Human Trafficking, Drug Trafficking and Terrorism in Central Asia

My post this week will start to tie together the various factors that contribute to human trafficking, drug trafficking and terrorism in Central Asia.

Criminal and terrorist elements thrive in prisons, difficult-to-govern spaces, regions with endemic corruption, conflict or post-conflict zones with little legitimate governance, border regions, free trade zones, and urban mega cities (Rollins 2013). Unfortunately, Central Asia possess all of these in abundance, with the exception of mega cities. Additional social elements that encourage criminal or terrorist development include trans-state nationalist, ethnic and religious movements, armed conflict, and constraints on transnational exchanges of illegal commodities, “exchanges that frequently involve third and fourth party intermediaries and corruptible internal security forces” (Mincheva, 2013). Most states in the region have dealt with all of these issues to some degree within the past two decades, and continue to deal with them.[1] Given the presence of such a large number of risk factors, it comes as no surprise that the region has struggled with criminal organizations involved with drug trafficking and more recently human trafficking, and terrorist activity. In the following analysis, I will focus on the effects of governmental policy, weak institutions and rule of law, low economic development, social influences, and geography. These factors influence and interact with each other to some degree, helping to facilitate drug and human trafficking, to contribute to the emergence of terrorism, and to set the stage for cooperation between criminal organizations and terrorist groups.

                The main contributor and facilitator of criminal organizations and terrorist groups in the region is governmental policy, weak institutions and rule of law, and low economic development. Kazakhstan’s strong energy sector has enabled the state to do significantly better economically than the rest, but all countries in the region face issues with lack of economic opportunity and poverty. The poor economic situation creates large numbers of unemployed or underemployed individuals who must find additional ways to support themselves and their families. Such individuals often become willing collaborators for traffickers engaged in either the drug or the human trade. This is particularly prevalent in Tajikistan’s highly impoverished regions, where the money brought in by drug trafficking is “likely a lifeline for isolated communities.”[2] The UNODC estimated in 2010 that drug traffickers made a “net profit of US$1.4 billion from the sale of transiting opiates” through Central Asia, which was a third of Tajikistan’s total 2010 GDP (US$ 4.58 billion). Poverty and lack of opportunity also makes desperate individuals more willing to go abroad for work, which can make them susceptible to human trafficking rings. These criminal organizations lure them abroad, entrap them, and force them to engage for little or no pay in prostitution, manual labor, drug smuggling, etc. However, trafficking victims are not limited to those in poverty. There have been several examples of educated women lured abroad by traffickers (Tverdova 2011). The primary instigator is a lack of opportunity at home, and the perception of a better life abroad.

                The connection is more direct in Central Asia between economic opportunity and drug or human trafficking, than it is with radicalization.  Neither poverty nor political repression lead directly to radicalization, the causal mechanisms are more complex.  In fact, there is a “lack of evidence that convincingly demonstrates the existence of a relationship between various indicators of levels of development and political deprivation, on the one hand, and the rise of radical Islam and terrorism on the other” (Omelicheva, 2010). We have seen radicalization across income and education levels in Central Asia. Similar to human trafficking victims, new members of radical groups are generally looking for a better future. In Central Asia, organizations such as Hizb ut-Tahrir (HT) are able to convince recruits that they offer a more positive vision of the future. It is easier to draw this contrast when people face distressing situations such as poverty, discrimination, and a repressive state. Furthermore, radical organizations that provide simple answers to their problems become more appealing when state restrictions on media and religious expression discourage legitimate channels for citizens to communicate and express their displeasure and desires. Overly repressive state policies also build up resentment and sympathy for oppressed groups, making it more likely moderate Islamists will be radicalized. Moreover, men are more likely to be arrested and imprisoned for association with radical groups than women in the region. They often leave behind their wives with little to no income and a family to support, making it more likely that she may become the victim of human trafficking as discussed above. Additionally, the imprisonment of radical Islamists will put them in contact with criminal organizations already in the prison system, creating opportunities for collaboration.

