Friday, October 18, 2013

The Role of Central Asia in the Opium Trade

                Building on my focus on illicit trafficking in Central Asia, I will discuss the region’s role in the distribution of opium-derived drugs, predominantly heroin, from the poppy fields and manufacturing laboratories of Afghanistan. Afghanistan has been the dominant international producer of opium for the past two decades, with production increasing over the past several years. Market share estimates range up to 90% of total international opium production.[1] A 2012 preliminary assessment of production by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) predicted a likely annual increase in 2013, which would be the “third consecutive increase since 2010.” Moreover, evidence predicts further expansion with a sharp increase in Afghan heroin in Chinese markets, which Southeast Asia historically supplied.[2]
               
                Of particular concern to Central Asia is the heroin destined for markets in Russia, and eastern and northern Europe. This is typically described as the “Northern route” as opposed to the additional routes that go from Afghanistan to the east through Pakistan and to the west through Iran. Trafficking routes generally rely on roads, although it appears rail networks are increasingly being used as traffickers expand their methods of operation. The UNODC reported in 2010 that of the estimated 380 tons of heroin manufactured in Afghanistan, 25 percent (90 tons) was sent north via the Northern route. Of this amount, 75 percent was destined for Russia, with only approximately 3-4 tons continuing on to Europe. However, trafficking within the region is not exclusively northward, routes through Turkmenistan apparently also feed the “Balkan route” into Europe via Iran. Interestingly, the UNODC also reported 35-40 tons of raw opium trafficked in 2010 from northern Afghanistan into Central Asian markets, raising questions as to whether it is now being processed into heroin outside of Afghan laboratories, which would be unusual.[3]

                Within the region, Tajikistan remains the key transit point for heroin leaving Afghanistan along the northern route, with Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan receiving considerably less trafficking across their borders. In fact, Uzbekistan receives significantly more heroin via Tajikistan than straight from Afghanistan. Estimates from 2010 reported 85 percent of the Central Asian opiate trade passing through Tajikistan. Traffickers naturally gravitate to areas with weakened governance and law enforcement, and given Tajikistan’s historically unstable position it has become a prime target. Traffickers prefer to continue through Tajikistan and across its relatively uncontrolled northern border into Kyrgyzstan, given its own issues with maintaining stability and the rule of law, particularly in the south. Despite attempted improvements to customs and the expansion of border guards along the Tajik-Afghan border, the UNODC reports that, as of 2012, “the majority of Northern route opiates continue to flow nearly uninterrupted into Tajikistan.” Moreover, entrenched corruption combined with historically strong criminal organizations in Tajikistan has created a broad array of large, highly organized groups and small operators involved in the trade that have been difficult for officials to handle.[4]

                Further worrying officials have been recent rises in Afghan heroin production and trade without a corresponding rise in drug seizures across Central Asia. It appears likely that traffickers have become more adept at concealing their illicit trade within legal trade flows across the region. The tendency for drug seizures to be located near main legitimate transit hubs and routes throughout not only Central Asia and Afghanistan, but also Iran and Pakistan provides support for this theory. The ability of traffickers to use licit transit routes has been enhanced by improved economic relations between Afghanistan and several Central Asian states, and between Kazakhstan and Russia. A number of trade agreements have been signed over the past decade with the goal of reducing trade barriers to increase regional trade. The reduction in customs inspections and border control points, and the standardization of transport regulations has resulted in a significant increase in trade that has been generally beneficial across the region. However, the higher volume of trade handled by local officials has not been accompanied by an expansion of law enforcement capabilities to discourage the traffickers from exploiting the new situation.[5] Key trade agreements include: the Afghanistan-Uzbekistan Trade and Transit Agreement signed in 2004; the Afghanistan-Tajikistan Joint Economic, Social and Business Agreement of 2012 that built upon a joint trade agreement in 2004; the Afghanistan-Turkmenistan Transport and Transit Agreement of 2007 that centered on supplying electricity but also provided for expanded rail connections; the Afghanistan-Kazakhstan Agreement on Trade and Economic Cooperation of 2004 and strengthened in 2011; and perhaps most importantly, the Customs Union of the Russian Federation, Kazakhstan and Belarus signed in 1995 and subsequently expanded with the possible future inclusion of Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan and Armenia.

                The Customs Union is of particular importance for several reasons. The agreement created a common, external border across the three nations that only requires one customs check at the Kazakh border before goods can be transported to the Russian or Belarusian border with the European Union. Once a trafficker gets into Kazakhstan, they face little threat of detection if their final destination is in Russia or Belarus. Moreover, additional regulations allow people to move freely across borders, which further facilitates not only the movement of illicit goods, but also eases the coordination and cooperation necessary for inter-state trafficking networks. A creation of the Customs Union has been the designation of International Road Transport (TIR) trucks that are inspected and sealed at their initial inspection by customs, but are nearly guaranteed no further inspections until their final destination as long as they stay within Customs Union territory. Law enforcement agencies in Kazakhstan have begun to suspect that TIR trucks have been tampered with and utilized by drug traffickers to conceal drugs en route to Russia.[6]

Finally, Central Asia’s unique location along the route between Afghanistan and Russia, and its remote and difficult terrain along the Afghan-Tajik border make it a natural transit corridor for drug traffickers and a difficult area for law enforcement to operate in. However, the roots of the problem go much deeper. Widespread poverty and limited employment opportunities across many areas within the region create willing collaborators for drug traffickers to exploit who are simply desperate for income. The UNODC estimated in 2010 that drug traffickers made a “net profit of US$ 1.4 billion from the sale of transiting opiates”, which was a third of Tajikistan’s total 2010 GDP (US$ 4.58 billion). For many of Tajikistan’s highly impoverished regions, the money brought in by drug trafficking is “likely a lifeline for isolated communities.”[7] Moreover, the presence of corruption at alarmingly high levels of government in all Central Asian states has restricted already weak law enforcement capabilities, with officials facilitating trafficking and shielding their collaborators for their own gain. Also contributing has been the inter-ethnic conflict that has plagued several Central Asian states since independence, destabilized the region, and taken law enforcement’s focus off of combating drug trafficking. Even labor migration, particularly destined for Russia or Kazakhstan, creates channels of people in legal limbo who can be exploited and used to transport drugs across borders.[8] While there is a strong argument for increasing law enforcement funding to increase shipment seizures, without improving the myriad of other contributing factors it will be difficult to significantly address the problem.







[1] Dahl, Fredrik. 2013. Afghan Opium Cultivation to Rise in 2013. Reuters. Available at:
http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/04/15/us-afhganistan-opium-idUSBRE93E0OR20130415
[2] United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, World Drug Report 2013, Available at: http://www.unodc.org/unodc/secured/wdr/wdr2013/World_Drug_Report_2013.pdf
[3] United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, Opiate Flows Through Northern Afghanistan and Central Asia 2012, Available at: http://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-analysis/Studies/Afghanistan_northern_route_2012_web.pdf
[4] Ibid.
[5] United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, Misuse of Licit Trade for Opiate Trafficking in Western and Central Asia 2012, Available at: http://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-analysis/Studies/Opiate_Trafficking_and_Trade_Agreements_english_web.pdf
[6] Ibid.
[7] Ibid.
[8] United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, Securing Central Asia’s Borders with Afghanistan 2007, Available at: http://www.unodc.org/documents/regional/central-asia/Microsoft%20Word%20-%20yellow_paper__no%20maps_16.09.17.pdf

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