My post this week will start to tie together the various factors that contribute to human trafficking, drug trafficking and terrorism in Central Asia.
Criminal and terrorist elements
thrive in prisons, difficult-to-govern spaces, regions with endemic corruption,
conflict or post-conflict zones with little legitimate governance, border
regions, free trade zones, and urban mega cities (Rollins 2013). Unfortunately,
Central Asia possess all of these in abundance, with the exception of mega
cities. Additional social elements that encourage criminal or terrorist
development include trans-state nationalist, ethnic and religious movements,
armed conflict, and constraints on transnational exchanges of illegal
commodities, “exchanges that frequently involve third and fourth party
intermediaries and corruptible internal security forces” (Mincheva, 2013). Most
states in the region have dealt with all of these issues to some degree within
the past two decades, and continue to deal with them.[1] Given the presence of such
a large number of risk factors, it comes as no surprise that the region has
struggled with criminal organizations involved with drug trafficking and more
recently human trafficking, and terrorist activity. In the following analysis,
I will focus on the effects of governmental policy, weak institutions and rule
of law, low economic development, social influences, and geography. These
factors influence and interact with each other to some degree, helping to facilitate
drug and human trafficking, to contribute to the emergence of terrorism, and to
set the stage for cooperation between criminal organizations and terrorist
groups.
The
main contributor and facilitator of criminal organizations and terrorist groups
in the region is governmental policy, weak institutions and rule of law, and
low economic development. Kazakhstan’s strong energy sector has enabled the
state to do significantly better economically than the rest, but all countries
in the region face issues with lack of economic opportunity and poverty. The poor
economic situation creates large numbers of unemployed or underemployed individuals
who must find additional ways to support themselves and their families. Such
individuals often become willing collaborators for traffickers engaged in
either the drug or the human trade. This is particularly prevalent in
Tajikistan’s highly impoverished regions, where the money brought in by drug
trafficking is “likely a lifeline for isolated communities.”[2] The UNODC estimated in
2010 that drug traffickers made a “net profit of US$1.4 billion from the sale
of transiting opiates” through Central Asia, which was a third of
Tajikistan’s total 2010 GDP (US$ 4.58 billion). Poverty and lack of opportunity
also makes desperate individuals more willing to go abroad for work, which can make
them susceptible to human trafficking rings. These criminal organizations lure
them abroad, entrap them, and force them to engage for little or no pay in
prostitution, manual labor, drug smuggling, etc. However, trafficking victims
are not limited to those in poverty. There have been several examples of
educated women lured abroad by traffickers (Tverdova 2011) . The primary instigator is
a lack of opportunity at home, and the perception of a better life abroad.
The
connection is more direct in Central Asia between economic opportunity and drug
or human trafficking, than it is with radicalization. Neither poverty nor political repression lead directly
to radicalization, the causal mechanisms are more complex. In fact, there is a “lack of evidence that
convincingly demonstrates the existence of a relationship between various
indicators of levels of development and political deprivation, on the one hand,
and the rise of radical Islam and terrorism on the other” (Omelicheva, 2010).
We have seen radicalization across income and education levels in Central Asia.
Similar to human trafficking victims, new members of radical groups are
generally looking for a better future. In Central Asia, organizations such as Hizb
ut-Tahrir (HT) are able to convince recruits that they offer a more positive
vision of the future. It is easier to draw this contrast when people face
distressing situations such as poverty, discrimination, and a repressive state.
Furthermore, radical organizations that provide simple answers to their
problems become more appealing when state restrictions on media and religious
expression discourage legitimate channels for citizens to communicate and
express their displeasure and desires. Overly repressive state policies also build
up resentment and sympathy for oppressed groups, making it more likely moderate
Islamists will be radicalized. Moreover, men are more likely to be arrested and
imprisoned for association with radical groups than women in the region. They
often leave behind their wives with little to no income and a family to
support, making it more likely that she may become the victim of human
trafficking as discussed above. Additionally, the imprisonment of radical
Islamists will put them in contact with criminal organizations already in the
prison system, creating opportunities for collaboration.