                Corruption is an endemic feature across all Central Asian states. It undercuts the rule of law, weakens institutions, destroys legitimacy, and encourages criminal behavior. First, “corrupt law enforcement, consular officials, diplomats and lawyers” are necessary to traffic humans across borders (Shelley, 2003) and make trafficking drugs much easier. Not only are corrupt officials facilitators, but also perpetrators. The enormous profits in both trades combines with low accountability and low pay for many to encourage participation across all levels of government, from upper-level officials looking to line their pockets, to underpaid local police trying to make ends meet. Corrupt officials encourage the trade and discourage enforcement, while any attempts at enforcement are further hampered by corruption at the lower levels, such as border guards. Moreover, an important effect of corruption is the loss in legitimacy and increasing distrust of government officials. Many human trafficking victims avoid going to the authorities because they do not trust their help, and may have been exploited by government officials themselves (Tverdova, 2011). Additionally, a perception of corruption encourages disaffected citizens to accept the narrative of radical groups who blame governmental policy for the lack of opportunities. These people “perceive that their way in life is blocked by the system” and see the path offered by radical groups as a better alternative. This explanation provides support for the radicalization of ambitious, educated people.[3]

                A lack of resources, corruption, difficult geography, and regional measures creating free trade zones in an attempt to boost local economies has created weak border control along several key transit points in Central Asia. In response to closed borders stifling trade,[4] a number of trade agreements have been signed over the past decade with the goal of reducing trade barriers to increase regional trade. The reduction in customs inspections and border control points, and the standardization of transport regulations has resulted in a significant increase in trade that has been generally beneficial across the region. However, the higher volume of trade handled by local officials has not been accompanied by an expansion of law enforcement capabilities to discourage traffickers from exploiting the new situation.  Of particular concern are the various trade agreements with Afghanistan, which have made it easier for heroin to be trafficked through Central Asia en route to markets in Russia and Eastern Europe. When combined with already poor border control in countries such as Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, the trade has become much more difficult to stop.

                The Customs Union of the Russian Federation, Kazakhstan and Belarus is of particular importance for several reasons. The agreement created a common, external border across the three nations that only requires one customs check at the Kazakh border before goods can be transported to the Russian or Belarusian border with the European Union. Once a trafficker gets into Kazakhstan, they face little threat of detection if their final destination is in Russia or Belarus. Moreover, additional regulations allow people to move freely across borders, which further facilitates not only the movement of illicit goods and trafficking victims, but eases the coordination and cooperation necessary for inter-state trafficking networks and terrorist organizations.[5]

                Finally, a history of governmental corruption and weak rule of law has created longstanding criminal organizations with experience in drug trafficking across the region and internationally. Tajikistan in particular has dealt with historically strong criminal groups that have been able to operate with near impunity in the many weakly governed parts of the country. We know that “areas where drug crime networks are well established are increasingly important growth areas for human trafficking” (Shelley, 2012). Additionally, criminal organizations who successfully move into human trafficking generally have extensive international links that facilitates locating, attracting, transporting, and trading victims (Sulaimanova, 2004). The low risk and high reward of human trafficking are enticing to these groups when compared to the high risk of the international drug trade. Moreover, ungoverned spaces attract not only traffickers, but also can serve as havens for terrorist groups hiding from crackdowns.

                Several social issues also make these phenomena more likely in Central Asia. The lack of opportunity has created a situation where much of the youth, especially young men, are simply bored. A feeling of “pointlessness” can encourage young men to look for excitement and diversion, which trafficking or going abroad for work can offer, or the sense of purpose that radical Islamist groups can offer.[6] This applies to young women as well, as advertisements asking for models and dancers abroad may appear appealing in contrast to what is available at home. International awareness can help curb ignorance within these vulnerable groups, making them aware of the risks involved when going abroad to work and avoiding suspect offers used by human trafficking groups. However, such awareness usually involves greater connectivity to information sources, whether via print media or online, and can increase exposure to the fraudulent advertisements used by human trafficking organizations to lure victims abroad.

