Arrest of Yulia Tymoshenko Draws Moscow’s Interest; Opposition Actors Continue to Face State Scrutiny in Former Soviet Union

This week Ukraine’s most visible opposition actor and ex-prime minister Yulia Tymoshenko was removed from a Kyiv courtroom after her arrest was ordered by Judge Rodion Kireyev for “repeatedly disrupting courtroom proceedings” during her trial on abuse of power during her tenure as prime minister. Facing as much as 10 years in prison on charges of striking a politically profitable but financially crippling deal with Russian energy company Gazprom in 2009, Tymoshenko’s trial has drawn considerable attention from outside observers, largely condemnations from the British and United States governments. Many observers have called Tymoshenko’s trial and arrest a political move by her 2010 opponent and current president Viktor Yanukovych in an attempt to combat oppositional civil and political actors and consolidate his power base by squeezing Tymoshenko out of politics. The most unlikely reaction to Tymoshenko’s arrest came from the Kremlin. Despite his Party of Regions affiliation, Yanukovych has fallen out of favor with the Medvedev-Putin tandem, and his recent actions taken to curb dissent in the Ukrainian press and public sphere have only worsened the situation. News agency REGNUM reported that “the best people are afraid of the Party of Regions – Akhemtov, Firtash, others whose business is substantially linked to the price of gas.” Gas wars between Russia and Ukraine seem inevitable and, as REGNUM continues, the relationship between the Party of Regions and Russia is not as easy as it had been before. REGNUM reported that a source in Medvedev’s administration stated “the arrest will cause an international resonance and is unlikely to have positive implications for Yanukovych.” The myth of “fast friends” has been dispelled by recent developments in Ukraine, and Russia seems to be distancing itself from its man in Kyiv.

Supporters of Tymoshenko’s opposition party bloc, All-Ukrainian “Fatherland” (Vseukrayinsk’e Obyednannya Bat’kivshchyna), have also come under the scrutiny of the Ukrainian authorities. Activists immediately set up tent cities in Kyiv after Tymoshenko’s arrest was announced. In the following days, Ukrainian police forces announced they would dismantle the camps, therefore bringing another round of crackdowns on civil unrest and protest (supported by a court order by the District Administrative Court of Kyiv). Fortunately for the protestors, their fears of a night assault by Ukrainian security forces never materialized. The results have not been in Yanukovych’s favor thus far as protests have spread beyond Kyiv. Political scientist Aleksandr Medvedev believes that if the protests continue and the government continues to take a heavy-handed approach to silencing the protestors, August 24 will see ten times more supporters on Independence Square than the Independence Day festivities on August 23. Political analyst Dmitri Tulchinsky believes, however, that while the rallies may continue the number of opposition supporters will reach its peak within the next week or two.

Articles referred to in this post:

«Крещатик зачистят: от сторонников Юлии Тимошенко» (“Cleaning the Kreshchatyk [capital]: from supporters of Yulia Tymoshenko”) http://www.kommersant.ru/doc/1693939?isSearch=True

«Спасет ли Путин Тимошенко?» (“Will Putin Save Tymoshenko?”) http://news.rambler.ru/10706797/?utm_source=regnum&utm_medium=tiser&utm_campaign=main

«Сторонниками Тимошенко позволили переночевать в палатках» (“Tymoshenko Supporters allowed to spend night in tents”) http://lenta.ru/news/2011/08/09/camp/

«Тимошенко: Я не ожидала такой реакции России на мой арест» (“Tymoshenko: I never expected Russia’s reaction to my arrest”) http://www.regnum.ru/news/polit/1433155.html

“Britain, U.S. Concerned over Ex-Ukraine Prime Minster Arrest” http://www.rferl.org/content/britain_us_concern_arrest_ex_prime_minister_tymoshenko_ukraine/24289203.html

“Former Ukrainian Prime Minister Tymoshenko Arrested” http://www.rferl.org/content/ukraine_tymoshenko_detention_arrest_court_trial_kyiv/24288010.html

“Tymoshenko Protests Continue In Ukraine, as Interested Moscow Looks On” http://www.rferl.org/content/tymoshenko_trial_continues_in_ukraine_as_moscow_looks_on/24290585.html

“U.S. Calls for Ukraine Review of Tymoshenko Arrest” http://www.rferl.org/content/united_states_yulia_tymoshenko_ukraine/24291000.html

