Book Review. Building Democracy in Contemporary Russia: Western Support for Grassroots Organizations

Sarah L. Henderson. Building Democracy in Contemporary Russia: Western Support for Grassroots Organizations. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2003. 229 pages. ISBN-10: 0801441358

Sarah Henderson’s work explores the effectiveness of western supported non-governmental organizations in post-Soviet civil society through the study of NGOs focusing on women's issues. According to her, “civil society” is “the realm of activism situated between the nodes of state, family, and business, where citizens interact and join organizations” (ix). Henderson places foreign aid to Russia within the larger trend of Western financial support for overseas civil society development that began in the 1980s during the Reagan administration. His presidency coalesced with a worldwide rise in democratization, weakening of communism, and the emergence of a post-Cold war world. These three developments reinforced policymakers’ beliefs that financial support for emerging democracies also mandated complementary financial support for civil society (4-5).

According to Henderson, Russia’s era of civil society began with Gorbachev’s introduction of “social pluralism” that allowed for the emergence of informal associations. The legal framework for non-governmental organizations did not fully emerge until the 1990s. Although Russian NGOs had legal recognition, Russia’s Soviet past presented a unique set of variables that continue to influence the effectiveness of NGOs working in post-Soviet Russia. During the 1990s, when Russia’s civil society was in its infancy, most individuals taking a leading role in its construction were familiar only with Soviet mass associations which relied on compulsory participation rather than volunteerism. Mass associations led many individuals to distrust association leaders, programs, and goals. She argues that this distrust carried over into post-Soviet society. Low trends in Russian volunteerism and private donations continue to support her findings.

Henderson’s study informs my own research because she sheds light on President Putin’s interest in NGOs. During Putin’s presidency, it was the first time that a national politician took interest in NGOs. He engaged NGO leaders in a national dialogue by sponsoring the Civic Forum—a 2001 conference that brought together state leaders and over 5,000 NGO representatives. The conference included roundtable discussions of how NGOs could help solve some of Russia’s major problems. It is now twelve years later and Putin continues to engage with NGO leaders through face to face meetings and the awarding of presidential grants. Henderson notes that onlookers—past and present—share the same speculations about Putin’s motives: is Putin trying to draw Russian NGOs away from the western collaboration? Is he trying to placate NGO leaders’ concerns by meeting with them, but not seriously considering their suggestions? Or, is he trying to take control of the activities of NGOs? (58-59). Henderson’s work illustrates that Putin’s actions have a historical foundation in the early 2000s, and many of the questions onlookers expressed then are still relevant in today’s Russia—especially in light of the “foreign agent” law.

The main argument of Henderson's work is that NGOs supported by western, particularly American, funds have very different “activities, goals, and structures” than those relying primarily on domestic funds. Western financed NGOs are better able to increase their likelihood of success and survival than those depending primarily on domestic funds (9). However, Henderson notes that “…NGO development is not synonymous with civil society development, and the development of one does not necessarily imply the advancement of the other” (10). This is particularly true since too much reliance on NGOs excludes other types of civil organizations, such as religious, cultural, and leisure organizations—all of which are essential components of a well-rounded civil society (74). Most importantly, she concludes that “...[western] aid had relatively little impact on how groups interact with their populations or with the state” [27].

In many ways, western financial support has its own flaws. First, although western donors desired to build grassroots organizations in Russia, they actually produced large bureaucratic organizations whose operating structures overshadowed local programming initiatives. Local NGOs were not only responsible to Russians, but also to the larger organizations' leaders based in the US, a paradox Henderson labels as “principled clientelism.” This created unequal working relationships between donors, organizers, and local Russians (164-165). Local leaders had to comply with reporting and success-tracking guidelines in order to maintain operations in Russia. Hence, a myriad of programs emerged that focused on quantifiable short term goals that could be reported back to the home agency as successes. This narrow focus excluded long-term projects from NGOs' agendas, thereby creating a pattern of civil development that favored top-down bureaucratic “supply driven” programs that could garner quick results (21-23). These programs included four common components: technical assistance, partnerships, small grant programs, and the constriction of NGO resource centers (76-79). Technical assistance meant teaching Russian NGOs the skills necessary to thrive—often replicating Western methods. Partnerships allowed NGOs the ability to work with and learn from large U.S. organizations. Small grants awarded funds to Russian NGOs sharing the goals of the larger organizations. Lastly, NGO resource centers served as on-going examples of the correct methods of organization and information. All of these perpetuated a large top-down bureaucracy based on U.S. standards.

In addition to bureaucratic difficulties, most Russian NGOs lacked widespread local support since many individuals distrusted NGOs and relied on informal personal networks to solve private and communal needs. This lack of support allowed administrators—often located abroad—the opportunity to determine which outreach programs would be implemented in Russia. This exasperated the negative effects of large overseas bureaucracies dictating what programs to pursue overseas. Lastly, western financial support tended to favor a few organizations, thereby precluding many other NGOs from collaboration (10).

Henderson's work is an excellent source for those seeking a broad overview of American financed NGOs working in Russia. It would be interesting to replicated Henderson's survey and fieldwork since the passage of the “foreign agent” law in order to test her observations. While reading her findings, I had two major observations. If Western aid has had such a small impact on NGOs' interactions with the state and local population, why is Putin's current administration so concerned with foreign financing? In my opinion, Henderson could have elaborated on her findings in order to provide a more nuanced discussion. Second, according to Henderson's findings, Russian NGOs were dependent on foreign funds, but this dependence limited their ability to best serve the local population. Perhaps Putin is aware of this fact. This could have influenced his decision to increase the amount of presidential grants recently awarded to NGOs. These grants not only increase NGOs collaboration with the state, but also allows NGOs to focus on local needs without the interference of top-down western style organizational bureaucracies. Whether or not a Russian bureaucracy will be more efficient will be determined as onlookers assess the progress of the presidential grant program.