                Several segments of the population in Central Asia are particularly susceptible to exploitation by human traffickers: single, unemployed mothers, adolescents in orphanages or those who had parents with substance abuse problems, foreign migrant workers and their children, and the homeless.[7] Overall, women in the region deal with several unique issues that increases their vulnerability. Women tend to suffer more than men in areas of poor economic growth, losing work and finding it more difficult to find new work (Tverdova, 2011). The difficult economic situation for women is further compounded by the fact that the “social status of women in Central Asia has been on the decline in the last decade” (Sulaimanova, 2004). This not only creates an obstacle to finding work, but also decreases social and institutional support for female victims of human trafficking. An additional issue has been the rise of conservative Islam in several parts of the region, which often relegates women to a lower social status. Conversely, increased social status for women can also trigger push back from conservative men who are struggling to deal with social upheaval and poor economic opportunities that have undermined their social status. This can increase support for groups such as HT who provide “a political and theological justification for reasserting male supremacy in society.”[8]

                Finally, certain ethnicities have proven to be more susceptible to radicalization than others in Central Asia. “Islamists have been less successful in gaining support in the communities of indigenous populations of Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, and Turkmenistan than among the Uzbek and Tajik minorities” (Omelicheva, 2010). Uzbeks and Tajiks have had a significantly different historical religious experience than the more traditionally nomadic Kazakhs, Kyrgyz and Turkmen that goes back to before the Russian Empire. Islam traditionally found a stronger foothold in the more sedentary Uzbek and Tajik societies. A stronger Islamic identity was enhanced by tsarist policy that distinguished between nomadic and sedentary populations, with Russification pushed on the Kazakhs, Kyrgyz, and Turkmen, and Islamic law allowed to govern Uzbeks and Tajiks. The resurgence of religion in Central Asia after Soviet religious suppression was relaxed was uneven, with a greater reception in Uzbekistan and Tajikistan than the rest. This unique experience has also allowed radical Islam to gain a greater foothold in their communities. Furthermore, counter-terrorist initiatives and repression have focused on the Uzbek and Tajik ethnic groups across the region, pushing them deeper underground and further radicalizing them (Omelicheva, 2010).

                Finally, Central Asia has a unique geographic location and landscape that has a significant influence on the prevalence of trafficking and the presence of terrorist organizations. Much of the region is located along the ‘Northern’ distribution route for drug traffic between Afghanistan and Russia. The remote and difficult terrain along the Afghan-Tajik border make it a natural transit corridor for drug traffickers and a difficult area for law enforcement to operate. The UNODC reported in 2010 that of the estimated 380 tons of heroin manufactured in Afghanistan, 25 percent (90 tons) was sent via the Northern route.

                Afghanistan has not only been a source of narcotics, but also of extremist ideas and arms that inspire and support radical groups in Central Asia. Additionally, the Taliban has set a precedent of terrorist collaboration with the drug trade that could influence radical Central Asian organizations. Despite historically cracking down on the opium trade while in power, the Taliban have begun encouraging the trade to profit from it.[9] Terrorist organizations across the globe have had to expand their income sources in the wake of the post-9/11 financial crackdown by the West on traditional sources of revenue (Gonzalez 2013). Both drug trafficking and human trafficking are viable sources of income for such groups in the region.

Sources:

Gonzalez, Elsie. 2013. “The Nexus between Human Trafficking and Terrorism/Organized Crime: Combating Human Trafficking By Creating a Cooperative Law Enforcement System.” South Orange, NJ: Seton Hall Law eRepository.

International Crisis Group, Central Asia: Islam and the State 2003, Available at: http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/asia/central-asia/059%20Central%20Asia%20Islam%20and%20the%20State

International Crisis Group, Radical Islam in Central Asia: Responding to Hizb ut-Tahrir 2003, Available at: http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/asia/central-asia/058%20Radical%20Islam%20in%20Central%20Asia%20Responding%20to%20Hizb%20ut-Tahrir.pdf

Mincheva, Lyuobov Grigorova and Ted Robert Gurr. 2013. Crime-Terror Alliances and the State: Ethnonationalist and Islamist Challenges to Regional Security. New York: Routledge.

