Thursday, October 31, 2013

Human Trafficking, Drug Trafficking and Terrorism in Central Asia

My post this week will start to tie together the various factors that contribute to human trafficking, drug trafficking and terrorism in Central Asia.

Criminal and terrorist elements thrive in prisons, difficult-to-govern spaces, regions with endemic corruption, conflict or post-conflict zones with little legitimate governance, border regions, free trade zones, and urban mega cities (Rollins 2013). Unfortunately, Central Asia possess all of these in abundance, with the exception of mega cities. Additional social elements that encourage criminal or terrorist development include trans-state nationalist, ethnic and religious movements, armed conflict, and constraints on transnational exchanges of illegal commodities, “exchanges that frequently involve third and fourth party intermediaries and corruptible internal security forces” (Mincheva, 2013). Most states in the region have dealt with all of these issues to some degree within the past two decades, and continue to deal with them.[1] Given the presence of such a large number of risk factors, it comes as no surprise that the region has struggled with criminal organizations involved with drug trafficking and more recently human trafficking, and terrorist activity. In the following analysis, I will focus on the effects of governmental policy, weak institutions and rule of law, low economic development, social influences, and geography. These factors influence and interact with each other to some degree, helping to facilitate drug and human trafficking, to contribute to the emergence of terrorism, and to set the stage for cooperation between criminal organizations and terrorist groups.
                The main contributor and facilitator of criminal organizations and terrorist groups in the region is governmental policy, weak institutions and rule of law, and low economic development. Kazakhstan’s strong energy sector has enabled the state to do significantly better economically than the rest, but all countries in the region face issues with lack of economic opportunity and poverty. The poor economic situation creates large numbers of unemployed or underemployed individuals who must find additional ways to support themselves and their families. Such individuals often become willing collaborators for traffickers engaged in either the drug or the human trade. This is particularly prevalent in Tajikistan’s highly impoverished regions, where the money brought in by drug trafficking is “likely a lifeline for isolated communities.”[2] The UNODC estimated in 2010 that drug traffickers made a “net profit of US$1.4 billion from the sale of transiting opiates” through Central Asia, which was a third of Tajikistan’s total 2010 GDP (US$ 4.58 billion). Poverty and lack of opportunity also makes desperate individuals more willing to go abroad for work, which can make them susceptible to human trafficking rings. These criminal organizations lure them abroad, entrap them, and force them to engage for little or no pay in prostitution, manual labor, drug smuggling, etc. However, trafficking victims are not limited to those in poverty. There have been several examples of educated women lured abroad by traffickers (Tverdova 2011). The primary instigator is a lack of opportunity at home, and the perception of a better life abroad.
                The connection is more direct in Central Asia between economic opportunity and drug or human trafficking, than it is with radicalization.  Neither poverty nor political repression lead directly to radicalization, the causal mechanisms are more complex.  In fact, there is a “lack of evidence that convincingly demonstrates the existence of a relationship between various indicators of levels of development and political deprivation, on the one hand, and the rise of radical Islam and terrorism on the other” (Omelicheva, 2010). We have seen radicalization across income and education levels in Central Asia. Similar to human trafficking victims, new members of radical groups are generally looking for a better future. In Central Asia, organizations such as Hizb ut-Tahrir (HT) are able to convince recruits that they offer a more positive vision of the future. It is easier to draw this contrast when people face distressing situations such as poverty, discrimination, and a repressive state. Furthermore, radical organizations that provide simple answers to their problems become more appealing when state restrictions on media and religious expression discourage legitimate channels for citizens to communicate and express their displeasure and desires. Overly repressive state policies also build up resentment and sympathy for oppressed groups, making it more likely moderate Islamists will be radicalized. Moreover, men are more likely to be arrested and imprisoned for association with radical groups than women in the region. They often leave behind their wives with little to no income and a family to support, making it more likely that she may become the victim of human trafficking as discussed above. Additionally, the imprisonment of radical Islamists will put them in contact with criminal organizations already in the prison system, creating opportunities for collaboration.
                Corruption is an endemic feature across all Central Asian states. It undercuts the rule of law, weakens institutions, destroys legitimacy, and encourages criminal behavior. First, “corrupt law enforcement, consular officials, diplomats and lawyers” are necessary to traffic humans across borders (Shelley, 2003) and make trafficking drugs much easier. Not only are corrupt officials facilitators, but also perpetrators. The enormous profits in both trades combines with low accountability and low pay for many to encourage participation across all levels of government, from upper-level officials looking to line their pockets, to underpaid local police trying to make ends meet. Corrupt officials encourage the trade and discourage enforcement, while any attempts at enforcement are further hampered by corruption at the lower levels, such as border guards. Moreover, an important effect of corruption is the loss in legitimacy and increasing distrust of government officials. Many human trafficking victims avoid going to the authorities because they do not trust their help, and may have been exploited by government officials themselves (Tverdova, 2011). Additionally, a perception of corruption encourages disaffected citizens to accept the narrative of radical groups who blame governmental policy for the lack of opportunities. These people “perceive that their way in life is blocked by the system” and see the path offered by radical groups as a better alternative. This explanation provides support for the radicalization of ambitious, educated people.[3]
                A lack of resources, corruption, difficult geography, and regional measures creating free trade zones in an attempt to boost local economies has created weak border control along several key transit points in Central Asia. In response to closed borders stifling trade,[4] a number of trade agreements have been signed over the past decade with the goal of reducing trade barriers to increase regional trade. The reduction in customs inspections and border control points, and the standardization of transport regulations has resulted in a significant increase in trade that has been generally beneficial across the region. However, the higher volume of trade handled by local officials has not been accompanied by an expansion of law enforcement capabilities to discourage traffickers from exploiting the new situation.  Of particular concern are the various trade agreements with Afghanistan, which have made it easier for heroin to be trafficked through Central Asia en route to markets in Russia and Eastern Europe. When combined with already poor border control in countries such as Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, the trade has become much more difficult to stop.