Observations on Russia's 2012 Presidential Elections

Predictions about the 2012 Russian presidential elections continue to flood cyberspace from official news outlets to independent perspectives from well-known actors from Russian civil society. The continuation of the Medvedev-Putin tandem seems (to this observer) to be the most likely outcome of the 2012 elections considering the benefits each has on certain spheres of Russia’s social, political, economic, and military institutions. The “managed pluralism” approach to governing Russia under the Medvedev-Putin mandate has had its share of ups and downs, which has caused considerable disenfranchisement in Russian civil society. Medvedev has called for an end to “government manipulation of the economy” and “for the devolution of power to the regions and municipalities” in partial hopes of filling these positions by public elections rather than the current Kremlin-appointed system.

Despite Medvedev’s ‘call to arms’ against the continuation of government meddling in the economic sectors and civil society, Russian citizens agree (71 percent) that they have no bearing on state matters. In addition, 63 percent of Russian citizens expect that the major threats to Russia in the future will come from within, as opposed to the 37 percent who see the main threats coming from abroad. Pavel Felgenhauer, independent Moscow-based defense analyst and contributor to the Eurasia Daily Monitor of the Jamestown Foundation, wrote at the end of June 2011 that “if drastic social/political reforms that may defuse the situation are not introduced immediately, a violent rebellion in Moscow seems highly probable, and, as in the recent ‘Arab spring’ revolutions, virtually any pretext may become the trigger.” Considering that the pretext is likely in the opinion of the Russian populace to come from within, the Kremlin must take action against subversive elements that might foment revolution against the ruling tandem and the current system of governance employed by the Kremlin. Unfortunately, in recent months, weeks, and days the state authorities’ actions against ‘subversive’ elements has targeted civil activists protesting for environmental preservation, historical preservation, and human rights. While a threat to the image of the authority of the Kremlin these civil activists do not represent the greatest threat to the Russian state. Dialogues rather than crackdowns could prove more beneficial for the tandem and civil society’s relationship with the Kremlin, especially if the Putin-led All-Russia People’s Front is, in fact, constructing its electoral program on “liberal” issues.

The state of fear and disenfranchisement Russian civil society feels is further precipitated by the unwillingness of either Medvedev or Putin to formally announce their intents to run for (re-) election in 2012. To some observers, this unwillingness is producing greater fear in society and political institutions that there is disorder in the tandem. Igor Jurgens and Eugene Gontmakher of Vedomosti posed what sounds like a troubling question for greater numbers of Russian citizens: “What happens if Dmitri Medvedev, for some unknown reason, refuses to publicly lay claim to the presidency in 2012?” In response they wrote, “It is safe to assume that the mere failure of the current president to continue his operation would cause large-scale crisis in the country.” Jurgens and Gontmakher continue, noting that the resignation of Medvedev would inevitably lead to the emergence of another candidate; however, they note that the candidate would “inevitably emerge from the prime minister’s cage.” While Jurgens and Gontmakher cast their votes for Medvedev’s reelection, viewing it as a positive and beneficial event for the future of Russia, they believe Putin will maintain a position of primacy in the Kremlin due to his maintenance of stability during his tenure as prime minister. Gleb Pavlovsky is less keen on Putin, and critical of the tandem’s silence about the future. He questions the tandem as a model for modern political governance, calling it an “involuntary agreement in a society where ‘everyone can agree about everything.’” Pavlovsky seems to be calling for Russian citizens to more closely scrutinize local government and Kremlin activities so passivity does not undermine participatory democratic institutions that might emerge after the 2012 elections. Pavlovsky identifies the inherent problem of silence in civil society and from political actors, “[The involuntary social contract] is captured, to usurp the space of a forced agreement, where it is impossible to formulate any interest out loud, or to offer a compromise, or even just to provide guarantees. The symbol of this: two people who keep silent in front of the whole country” [emphasis added].

What are Medvedev and Putin waiting for? Is the matryoshka doll model (evidenced by Pavlovsky) for the structure of power and property keeping the tandem at bay, relegating their actions to the directives of Aleksei Ulyukayev and the Bank of Russia and, ergo, creating a less transparent regime? Or is the tandem waiting to find more suitable replacements that could serve as a tabula rasa for Russia, dusting away the allegations of corruption and poor policy-making that have marred the tandem’s reputation with certain civil and political groups? From early observations one thing is certain: the 2012 presidential elections are representative of the major changes made in Russia since 1991, a fitting recent-history lesson for the anniversary of the fall of the Soviet Union. The question remains whether Russia will face its domestic challenges with democratic reforms or continue to address civil social and political concerns with a heavy hand. Serious evaluation from all levels of Russian society is a necessity otherwise jokes such as Kommersant correspondent Oleg Kashin’s, “We’re all going to die under Putin [My vsem umrem pri Putine],” that tend to materialize more frequently than serious assessments, might become a reality.