Omelicheva, Mariya. 2010. “The Ethnic Dimension of Religious Extremism and Terrorism in Central Asia.” International Political Science Review, 31(2), 167–186

Rollins, John and Liana Sun Wyler. 2013. Terrorism and Transnational Crime: Foreign Policy Issues for Congress. Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service.

Shelley, Louise. 2012. The Relationship of Drug and Human Trafficking: A Global Perspective. Dordrecht: Springer Science+Business Media B.V.

Sulaimanova, Saltanat. 2004. "Migration Trends in Central Asia and the Case of Trafficking of Women." In In the Tracks of Tamerlane: Central Asia's Path to the 21st Century, by eds. Dan Burghart and Theresa Sabonis-Helf, 377-400. Washington, DC: National Defense University.

Tverdova, Yuliya V. 2011. "Human Trafficking in Russia and Other Post-Soviet States." Human Rights Review 329-344. http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007%2Fs12142-010-0188-1.

United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, Opiate Flows Through Northern Afghanistan and Central Asia 2012, Available at: http://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-analysis/Studies/Afghanistan_northern_route_2012_web.pdf

United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, Securing Central Asia’s Borders with Afghanistan 2007, Available at: http://www.unodc.org/documents/regional/central-asia/Microsoft%20Word%20-%20yellow_paper__no%20maps_16.09.17.pdf

United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, World Drug Report 2013, Available at: http://www.unodc.org/unodc/secured/wdr/wdr2013/World_Drug_Report_2013.pdf

US State Department. 2013. Trafficking in Persons Report. Washington, DC: US State Department.

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[1] Given the difficult of obtaining reliable information on Turkmenistan, it has not been strongly incorporated into this analysis.

[2] United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, Misuse of Licit Trade for Opiate Trafficking in Western and Central Asia 2012

[3] International Crisis Group, Radical Islam in Central Asia: Responding to Hizb ut-Tahrir 2003

[4] Hizb ut-Tahrir has historically recruited from individuals involved in private trade who were frustrated with governmental restrictions on inter-state trade, particularly in Uzbekistan. Source: International Crisis Group, Radical Islam in Central Asia: Responding to Hizb ut-Tahrir 2003

[5] United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, Misuse of Licit Trade for Opiate Trafficking in Western and Central Asia 2012

[6] International Crisis Group, Radical Islam in Central Asia: Responding to Hizb ut-Tahrir 2003

[7] USD. 2013. Trafficking in Persons Report. Washington, DC: US State Department.

[8] International Crisis Group, Radical Islam in Central Asia: Responding to Hizb ut-Tahrir 2003

[9] Shah, Taimoor. 2012. In Poppy War, Taliban Aim to Protect a Cash Crop. The New York Times. April 11. Available at: http://www.nytimes.com/2012/04/12/world/asia/taliban-poppy-war-targets-tractors-and-police.html?_r=0

Book Review. Funding Civil Society: Foreign Assistance and NGO Development in Russia.

Lisa McIntosh Sundstrom.  Funding Civil Society:  Foreign Assistance and NGO Development in Russia.  Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2006.  272 pages.  ISBN:  0-8047-5443-8

The primary research question guiding McIntosh’s work is: “Are foreign donors having an impact in Russia, and if it exists, does their influence lead to positive developments for democratization in Russia?” (xiv). Prior to embarking on a detailed examination of her findings, McIntosh provides working terms for “civil society” and “development.”  According to her, civil society is:

“…a realm of collective, publically oriented activity by nongovernmental actors that is often formally organized…but also includes many less formal networks of public discourse, such as non-governmental mass media and informed networks among neighbors in a community” (7).

She asserts that there exists two forms of NGO development: internal development and professionalization and external mobilization.  Internal development includes defining goals, proper management, and networking, while external mobilization demonstrates an NGO’s ability to garner support from local citizens and leaders (17).