                The Customs Union of the Russian Federation, Kazakhstan and Belarus is of particular importance for several reasons. The agreement created a common, external border across the three nations that only requires one customs check at the Kazakh border before goods can be transported to the Russian or Belarusian border with the European Union. Once a trafficker gets into Kazakhstan, they face little threat of detection if their final destination is in Russia or Belarus. Moreover, additional regulations allow people to move freely across borders, which further facilitates not only the movement of illicit goods and trafficking victims, but eases the coordination and cooperation necessary for inter-state trafficking networks and terrorist organizations.[5]
                Finally, a history of governmental corruption and weak rule of law has created longstanding criminal organizations with experience in drug trafficking across the region and internationally. Tajikistan in particular has dealt with historically strong criminal groups that have been able to operate with near impunity in the many weakly governed parts of the country. We know that “areas where drug crime networks are well established are increasingly important growth areas for human trafficking” (Shelley, 2012). Additionally, criminal organizations who successfully move into human trafficking generally have extensive international links that facilitates locating, attracting, transporting, and trading victims (Sulaimanova, 2004). The low risk and high reward of human trafficking are enticing to these groups when compared to the high risk of the international drug trade. Moreover, ungoverned spaces attract not only traffickers, but also can serve as havens for terrorist groups hiding from crackdowns.
                Several social issues also make these phenomena more likely in Central Asia. The lack of opportunity has created a situation where much of the youth, especially young men, are simply bored. A feeling of “pointlessness” can encourage young men to look for excitement and diversion, which trafficking or going abroad for work can offer, or the sense of purpose that radical Islamist groups can offer.[6] This applies to young women as well, as advertisements asking for models and dancers abroad may appear appealing in contrast to what is available at home. International awareness can help curb ignorance within these vulnerable groups, making them aware of the risks involved when going abroad to work and avoiding suspect offers used by human trafficking groups. However, such awareness usually involves greater connectivity to information sources, whether via print media or online, and can increase exposure to the fraudulent advertisements used by human trafficking organizations to lure victims abroad.
                Several segments of the population in Central Asia are particularly susceptible to exploitation by human traffickers: single, unemployed mothers, adolescents in orphanages or those who had parents with substance abuse problems, foreign migrant workers and their children, and the homeless.[7] Overall, women in the region deal with several unique issues that increases their vulnerability. Women tend to suffer more than men in areas of poor economic growth, losing work and finding it more difficult to find new work (Tverdova, 2011). The difficult economic situation for women is further compounded by the fact that the “social status of women in Central Asia has been on the decline in the last decade” (Sulaimanova, 2004). This not only creates an obstacle to finding work, but also decreases social and institutional support for female victims of human trafficking. An additional issue has been the rise of conservative Islam in several parts of the region, which often relegates women to a lower social status. Conversely, increased social status for women can also trigger push back from conservative men who are struggling to deal with social upheaval and poor economic opportunities that have undermined their social status. This can increase support for groups such as HT who provide “a political and theological justification for reasserting male supremacy in society.”[8]
                Finally, certain ethnicities have proven to be more susceptible to radicalization than others in Central Asia. “Islamists have been less successful in gaining support in the communities of indigenous populations of Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, and Turkmenistan than among the Uzbek and Tajik minorities” (Omelicheva, 2010). Uzbeks and Tajiks have had a significantly different historical religious experience than the more traditionally nomadic Kazakhs, Kyrgyz and Turkmen that goes back to before the Russian Empire. Islam traditionally found a stronger foothold in the more sedentary Uzbek and Tajik societies. A stronger Islamic identity was enhanced by tsarist policy that distinguished between nomadic and sedentary populations, with Russification pushed on the Kazakhs, Kyrgyz, and Turkmen, and Islamic law allowed to govern Uzbeks and Tajiks. The resurgence of religion in Central Asia after Soviet religious suppression was relaxed was uneven, with a greater reception in Uzbekistan and Tajikistan than the rest. This unique experience has also allowed radical Islam to gain a greater foothold in their communities. Furthermore, counter-terrorist initiatives and repression have focused on the Uzbek and Tajik ethnic groups across the region, pushing them deeper underground and further radicalizing them (Omelicheva, 2010).
                Finally, Central Asia has a unique geographic location and landscape that has a significant influence on the prevalence of trafficking and the presence of terrorist organizations. Much of the region is located along the ‘Northern’ distribution route for drug traffic between Afghanistan and Russia. The remote and difficult terrain along the Afghan-Tajik border make it a natural transit corridor for drug traffickers and a difficult area for law enforcement to operate. The UNODC reported in 2010 that of the estimated 380 tons of heroin manufactured in Afghanistan, 25 percent (90 tons) was sent via the Northern route.
                Afghanistan has not only been a source of narcotics, but also of extremist ideas and arms that inspire and support radical groups in Central Asia. Additionally, the Taliban has set a precedent of terrorist collaboration with the drug trade that could influence radical Central Asian organizations. Despite historically cracking down on the opium trade while in power, the Taliban have begun encouraging the trade to profit from it.[9] Terrorist organizations across the globe have had to expand their income sources in the wake of the post-9/11 financial crackdown by the West on traditional sources of revenue (Gonzalez 2013). Both drug trafficking and human trafficking are viable sources of income for such groups in the region.



