopolitical scene, Turkey and Ukraine have more similarities than differences in reference to their relation to the EU.

Articles referenced in this post:

Turkey and Ukraine -- different but similar

http://www.todayszaman.com/columnistDetail_getNewsById.action?newsId=233883

Mustafa Dzhemilev nominated for Nobel Peace Prize

http://www.kyivpost.com/news/nation/detail/96180/

Tatars carry on decades-long struggle to reclaim Crimean land taken away

http://www.kyivpost.com/news/nation/detail/96308/

Crimean Tatar leader: “We don’t want that kind of republic.”

http://en.rian.ru/analysis/20110203/162440136.html

Безлад в Африці: Туреччина виграє, Україна програє?

http://www.epravda.com.ua/publications/2011/02/1/269184/

Crimean Tatars fear for the future

http://english.aljazeera.net/focus/2010/08/201087102453222638.html 

This Week in the News

New legislation was signed into place this week regarding the Law on Freedom of Conscience and Religious Organizations by President Yanukovich. Of the changes made to the law--which were many--of particular note are the recognition of religious organizations as legal persons and a change in the process of registering religious organizations (the original text in Ukrainian can be found here; the amended law is here). A letter from Patriarch Filaret (UOC-KP), who has recently been outspoken against the Yanukovich administration's alleged cooperation with Moscow to dissolve the UOC-KP, stated his disapproval of the legislation, stating that these new measures will only increase interconfessional conflict. He also noted that previously, all proposed changes to this law were first presented to the All-Ukrainian Council of Churches, yet these measures never were. There has of yet been no official response to the amended law by the All-Ukrainian Council of Churches. The updated law is written to go into effect on February 1, 2011.

Meanwhile, in Crimea, Vasil' Dzharty, head of the autonomous republic, drafted a letter to Mejlis leader Mustafa Dzhemil'ov requesting that he use his influence in the Tatar community to encourage Tatar squatters to vacate their homes. Dzharty stated in the letter that the situation these squatters have created is a major roadblock to the economical and social development of the peninsula. He also stated that if Dzhemil'ov did not exert his influence, the matter would be turned over to security forces. Dzhemil'ov, on official business in Turkey, responded that such questions are not solved in that manner. The Tatar leader then expressed his disappointment in the government, stating that the administration "is not interested in stability in Crimea." Five days later, while still in Turkey, Dzhemil'ov asked the President of Turkey Abdullah Gül for assistance in mitigating the conflict between the Mejlis and the Crimean government. In his letter to President Gül, Dzhemil'ov asked for Turkey to adopt a program of building apartments, schools, houses, and hostels for immigrants and Tatars in addition to laying out the Tatar community's major grievances with the Dzarty and Yanukovich administrations. Dzhimil'ov also spoke with President of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe Mevlut Cavusoglu in Turkey on the same topic. Cavusoglu said that he and his deputies would see to it that Ukraine fulfill its obligations to the Council of Europe in regards to the treatment of the Tatar minority in Crimea.

Articles referred to in this post:

"Київський Патріархат закликає керівництво держави не порушувати міжконфесійний мир через прагнення змінити законодавство" (Kyiv Patriarchate calls on government leaders to not break the interconfessional peace by changing legislation)

http://www.irs.in.ua/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=787%3A1&catid=34%3Aua&Itemid=61&lang=uk

"Звернення Архієрейського Собору УПЦ Київського Патріархату до Президента України" (Address of the Council of Archbishops of the UOC Kyiv Patriarchate to the President of Ukraine)

http://www.irs.in.ua/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=786%3A1&catid=50%3Azv&Itemid=78&lang=uk

"М.Джемільов: На частку кримських татар припадає тільки 17% самозахоплень землі в Криму" (M. Dzhemil'ov: Crimean Tatars account for only 17% of squatted-upon land in Crimea)

http://www.rbc.ua/ukr/newsline/show/m-dzhemilev-na-dolyu-krymskih-tatar-prihoditsya-tolko-17--19012011092200

"Кримських татар попросили піти" (Crimean Tatars are asked to leave)

http://www.epravda.com.ua/news/2011/01/19/267009/

"ПАРЄ спробує розібратися в конфлікті кримських татар і керівництва автономії" (PACE [Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe] will try to mediate conflict between Crimean Tatars and the autonomous republic's leadership)

http://www.epravda.com.ua/news/2011/01/24/267809/