After defining her terms, she concludes, rather quickly, that foreign donors are impacting Russian civil society, but their impact is not always positive since foreign donors focused on internal development and lost sight of external mobilization (17).  Instead of focusing on developing wide spread support for NGO activities, foreign donors stressed the creation of a Washington, D.C. led top-down bureaucracy (38) that focuses on building an NGO infrastructure in Russia through training, organization, and networking (44).  Foreign donors also directed their attention toward NGOs working on issues that local communities don’t fully support (46-47).  Foreign donors also face difficulties depending on the regions where NGOs work.  Through an examination of soldiers’ mothers’ committees and NGOs focused on women’s issues, McIntosh illustrates the degrees to which “norms” or “collective experiences” and local political infrastructure supports or inhibits foreign donors and NGO development in varied socio-economic regions of Russia. 

Her main argument is that “where foreign assistance is employed to promote norms that are universally embraced around the world, it is highly likely to lead to a successful NGO movement” (53). To prove this point, she argues that the soldiers’ mothers’ organizations were rather successful in their opposition to conscription based on physical abuse and deprivation in the Russian armed forces.  However, NGOs protesting conscription based on pacifism were far less effective (60).  The success of the soldiers’ mothers’ committees is due to the fact that most Russians accept the fact that abuse and deprivation are “violations of physical dignity,” and this is a universally accepted norm among Russians (73).  Pacifism, on the other hand, is not universally accepted since Russians do not oppose war or the military (79). 

McIntosh also supports her “norm” based theory by countering opponents who claim that the popularity of the soldiers’ mothers’ committees stems from the tangible resources they provide to soldiers and their families.  She compares these services to the services that women’s organizations provide and notes that the “service” element is certainly important to NGOs, but that it doesn’t account for their successes.  If it did, women’s organization—which provide a host of services—would be vastly popular (73).  However, women’s organizations are from popular since their efforts to address employment discrimination and sexual harassment against women have largely failed “…in large part due to Russian citizens’ general rejection of the norms of feminism and gender equality” (89).  She identifies domestic violence as the only areas where women’s organizations found success; this success stems from the fact that an individual has the right to be protected from bodily harm.  This protection is an example of a universal norm (96). 

The remainder of McIntosh’s book is devoted to her second argument that foreign donors who work with NGOs located in regions with supportive governments will be more successful.  McIntosh asserts that her research challenges existing scholars who argue that a global civil society is emerging, while local civil societies and existing political structures are becoming less influential (2).  She demonstrates this through case studies of seven cities:  Moscow, Saint Petersburg, Yekaterinburg, Izhevsk, Vladivostok, Khabarovsk, and Novgorod.  Her case studies show four emergent patterns.  First, high levels of foreign donors coupled with a supportive government yield active and independent NGOs (Moscow and Novgorod). High levels of foreign donors working in areas with an unsupportive government produce many NGOs with little ability to achieve success (Yekaterinburg and Izhevsk).  An area with supportive government that lacks many foreign donors creates a region with active, networked, and effective NGOs that address local needs (Vladivostok, Khabarovsk, and St. Petersburg)  Lastly, an area with very few foreign donors working in a politically unsupportive environment will have small, weak, NGOs—but none of the seven cities surveyed fell into this category (104). 

McIntosh concludes her book with a chapter that suggests changes foreign donors can take in order to have a more successful impact on Russian society. First, foreign donors must focus on outreach in order to address the most immediate needs of the majority of the citizenry (176).  Donors and NGOs must increase public awareness of the tangible successes (176).  This is especially important since contemporary NGOs battle a host of stereotypes stemming from the Soviet era, including suspicion of voluntary organizations and their motives (30).  McIntosh also recommends that donors focus on developing closer relations between NGOs and the government, if at all possible.

TUVA : RUSSIA'S UNEXPLORED BORDERLAND

                                                Tuva : Russia's Unexplored Borderland                     

This week i  discusses on the Tuva Republic.It is a territory which lies on the southern part of Russian Siberia and just north of modern republic of Mongolia.Traditionally Tuvans were Turkic speaking Mongol  herdsmen.They followed and still follows Mahayana  Buddhism.Or in other words, Tuvans are the only Turkic group which follow Buddhism as their prime religion.Besides traditional shamanic culture also has significant influence over Tuvan mindset.Here, I am going to discuss on the events which happened in between 1912 and 1992-1995.The more recent developments will discuss later.