Corruption
is an endemic feature across all Central Asian states. It undercuts the rule of
law, weakens institutions, destroys legitimacy, and encourages criminal
behavior. First, “corrupt law enforcement, consular officials, diplomats and
lawyers” are necessary to traffic humans across borders (Shelley, 2003) and
make trafficking drugs much easier. Not only are corrupt officials facilitators,
but also perpetrators. The enormous profits in both trades combines with low
accountability and low pay for many to encourage participation across all
levels of government, from upper-level officials looking to line their pockets,
to underpaid local police trying to make ends meet. Corrupt officials encourage
the trade and discourage enforcement, while any attempts at enforcement are
further hampered by corruption at the lower levels, such as border guards.
Moreover, an important effect of corruption is the loss in legitimacy and increasing
distrust of government officials. Many human trafficking victims avoid going to
the authorities because they do not trust their help, and may have been
exploited by government officials themselves (Tverdova, 2011). Additionally, a
perception of corruption encourages disaffected citizens to accept the
narrative of radical groups who blame governmental policy for the lack of
opportunities. These people “perceive that their way in life is blocked by the
system” and see the path offered by radical groups as a better alternative.
This explanation provides support for the radicalization of ambitious, educated
people.[3]
A
lack of resources, corruption, difficult geography, and regional measures creating
free trade zones in an attempt to boost local economies has created weak border
control along several key transit points in Central Asia. In response to closed
borders stifling trade,[4] a number of trade
agreements have been signed over the past decade with the goal of reducing trade
barriers to increase regional trade. The reduction in customs inspections and
border control points, and the standardization of transport regulations has
resulted in a significant increase in trade that has been generally beneficial
across the region. However, the higher volume of trade handled by local
officials has not been accompanied by an expansion of law enforcement
capabilities to discourage traffickers from exploiting the new situation. Of particular concern are the various trade
agreements with Afghanistan, which have made it easier for heroin to be
trafficked through Central Asia en route to markets in Russia and Eastern
Europe. When combined with already poor border control in countries such as
Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, the trade has become much more difficult to stop.
The Customs Union of the Russian
Federation, Kazakhstan and Belarus is of particular importance for
several reasons. The agreement created a common, external border across the
three nations that only requires one customs check at the Kazakh border before
goods can be transported to the Russian or Belarusian border with the European
Union. Once a trafficker gets into Kazakhstan, they face little threat of
detection if their final destination is in Russia or Belarus. Moreover,
additional regulations allow people to move freely across borders, which
further facilitates not only the movement of illicit goods and trafficking
victims, but eases the coordination and cooperation necessary for inter-state
trafficking networks and terrorist organizations.[5]
Finally,
a history of governmental corruption and weak rule of law has created
longstanding criminal organizations with experience in drug trafficking across
the region and internationally. Tajikistan in particular has dealt with
historically strong criminal groups that have been able to operate with near
impunity in the many weakly governed parts of the country. We know that “areas
where drug crime networks are well established are increasingly important
growth areas for human trafficking” (Shelley, 2012). Additionally, criminal
organizations who successfully move into human trafficking generally have
extensive international links that facilitates locating, attracting,
transporting, and trading victims (Sulaimanova, 2004). The low risk and high
reward of human trafficking are enticing to these groups when compared to the
high risk of the international drug trade. Moreover, ungoverned spaces attract
not only traffickers, but also can serve as havens for terrorist groups hiding
from crackdowns.