Articles referred to in this post:

«Мы хотели стабильности – мы её получили» (“We wanted stability – we got it”), http://www.kommersant.ru/doc/1682929

«Партстроительство: Вхождение в народ» (“Party Building: Engaging the people”), http://gazeta.ru/politics/2011/07/25_a_3708789.shtml

«Президент должен заявить о себе» (“President should declare himself”), http://www.vedomosti.ru/opinion/news/1326592/medvedevu_pora_perejti_rubikon

«Путин готов стать президентом?» (“Putin ready to become president?”), http://www.regnum.ru/news/polit/1429769.html

«Расстройство тандема» (“Disorder of the tandem”), http://www.ng.ru/politics/2011-07-28/1_tandem.html

«Тандем как фактор риска» (“Tandem as a risk factor”), http://www.vedomosti.ru/opinion/news/1328552/zabyt_tandem

Pavel Felgenhauer, “The Majority of Russians Feel Disenfranchised,” http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=38086

“Russia Readies 2012 Pres Elections, but Who is Running?” http://blogs.forbes.com/kenrapoza/2011/07/21/russia-readies-2012-pres-elections-but-who-is-running/

“The Power Vertical: The 2012 Shadowboxing Intensifies,” http://www.rferl.org/content/the_2012_shadowboxing_intensifies/24280112.html

“The Power Vertical: The Popular Front’s Liberal Platform,” http://www.rferl.org/content/the_popular_fronts_liberal_platform/24277672.html

This Week in the News

‘Silent Protests’ Amid Russia-Belarus Investment Talks

Belarusian protesters and journalists continue to be detained after the latest weekly protest against authoritarian President Alyaksandr Lukashenka in Minsk and across the country. The police force continues to heavy-handedly deal with the opposition through the violent dispersal and detaining of protesters. Court hearings for detained protesters vary in penalty, issuing jail sentences from 5 to 15 days to as long as 3 ½ years in a high security prison (20-year-old Nikita Likhovid). Some observers fear the protests are dwindling due to the violent crackdowns of the Belarusian security forces, but as one protester in Minsk stated, “Every demonstration on our part is a big success. The country is rising up!” Belarusian civil society need not worry, however, about smaller showings at the weekly demonstrations, as the size and severity of the crackdowns at protests in late June and early July have garnered global attention to Belarus’ economic crisis and Lukashenka’s repression of the ‘silent’ protesters. Claire Bigg of RFE/RL’s Belarus Service reports that while facing “growing international isolation” Lukashenka described the protests as “part of a foreign-inspired plot to topple him.” Recent arrests come as Belarusian Prime Minister Mikhail Myasnikovich met with Russian investors in Moscow about the possibility of selling state-owned shares in key enterprises such as gas pipelines, oil refineries, mobile phone carriers, and a carmaker, attracting interest from Gazprom, LUKoil, Rosneft, and others. In addition to the $800 million Belarus has received as “stabilization funding” from the Eurasian Economic Community, Moscow has promised additional support as a result of Minsk’s willingness to privatize nearly $8 billion in state-owned shares in national enterprises.

Crackdown on Opposition Protests in Moscow

On July 19 two civil activist groups, Ecological Defense of the Moscow Oblast (Ekooborona: Ekologicheskaya oborona Moskovskoi oblasti) and opposition party The Other Russia (Drugaya Rossiya) held protests in the center of Moscow and were met with numerous arrests. Evgeniia Chirikova, leader of Ekooborona explained that their actions were a response to the corruption surrounding the construction of the Khimki Forest highway. The group attempted to hold a ‘flash mob’ entitled “Who is guilty?” (Kto vinovat?) on Slavanskaya Square in which they carried puppets representing Transport Minister Igor Levitin, Prime Minister Vladimir Putin, and businessman Arkady Rotenberg on their shoulders. Five activists were arrested in connection with the short-lived flash mob but were all released by that evening. While Chirikova is a frequent critic of the Kremlin her status among similar organizations worldwide seems to protect her from likely harsher punishment. While protection based on the repute of civil actors cannot be considered a trend, due to the imprisonment of Mikhail Khodorovsky and the killing of numerous reputable journalists throughout the post-Soviet period, the status of activists such as Chirikova leads to continual give-and-take with the authorities. On the other hand, the Medvedev-led Kremlin has moved away from the heavy-handed repression of oppositional voices that typified Putin’s administration. While it is obvious that even under Medvedev’s mandate civil activists are publicly limited in their challenges to the Kremlin, civil society’s freedoms have largely increased.