Sources:
Gonzalez, Elsie. 2013. “The Nexus between Human Trafficking and Terrorism/Organized Crime: Combating Human Trafficking By Creating a Cooperative Law Enforcement System.” South Orange, NJ: Seton Hall Law eRepository.
International Crisis Group, Central Asia: Islam and the State 2003, Available at: http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/asia/central-asia/059%20Central%20Asia%20Islam%20and%20the%20State
International Crisis Group, Radical Islam in Central Asia: Responding to Hizb ut-Tahrir 2003, Available at: http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/asia/central-asia/058%20Radical%20Islam%20in%20Central%20Asia%20Responding%20to%20Hizb%20ut-Tahrir.pdf
Mincheva, Lyuobov Grigorova and Ted Robert Gurr. 2013. Crime-Terror Alliances and the State: Ethnonationalist and Islamist Challenges to Regional Security. New York: Routledge.
Omelicheva, Mariya. 2010. “The Ethnic Dimension of Religious Extremism and Terrorism in Central Asia. International Political Science Review, 31(2), 167–186
Rollins, John and Liana Sun Wyler. 2013. Terrorism and Transnational Crime: Foreign Policy Issues for Congress. Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service.
Shelley, Louise. 2012. The Relationship of Drug and Human Trafficking: A Global Perspective. Dordrecht: Springer Science+Business Media B.V.
Sulaimanova, Saltanat. 2004. "Migration Trends in Central Asia and the Case of Trafficking of Women." In In the Tracks of Tamerlane: Central Asia's Path to the 21st Century, by eds. Dan Burghart and Theresa Sabonis-Helf, 377-400. Washington, DC: National Defense University.
Tverdova, Yuliya V. 2011. "Human Trafficking in Russia and Other Post-Soviet States." Human Rights Review 329-344. http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007%2Fs12142-010-0188-1.
United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, Opiate Flows Through Northern Afghanistan and Central Asia 2012, Available at: http://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-analysis/Studies/Afghanistan_northern_route_2012_web.pdf
United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, Securing Central Asia’s Borders with Afghanistan 2007, Available at: http://www.unodc.org/documents/regional/central-asia/Microsoft%20Word%20-%20yellow_paper__no%20maps_16.09.17.pdf
United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, World Drug Report 2013, Available at: http://www.unodc.org/unodc/secured/wdr/wdr2013/World_Drug_Report_2013.pdf
US State Department. 2013. Trafficking in Persons Report. Washington, DC: US State Department.



[1] Given the difficult of obtaining reliable information on Turkmenistan, it has not been strongly incorporated into this analysis.
[2] United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, Misuse of Licit Trade for Opiate Trafficking in Western and Central Asia 2012
[3] International Crisis Group, Radical Islam in Central Asia: Responding to Hizb ut-Tahrir 2003
[4] Hizb ut-Tahrir has historically recruited from individuals involved in private trade who were frustrated with governmental restrictions on inter-state trade, particularly in Uzbekistan. Source: International Crisis Group, Radical Islam in Central Asia: Responding to Hizb ut-Tahrir 2003
[5] United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, Misuse of Licit Trade for Opiate Trafficking in Western and Central Asia 2012
[6] International Crisis Group, Radical Islam in Central Asia: Responding to Hizb ut-Tahrir 2003
[7] USD. 2013. Trafficking in Persons Report. Washington, DC: US State Department.
[8] International Crisis Group, Radical Islam in Central Asia: Responding to Hizb ut-Tahrir 2003
[9] Shah, Taimoor. 2012. In Poppy War, Taliban Aim to Protect a Cash Crop. The New York Times. April 11. Available at: http://www.nytimes.com/2012/04/12/world/asia/taliban-poppy-war-targets-tractors-and-police.html?_r=0

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