Several
social issues also make these phenomena more likely in Central Asia. The lack
of opportunity has created a situation where much of the youth, especially
young men, are simply bored. A feeling of “pointlessness” can encourage young
men to look for excitement and diversion, which trafficking or going abroad for
work can offer, or the sense of purpose that radical Islamist groups can offer.[6] This applies to young
women as well, as advertisements asking for models and dancers abroad may
appear appealing in contrast to what is available at home. International
awareness can help curb ignorance within these vulnerable groups, making them
aware of the risks involved when going abroad to work and avoiding suspect
offers used by human trafficking groups. However, such awareness usually
involves greater connectivity to information sources, whether via print media
or online, and can increase exposure to the fraudulent advertisements used by
human trafficking organizations to lure victims abroad.
Several
segments of the population in Central Asia are particularly susceptible to
exploitation by human traffickers: single, unemployed mothers, adolescents in orphanages
or those who had parents with substance abuse problems, foreign migrant workers
and their children, and the homeless.[7] Overall, women in the
region deal with several unique issues that increases their vulnerability.
Women tend to suffer more than men in areas of poor economic growth, losing
work and finding it more difficult to find new work (Tverdova, 2011). The
difficult economic situation for women is further compounded by the fact that
the “social status of women in Central Asia has been on the decline in the last
decade” (Sulaimanova, 2004). This not only creates an obstacle to finding work,
but also decreases social and institutional support for female victims of human
trafficking. An additional issue has been the rise of conservative Islam in
several parts of the region, which often relegates women to a lower social
status. Conversely, increased social status for women can also trigger push back from
conservative men who are struggling to deal with social upheaval and poor
economic opportunities that have undermined their social status. This can
increase support for groups such as HT who provide “a political and theological
justification for reasserting male supremacy in society.”[8]
Finally,
certain ethnicities have proven to be more susceptible to radicalization than
others in Central Asia. “Islamists have been less successful in gaining support
in the communities of indigenous populations of Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, and
Turkmenistan than among the Uzbek and Tajik minorities” (Omelicheva, 2010). Uzbeks
and Tajiks have had a significantly different historical religious experience than the
more traditionally nomadic Kazakhs, Kyrgyz and Turkmen that goes back to before
the Russian Empire. Islam traditionally found a stronger foothold in the more
sedentary Uzbek and Tajik societies. A stronger Islamic identity was enhanced
by tsarist policy that distinguished between nomadic and sedentary populations,
with Russification pushed on the Kazakhs, Kyrgyz, and Turkmen, and Islamic law
allowed to govern Uzbeks and Tajiks. The resurgence of religion in Central Asia
after Soviet religious suppression was relaxed was uneven, with a greater reception
in Uzbekistan and Tajikistan than the rest. This unique experience has also allowed
radical Islam to gain a greater foothold in their communities. Furthermore,
counter-terrorist initiatives and repression have focused on the Uzbek and
Tajik ethnic groups across the region, pushing them deeper underground and
further radicalizing them (Omelicheva, 2010).
Finally, Central
Asia has a unique geographic location and landscape that has a significant
influence on the prevalence of trafficking and the presence of terrorist organizations.
Much of the region is located along the ‘Northern’ distribution route for drug
traffic between Afghanistan and Russia. The remote and difficult terrain along
the Afghan-Tajik border make it a natural transit corridor for drug traffickers
and a difficult area for law enforcement to operate. The UNODC reported in 2010
that of the estimated 380 tons of heroin manufactured in Afghanistan, 25 percent
(90 tons) was sent via the Northern route.
Afghanistan
has not only been a source of narcotics, but also of extremist ideas and arms
that inspire and support radical groups in Central Asia. Additionally, the
Taliban has set a precedent of terrorist collaboration with the drug trade that
could influence radical Central Asian organizations. Despite historically cracking
down on the opium trade while in power, the Taliban have begun encouraging the
trade to profit from it.[9] Terrorist organizations
across the globe have had to expand their income sources in the wake of the
post-9/11 financial crackdown by the West on traditional sources of revenue
(Gonzalez 2013). Both drug trafficking and human trafficking are viable sources
of income for such groups in the region.