Actions taken by members of The Other Russia were equally short-lived, as activists were quickly detained after climbing the fence into Lubyanka Square, which had been cordoned off by police before an organized protest could occur. The sit-in protests were to be carried out at the Solovetsky Stone—the monument to victims of political repressions in the USSR—as part of the larger actions taken in support and demanding the release of opposition activist and political prisoner Taisiya Osipova. Some observers and fellow activists believe Osipova has been detained on false charges of drug possession and intent to sell as a “clumsy frame-up aimed at punishing her husband (Sergei Fomchenkov), an associate of outspoken Kremlin critic Eduard Limonov.” Both Fomchenkov and Limonov are members of the Other Russia party, which Voina activist Leonid Nikolaev describes as “obsessively haunted by the authorities.” When Kremlin pressure failed to break Fomchenkov, Nikolaev contends, they turned their sights to Osipova “so that the husband and the party would be more compliant.” Osipova’s case has received considerable attention from the global community, especially the World Organization Against Torture (OMCT: Organisation Mondiale Contre la Torture) which sent an open letter to President Medvedev on June 21 demanding her immediate release from the Smolensk pretrial detention center and adequate treatment.

The Other Russia party faces greater Kremlin scrutiny in the wake of the completed investigation into the riots at Manezhnaya Square in December 2010, which concluded that Other Russia party members were involved if not responsible for the 32 injuries and the murder of Yegor Sviridov. These conclusions have opened a new case against the Other Russia party that is attempting to prove the party is an extremist organization, ergo giving the Kremlin a reason to ban it. Though the group draws members from the National Bolshevik and communist-leaning groups, it includes members from Russian-based human rights movements and notable left and right-wing opposition leaders such as Garry Kasparov of the United Civil Front, Liudmila Alexeyeva of the Moscow Helsinki Group, and aforementioned Eduard Limonov (the most radical of the three). While elements of the Other Russia party have a history of extremist views and actions it is currently a symbol of opposition to Putin and the damages they feel his administration caused to electoral democracy in Russia.

Brief Observations on 2012 Presidential Elections

With the 2012 presidential election campaign on the horizon actions taken against oppositional parties in Russia generate greater concern about the future of democracy in Russia. Though democratic institutions in Russia are considerably different from those found in the west, actions taken to limit rights to assembly and speech are cause for concern. Putin’s presidency was marked by a semi-authoritarian approach to managing society that appears to have continued during his tenure as prime minister, which according to Lauren Goodrich, allowed Medvedev to represent the face of Russian modernization and democracy while Putin maintained the stability of the nation via firm control over the population and the economy:

“It is managed pluralism underneath not a president or a premier, but under a person more like the leader of the nation, not just the leader of the state. In theory, the new system is meant to allow the Kremlin to maintain control of both its grand strategies of needing to reach out abroad to keep Russia modern and strong and trying to ensure that the country is also under firm control and secure for years to come.”

Despite the changes that Medvedev’s presidency has brought to Russia’s political and economic institutions Putin continues to hold considerable sway in the operations of the nation vis-à-vis his close relationship with the military and security forces (what Brian Whitmore calls the “Deep State”). The tandem or team-approach to governing Russia pioneered by Medvedev and Putin, i.e. “managed pluralism” in Goodrich’s words, allows the elite to remain firmly in control and influential while maintaining the visage of a more democratic system. Such observations make Putin’s exit in 2012 highly unlikely and the continuation of the Medvedev-Putin regime all the more probable given recent allusions to plans for post-2012 Russia that involve “the team.”