 Tuva deserves attention.yes, it is small.but Tuva, this lost corner of Central Asia, is eminently relevant to the understanding of the natives of the Soviet Union.

                                                                        Otto Manchen - Heifen, German Scholar in 1929.

Even 80 years after the Heifen's statement Tuva still deserves attention. First of all it is one of the non-Russian republic which was never part of Tsarist empire for most part of its existence and in contrast to its neighbors, it also enjoyed independence from 1921 to 1944. Many ways it's development was closer to the Baltic republics than its own Asian neighbours. Ethnic Slavs never got majority in Tuva and it also bypassed Stalin's collectivization movement which made havoc in Ukraine and Kazakhstan. Tuva was annexed to Soviet Union only in 1944 during the Second World War. It is very much alive in the minds of  Tuvans that their land was free for quite long time.Moreover, it was one of the five republic where the first Russian president Boris Yeltsin got defeated. Yeltsin received just 15% of vote in Tuva. Among the Russia's Asian republics Tuva shares  strong cultural relationship with both China and Mongolia.

In 1914 Tsar Nicholas II declared Tuva as a Russian protectorate. Tuva was an independent unit under Chinese Empire.Under Qing, Tuva was ruled by ambyn-noyoon elected from among the local elites. Romanov dynasty ended in 1917, so Tuva again found it's  independence.But into this vacuum Bolsheviks entered but not directly like  other parts of Tsarist Empire but discreetly. Tuva already had significant number of Russian settlers from the 19th century gold diggers times to the newly arrived one during the final days of Tsarist rule.They already formed self-governed Russian labour colony which was under Russian Communist Party (Siberian Branch).The mine workers also declared Tuva as a Soviet colony.But mainly due to the deadly civil war and other local disturbances,Bolsheviks were not able to stop the independence of Tuvans. It declared its independence on 14 August 1921 as Tannu-Tuva People's Republic. The term Tannu (means taiga) omitted  in 1926 and the country became the People's Republic of Tuva. The last ambyn-noyoon, Sodnam Baltsyr became the head of the state.But he resigned just after one month. It was the end of traditional rule in Tuva.

Tuva's independence was recognized by its both neighbours : Soviet Russia and Mongolia. It  also adopted its new currency Aksha in 1933-34. Tuva  issued  postage stamps and also passed a national constitution and criminal code. In 1935 Moscow even transferred the goldmines to Tuva which had been under its control. Russian settlers continued in Tuva with partial rights.They were not yet citizens.Most of them accepted it because through that they managed to escape the atrocities of Stalin in USSR as part of massive collectivization movement.The first Prime Minister of Tuva, Dunduk Kuular declared Buddhism as state religion with an overt support of lamas and lamaseries.According to contemporary Soviet ethnologist l.P Potapov: Tuvans were in complete political and economic and also spiritual dependence on the feudal and theocratic aristocracy. More than 5,000 lamas employed in about 30 khure ( lamaseries) and more than 1,000 shamans were the 'teachers' and 'tutors' of the working peasantry.Meanwhile Soviets were able to form a native version of Communist Party named Tuvan's People Revolutionary Party in 1922 with its powerful ideologue, Salchak Toka ( the confidant of Moscow for next 40 years).Moscow was not happy with the developments in Tuva. So it orchaestred a coup through five Tuvan students from Moscow's Communist University of the Toilers of East.The new rulers replaced the traditional Tuvan script with Latin one which was developed under Soviet linguists.Under Toka's tutelage, the collectivization started in Tuva but less vigorous fashion than in Stalin's Russia. Toka also crushed the power of lamas and lamaseries.

