Building on my focus on illicit trafficking in
Central Asia, I will discuss the region’s role in the distribution of opium-derived
drugs, predominantly heroin, from the poppy fields and manufacturing
laboratories of Afghanistan. Afghanistan has been the dominant international
producer of opium for the past two decades, with production increasing over the
past several years. Market share estimates range up to 90% of total international
opium production.[1] A 2012
preliminary assessment of production by the United Nations Office on Drugs and
Crime (UNODC) predicted a likely annual increase in 2013, which would be the “third
consecutive increase since 2010.” Moreover, evidence predicts further expansion
with a sharp increase in Afghan heroin in Chinese markets, which Southeast Asia
historically supplied.[2]
Of particular concern to Central Asia is the heroin
destined for markets in Russia, and eastern and northern Europe. This is
typically described as the “Northern route” as opposed to the additional routes
that go from Afghanistan to the east through Pakistan and to the west through
Iran. Trafficking routes generally rely on roads, although it appears rail
networks are increasingly being used as traffickers expand their methods of
operation. The UNODC reported in 2010 that of the estimated 380 tons of heroin
manufactured in Afghanistan, 25 percent (90 tons) was sent north via the Northern route. Of this amount, 75 percent was destined for Russia, with only
approximately 3-4 tons continuing on to Europe. However, trafficking within the
region is not exclusively northward, routes through Turkmenistan apparently
also feed the “Balkan route” into Europe via Iran. Interestingly, the UNODC
also reported 35-40 tons of raw opium trafficked in 2010 from northern
Afghanistan into Central Asian markets, raising questions as to whether it is now
being processed into heroin outside of Afghan laboratories, which would be unusual.[3]
Within
the region, Tajikistan remains the key transit point for heroin leaving Afghanistan
along the northern route, with Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan receiving considerably less trafficking across their borders. In fact, Uzbekistan receives significantly
more heroin via Tajikistan than straight from Afghanistan. Estimates from 2010
reported 85 percent of the Central Asian opiate trade passing through
Tajikistan. Traffickers naturally gravitate to areas with weakened
governance and law enforcement, and given Tajikistan’s historically unstable position
it has become a prime target. Traffickers prefer to continue through Tajikistan
and across its relatively uncontrolled northern border into Kyrgyzstan, given its own issues
with maintaining stability and the rule of law, particularly in the south.
Despite attempted improvements to customs and the expansion of border guards
along the Tajik-Afghan border, the UNODC reports that, as of 2012, “the
majority of Northern route opiates continue to flow nearly uninterrupted into
Tajikistan.” Moreover, entrenched corruption combined with historically strong
criminal organizations in Tajikistan has created a broad array of large, highly
organized groups and small operators involved in the trade that have been
difficult for officials to handle.[4]
Further
worrying officials have been recent rises in Afghan heroin production and trade
without a corresponding rise in drug seizures across Central Asia. It appears
likely that traffickers have become more adept at concealing their illicit
trade within legal trade flows across the region. The tendency for drug
seizures to be located near main legitimate transit hubs and routes throughout
not only Central Asia and Afghanistan, but also Iran and Pakistan provides
support for this theory. The ability of traffickers to use licit transit routes
has been enhanced by improved economic relations between Afghanistan and
several Central Asian states, and between Kazakhstan and Russia. A number of
trade agreements have been signed over the past decade with the goal of
reducing trade barriers to increase regional trade. The reduction in customs
inspections and border control points, and the standardization of transport
regulations has resulted in a significant increase in trade that has been
generally beneficial across the region. However, the higher volume of trade
handled by local officials has not been accompanied by an expansion of law
enforcement capabilities to discourage the traffickers from exploiting the new situation.[5]
Key trade agreements include: the Afghanistan-Uzbekistan Trade and
Transit Agreement signed in 2004; the Afghanistan-Tajikistan Joint Economic,
Social and Business Agreement of 2012 that built upon a joint trade agreement
in 2004; the Afghanistan-Turkmenistan Transport and Transit Agreement of 2007
that centered on supplying electricity but also provided for expanded rail
connections; the Afghanistan-Kazakhstan Agreement on Trade and Economic Cooperation
of 2004 and strengthened in 2011; and perhaps most importantly, the Customs
Union of the Russian Federation, Kazakhstan and Belarus signed in 1995 and
subsequently expanded with the possible future inclusion of Tajikistan,
Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan and Armenia.