Articles Referred to in this Post:

«Белорусской « революции» требуется перезагрузка? (“Belarusian ‘revolution’ needs to be rebooted?”) http://www.bbc.co.uk/russian/international/2011/07/110713_belorus_protest.shtml

«В Минске задержаны несколько десятков участников очередной молчаливой акции протеста» (“In Minsk, dozens of participants of the silent protests detained”) http://www.itar-tass.com/c13/189455.html

«Женева требует немедленного освобождения Таисии Осиповой» (“Geneva demands the immediate release of Taisiya Osipova”) http://free-voina.org/post/6755345085

«Завершено расследование беспорядков на Манежной площади» (“Investigation of riots on Manezhnaya Square Completed”) http://www.bbc.co.uk/russian/russia/2011/07/110711_manezhnaya_investigation.shtml

«Защитников Химкинского леса задержали с куклой Путина» (“Defenders of the Khimki Forest detained with doll of Putin”) http://www.bbc.co.uk/russian/russia/2011/07/110719_khimki_flashmob_detentions.shtml

«Леня Николаев в Смоленске на суде Таисии Осиповой» (“Leonid Nikolaev in Smolensk in court hearing of Taisiya Osipova”) http://free-voina.org/post/4080488290

«Минск готовится не доспустить проведения очередной молчаливой акции протеста» (“Minsk Prepares to Prevent Another Silent Protest”) http://www.itar-tass.com/c13/189428.html

«На Лубянке задержаны 20 активистов «Другой России» (“On Lubyanka Square 20 activists of ‘The Other Russia’ detained”) http://www.bbc.co.uk/russian/russia/2011/07/110720_lubianka_osipova.shtml

«Путин» задержан, Чирикова свободна» (“Putin” detained, Chirikova free”) http://www.svobodanews.ru/content/article/24270349.html

«Путин перенес президентские выборы» (“Putin postponed presidential elections”) http://www.utro.ru/articles/2011/07/21/987863.shtml

«Сидячая забастовка с требованием освободить Таисию Осипову» (“Sit-in demands the release of Taisiya Osipova”) http://free-voina.org/post/7648174359

“Belarus Protests Continue as Minsk, Moscow Sit Down for Share-Sale Talks” http://www.rferl.org/content/belarus_protests_continue_crackdown_economic_crisis_lukashenka/24265346.html

“Belarusian Protesters Detained After Latest Weekly Protest” http://www.rferl.org/content/belarus_protesters_detained/24271799.html

“The Power Vertical: Putin’s Plan” http://www.rferl.org/content/putins_plan/24270567.html

“Russia’s Evolving Leadership” http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/20110704-russias-evolving-leadership

A Round of Applause from the Belarusian Opposition

More than four hundred participants have been detained in Belarus in connection with the “Revolution Through Social Networks” protests from June 23 through July 3. The protests are motivated by civil opposition to the economic policies pursued by Aleksandr Lukashenko’s government that have put the country in an economic crisis. Unable to make payments in a timely fashion the state of Belarus’ civil society has worsened in recent weeks as the government cracks down on the protesters, their tools of organization, and civil liberties. Despite the high number of arrests the ‘silent protesters’ continue to be a thorn in Lukashenko’s side, prompting the Belarusian authorities to restrict access to social networking sites, namely Facebook, Twitter, and the Russian Vkontakte. This action represents a traditional approach to silencing the opposition; severing protesters’ means of organization before dissident actions can take place.

This method is not commonly reserved for limiting Belarusian citizens’ access to the Internet, but instead contributes to the various government actions taken in the global war on terrorism. The April 11, 2011 Minsk Metro bombing at the Oktyabrskaya station is a recent example of the realistic threat terrorism plays in Belarusian policy and its proclivity for meddling in civil liberties. The Internet restrictions imposed by the Belarusian government play a role in the cyber security that is included in the political and military security of many nations at present, which these states adopt for all intents and purposes to protect its social, political, economic, and military interests. While this arrangement generally has positive implications for civil society, Belarusian citizens now face greater scrutiny, repression, and restricted access to technologies that hold great capabilities for keeping the public well-informed and well-developed democratically.