Sources:
Gonzalez, Elsie. 2013. “The Nexus between Human Trafficking and Terrorism/Organized Crime:
Combating Human Trafficking By Creating a Cooperative Law Enforcement System.”
South Orange, NJ: Seton Hall Law eRepository.
International
Crisis Group, Central Asia: Islam and the
State 2003, Available at: http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/asia/central-asia/059%20Central%20Asia%20Islam%20and%20the%20State
International
Crisis Group, Radical Islam in Central
Asia: Responding to Hizb ut-Tahrir 2003, Available at: http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/asia/central-asia/058%20Radical%20Islam%20in%20Central%20Asia%20Responding%20to%20Hizb%20ut-Tahrir.pdf
Mincheva, Lyuobov Grigorova and Ted Robert Gurr. 2013.
Crime-Terror Alliances and the State: Ethnonationalist and Islamist
Challenges to Regional Security. New York: Routledge.
Omelicheva,
Mariya. 2010. “The Ethnic Dimension of Religious Extremism and Terrorism in
Central Asia.” International Political Science Review, 31(2), 167–186
Rollins, John and Liana Sun Wyler. 2013. Terrorism
and Transnational Crime: Foreign Policy Issues for Congress. Washington,
DC: Congressional Research Service.
Shelley, Louise. 2012. The Relationship of Drug and
Human Trafficking: A Global Perspective. Dordrecht: Springer
Science+Business Media B.V.
Sulaimanova, Saltanat. 2004. "Migration Trends in
Central Asia and the Case of Trafficking of Women." In In the Tracks of
Tamerlane: Central Asia's Path to the 21st Century, by eds. Dan Burghart
and Theresa Sabonis-Helf, 377-400. Washington, DC: National Defense University.
Tverdova, Yuliya V. 2011. "Human Trafficking in
Russia and Other Post-Soviet States." Human Rights Review 329-344.
http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007%2Fs12142-010-0188-1.
United Nations
Office on Drugs and Crime, Opiate Flows
Through Northern Afghanistan and Central Asia 2012, Available at: http://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-analysis/Studies/Afghanistan_northern_route_2012_web.pdf
United Nations
Office on Drugs and Crime, Securing
Central Asia’s Borders with Afghanistan 2007, Available at: http://www.unodc.org/documents/regional/central-asia/Microsoft%20Word%20-%20yellow_paper__no%20maps_16.09.17.pdf
United Nations Office
on Drugs and Crime, World Drug Report
2013, Available at: http://www.unodc.org/unodc/secured/wdr/wdr2013/World_Drug_Report_2013.pdf
US State Department. 2013. Trafficking in Persons Report. Washington, DC: US State Department.
[1]
Given the difficult of obtaining reliable information on Turkmenistan, it has
not been strongly incorporated into this analysis.
[2]
United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, Misuse
of Licit Trade for Opiate Trafficking in Western and Central Asia 2012
[3] International
Crisis Group, Radical Islam in Central
Asia: Responding to Hizb ut-Tahrir 2003
[4] Hizb
ut-Tahrir has historically recruited from individuals involved in private trade
who were frustrated with governmental restrictions on inter-state trade,
particularly in Uzbekistan. Source: International Crisis Group, Radical Islam in Central Asia: Responding
to Hizb ut-Tahrir 2003
[5]
United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, Misuse
of Licit Trade for Opiate Trafficking in Western and Central Asia 2012
[6] International
Crisis Group, Radical Islam in Central
Asia: Responding to Hizb ut-Tahrir 2003
[7] USD.
2013. Trafficking in Persons Report. Washington, DC: US State Department.
[8] International
Crisis Group, Radical Islam in Central
Asia: Responding to Hizb ut-Tahrir 2003
[9]
Shah, Taimoor. 2012. In Poppy War,
Taliban Aim to Protect a Cash Crop. The New York Times. April 11. Available
at: http://www.nytimes.com/2012/04/12/world/asia/taliban-poppy-war-targets-tractors-and-police.html?_r=0