The
Customs Union is of particular importance for several reasons. The agreement
created a common, external border across the three nations that only requires
one customs check at the Kazakh border before goods can be transported to the
Russian or Belarusian border with the European Union. Once a trafficker gets
into Kazakhstan, they face little threat of detection if their final
destination is in Russia or Belarus. Moreover, additional regulations allow
people to move freely across borders, which further facilitates not only the
movement of illicit goods, but also eases the coordination and cooperation
necessary for inter-state trafficking networks. A creation of the Customs Union
has been the designation of International Road Transport (TIR) trucks that are
inspected and sealed at their initial inspection by customs, but are nearly
guaranteed no further inspections until their final destination as long as they
stay within Customs Union territory. Law enforcement agencies in Kazakhstan
have begun to suspect that TIR trucks have been tampered with and utilized by
drug traffickers to conceal drugs en route to Russia.[6]
Finally,
Central Asia’s unique location along the route between Afghanistan and Russia,
and its remote and difficult terrain along the Afghan-Tajik border make it a natural
transit corridor for drug traffickers and a difficult area for law enforcement
to operate in. However, the roots of the problem go much deeper. Widespread
poverty and limited employment opportunities across many areas within the
region create willing collaborators for drug traffickers to exploit who are
simply desperate for income. The UNODC estimated in 2010 that drug traffickers
made a “net profit of US$ 1.4 billion from the sale of transiting opiates”,
which was a third of Tajikistan’s
total 2010 GDP (US$ 4.58 billion). For many of
Tajikistan’s highly impoverished regions, the money brought in by drug
trafficking is “likely a lifeline for isolated communities.”[7]
Moreover, the presence of corruption at alarmingly high levels of government in all Central
Asian states has restricted already weak law enforcement capabilities, with
officials facilitating trafficking and shielding their collaborators for their
own gain. Also contributing has been the inter-ethnic conflict that has plagued
several Central Asian states since independence, destabilized the region, and
taken law enforcement’s focus off of combating drug trafficking. Even labor
migration, particularly destined for Russia or Kazakhstan, creates channels of
people in legal limbo who can be exploited and used to transport drugs across
borders.[8]
While there is a strong argument for increasing law enforcement funding to
increase shipment seizures, without improving the myriad of other contributing
factors it will be difficult to significantly address the problem.
[1] Dahl,
Fredrik. 2013. Afghan Opium Cultivation
to Rise in 2013. Reuters. Available at:
http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/04/15/us-afhganistan-opium-idUSBRE93E0OR20130415
[2] United
Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, World
Drug Report 2013, Available at: http://www.unodc.org/unodc/secured/wdr/wdr2013/World_Drug_Report_2013.pdf
[3] United
Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, Opiate
Flows Through Northern Afghanistan and Central Asia 2012, Available at: http://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-analysis/Studies/Afghanistan_northern_route_2012_web.pdf
[4] Ibid.
[5] United
Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, Misuse
of Licit Trade for Opiate Trafficking in Western and Central Asia 2012, Available
at: http://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-analysis/Studies/Opiate_Trafficking_and_Trade_Agreements_english_web.pdf
[6] Ibid.
[7] Ibid.
[8] United
Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, Securing
Central Asia’s Borders with Afghanistan 2007, Available at: http://www.unodc.org/documents/regional/central-asia/Microsoft%20Word%20-%20yellow_paper__no%20maps_16.09.17.pdf
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