The media has also faced greater scrutiny in the wake of Belarusian crackdowns on protestors, as large numbers of journalists have been detained prior to routine credential checks (according to Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty reports and the Committee to Protect Journalists, many of these journalists have been released excluding nine others that are serving sentences and will appear in Belarusian courts. The charges against these nine journalists remain unclear). Though journalists are often constrained by their editors or the media’s owners, they continue to play a crucial role in post-Soviet politics and power dynamics. A trend in the former Soviet Union seems to be developing, that of a double (or possibly triple) standard for mass media. On one hand, traditional media and its online counterparts contribute to the development of civil society in the former authoritarian states, providing greater access to ideas and opinions. On the other hand, these media provide governments with valuable information that officials can use to improve the lives and liberties of civil society. In a discussion of Russian security measures taken in advance of the 2014 Olympics in Sochi, Andrei Novikov, head of the CIS Anti-Terrorist Center, noted “that 80 percent of all the valuable information is obtained from the media. In these times, maybe more.” When asked what was being ‘stored’ (skladirovat’), Novikov replied “We’re not storing anything – we’re analyzing.” While this analysis contributes to the security of the CIS as Russia continues its preparations for the Sochi Olympics, a third standard emerges. This trend involves the continued use of the media as a source for governing, but instead of improving civil society it contributes to new methods for governments to police their citizens.

Articles referred to in this post:

«Более 400 человек задержаны во время акций протеста в Белоруссии» (“More than 400 people detained during protests in Belarus”)

http://ria.ru/world/20110706/398236211.html

«В Минске ограничен доступ на площади, где собираются протестующие» (“In Minsk, limited access to the area where protestors gather”)

http://ria.ru/society/20110706/398190825.html

«Взрыв в минском метро» (“Explosion in Minsk Metro”)

http://www.svobodanews.ru/content/article/3553955.html

«Интеллектуальный ответ террористам» (“Intellectual response to terrorists”)

http://rus.ruvr.ru/radio_broadcast/6320486/52113965.html

«Минск: массовые задержания через социальные сети» (“Minsk: Mass arrests through social networks”)

http://www.svobodanews.ru/content/article/24257744.html

«Почему Лукашенко forever» (“Why Lukashenko forever?”)

http://www.svobodanews.ru/content/blog/2257438.html

«Разрешите затолкать вас в автозак» (“Let me shove you into the paddy wagon”)

http://naviny.by/rubrics/society/2011/07/06/ic_articles_116_174287/

“Belarusian Opposition Plans More Protests as Economy Weakens”

http://www.rferl.org/content/belarus_opposition_plans_more_protests/24257526.html

"Dozens of journalists detained in Belarus crackdown"

http://cpj.org/2011/07/dozens-of-journalists-detained-in-belarus-crackdow.php

Затрыманьні актывістаў і журналістаў па ўсёй Беларусi (“Detention of activists and journalists across Belarus”)

http://www.svaboda.org/content/article/24257757.html

Seliger v. Anti-Seliger: Political Forums and the Future of Russia

Summer camps have a profound impact on the youth of a country. In those formative years they serve as proving grounds for young men and women to demonstrate their myriad skills and dominance over their competitors. Enter “Seliger”, the all-Russian youth educational camp sponsored by the Russian nationalist youth group “Nashi”.

Serving to mold young minds through all manner of political activities (and, apparently, extracurricular activities such as the “breeding tents”), the Seliger forum and Nashi’s platform will contribute to the protection and elevation of ‘Russianness’ and the great power of the Russian Federation. The groups ideological doctrine can be compared to that of emperor Nicholas I whose “Official Nationality” policy called for conduct in the spirit of “Orthodoxy, Autocracy, and Nationality” (Pravoslavie, Samoderzhavie, Narodnost’). Since Putin’s presidency and Russia’s resulting slide toward political authoritarianism, Nashi and the Seliger forum have contributed to the sociopolitical wherewithal of the ruling party, commanding constant influence over society while educating the next generation of Kremlin devotees. One is inclined to draw comparisons between Nashi and the Hitler Youth, or perhaps more appropriately the Soviet Young Pioneers, due to its political devoutness to the regime, the idolization (idolatry?) of the ruling tandem of Medvedev and Putin, and its penchant for flexing its group-exercised arms in public through counter-protest and rallies in support of Kremlin initiatives.

Nashi is known for frequently challenging civic protests from Russia’s marginalized left, sometimes through the use of violence but more often drowning out protests by its sheer numbers. When Russia appears on the verge of real democracy Nashi takes up the fight against oppositional actors deemed the ‘Fifth Column’ that “blackens [their] homeland’s reputation.” Though the movement may contribute to the larger breakdown of democracy in the Russian Federation today, Nashi affiliation has its benefits for the aspiring young Russian: placement in Russia’s top universities and courses of study that can lead to jobs in government and business. The benefits for Russian civil society stop there, however, as democratic expansion and human rights play second fiddle to the group’s xenophobia and paranoia. Nashi and the Seliger camp might be less about indoctrination than it is about continuing the Soviet trend of compartmentalization, engaging the world on one occasion and protecting Russia’s historical and cultural identity “under a shell of intolerance and paranoia” on another. When real democracy creeps into Russia’s public sphere, Nashi and its pro-Kremlin affiliates do their best to repress the left’s democratic aspirations.

The fervor of the Seliger attendants and their discipline is unprecedented in Russia’s small leftist camp. Despite its marginalized status in Russian civil society the left receives a great deal of attention from western observers, as worldwide environmental and human rights activism spreads. When these domestic activists challenge Kremlin-sponsored projects or policies, however, observers fear government crackdown meant to shun dissident movements from gaining influence in society. Russia’s left recognizes this persistent threat and has decided to mimic the pro-Kremlin Seliger camp, aptly titled “Anti-Seliger,” and educate the next generation of dissidents and activists. Held for the first time in the contested Khimki forest, notable activists such as Evgeniia Chirikova, renowned for her campaign to protect the forest against the construction of a highway, and Aleksandr Navalniy, known for his fight against corruption in Russian business and government, met to discuss new methods for civil activism and prototypes for new systems of governance in an open-air forum. The addition of music groups to the mix gives the Anti-Seliger forum a decidedly Woodstock atmosphere. Fervent social and political activism coupled with contemporary musicians challenges the status quo in Russia today.

Oleg Kozyrev’s report on the Anti-Seliger forum notes four distinct outcomes of the weekend’s proceedings. First, it identified the vast network of civil activists in Russia and their willingness to cooperate and coordinate their efforts for various causes other than their own. Second, it recognized the success of activists, such as Chirikova and Navalniy, who serve as archetypes for future activists and movements. Third, the “traditional political opposition forces are willing to listen to representatives from the non-political civilian force, to help them and, in return, receive some support for themselves.” Fourth, the Anti-Seliger forum reiterated the need for civil activists to merge against the “huge bulldozer” that is Putinism, which “wants to lay the track through all of us.” Though Russia’s left remains marginalized, and activists continue to be repressed or censored in various spheres of Russian civil society, the Anti-Seliger forum removed some of the fears caused by its pro-Kremlin antithesis, and was a necessary step for oppositional movements to grow and succeed. The future of Russia’s left and its aspirations for a fair and free civil society are less bleak and, if the Kremlin does not meddle in later forums, will grant Russians decidedly better outlooks for the future.

Articles referred to in this post:

«Антиселигер зовет в Химкинский лес» (“Anti-Seliger Convenes in Khimki Forest”)

http://www.svobodanews.ru/content/article/24212711.html

«Антиселигер. Итоги» (“Anti-Seliger. Results”)

http://oleg-kozyrev.livejournal.com/3596167.html and http://echo.msk.ru/blog/gagman/786864-echo/

«Антиселигер: Первый интеллектуальный форум «несогласных» (“Anti-Seliger: First Intellectual Forum of Dissent”)

http://finam.fm/archive-view/4207/

«Антиселигер: прямая трансляция Радио Свобода» (“Anti-Seliger: Live Broadcast of Radio Svoboda”)

http://www.svobodanews.ru/content/article/24237061.html

«Все в лес!» (“Everything in the woods!”)

http://www.kasparov.ru/material.php?id=4DF879ACDD311

«Всероссийский форум Селигер 2011» (“All-Russian Seliger Forum 2011”) Official Website

http://www.forumseliger.ru

«Новый защитник» (“The New Defender”)

http://www.kasparov.ru/material.php?id=4DFC818FAC39F

«Чтобы в лес никто не влез» (“In order that no one would meddle in the woods”)

http://www.mk.ru/daily/newspaper/article/2011/06/15/597675-chtobyi-v-les-nikto-ne-vlez.html

“Anti-Seliger”

http://www.newyorker.com/online/blogs/newsdesk/2011/06/anti-seliger.html

“In Khimki Forest, Opposition Seeks a Voice”

http://www.themoscowtimes.com/news/article/in-khimki-forest-opposition-seeks-a-voice/439242.html

“Russia’s Nationalist Summer Camp”

http://www.newyorker.com/online/blogs/newsdesk/2010/08/seliger.html

“Sex for the motherland: Russian youths encouraged to procreate at camp”

http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-471324/Sex-motherland-Russian-youths-encouraged-procreate-camp.html