The new Prime Minister Churmit Dazy was pro-Tuvan. So under him (especially1932-38), Tuva witnessed a radical shift in its policies in comparison with Russia and Mongolia. Buddhist church revived under him and he also reversed the policies of Stalin. In Tuva nomads continued with their traditional way of life.But again through clever manipulation and strategy Moscow and it's Tuvan lieutenant Toka were able to remove most of it's opponents.The next premier Kh Anchima was pro-Moscow in character.Under her almost all pro-independent Tuvan leaders were executed (including Churmit-Dazy).Tuvans joined with the war efforts of Soviet Union.It was also the right time for Tuva to join the union.Story developed as according to the script which was written by Moscow and it also implemented by Toka in Tuva. Officially Tuvan parliament (Khural) sent appeal to Moscow for unification.At last 1944 Tuva entered into Soviet Union.It had been given the status of an autonomous region in the USSR.

Tuva's suppressed feeling resurfaced under Mikhail Gorbachev.His rule also witnessed the Tuvan-Russian clash. Tuvans still retained their majority status in the republic. The period of perestroika and glasnost also caused for the formation of Tuvan democratic movement  known as Popular Front with Tuva's future president Kadyr-ool Bicheldei as the leader.There were mainly two factions in Tuva  after the disintegration of Soviet Union:1) Nationalist- it demanded the staus quo (supported by ex-nomenclatura), 2) Nationalist- democratic faction led by Bicheldei which favoured maximum autonomy and if possible independence (not very strictly).Democratics also demanded liberal policies from Moscow. Tuva refused to conduct the Russian presidential referendum. But it participated in all union referendum on March 1991.Similarly Tuvan parliament dropped the constitutional amendment which further reduces the power of ethnic republics (minority national).As i pointed before Yeltsin lacked support here and Sh.Oorzhak became Prime Minister on 15 March 1992.

It is difficult to predict the future of Tuva. Vladimir Putin's power vertical ideology may get successful in this Siberian borderland.Scholars prefer to compare Tuva with Tibet and Lithuania.It shares lot in common with these two geographical entities.In the case of Tibet, it shares religion and like Tibet it was also an autonomous entity under Qing. Tibet resists China not so successfully like Tuva to Russia.Like Lithuania Tuva also got independence during First World War but occupied again during Second World War.Soviet Union's decline started in Lithuania.Will Russian Federation's fall start with Tuva?

References :

1) Altalu, Toomas (1992), "Tuva- A State Reawakens," Soviet Studies,44(5) : 881-895.

2) Mc Mullen (1993), " Tuva : Russia's Tibet or the Next Lithuania ?",Friends of Tuva (www.fotuva.org).

3) Khisamiev,Nail & Robert Coalson (2012), "Ramblings In The Republics : New Russian Nationalities Policy Sparks Outcry", RFE/RL.

4) Tuva - Online/ Latest news from Tuva,  en.tuvaonline.ru.

The Role of Central Asia in the Opium Trade

                Building on my focus on illicit trafficking in Central Asia, I will discuss the region’s role in the distribution of opium-derived drugs, predominantly heroin, from the poppy fields and manufacturing laboratories of Afghanistan. Afghanistan has been the dominant international producer of opium for the past two decades, with production increasing over the past several years. Market share estimates range up to 90% of total international opium production.[1] A 2012 preliminary assessment of production by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) predicted a likely annual increase in 2013, which would be the “third consecutive increase since 2010.” Moreover, evidence predicts further expansion with a sharp increase in Afghan heroin in Chinese markets, which Southeast Asia historically supplied.[2]

               

                Of particular concern to Central Asia is the heroin destined for markets in Russia, and eastern and northern Europe. This is typically described as the “Northern route” as opposed to the additional routes that go from Afghanistan to the east through Pakistan and to the west through Iran. Trafficking routes generally rely on roads, although it appears rail networks are increasingly being used as traffickers expand their methods of operation. The UNODC reported in 2010 that of the estimated 380 tons of heroin manufactured in Afghanistan, 25 percent (90 tons) was sent north via the Northern route. Of this amount, 75 percent was destined for Russia, with only approximately 3-4 tons continuing on to Europe. However, trafficking within the region is not exclusively northward, routes through Turkmenistan apparently also feed the “Balkan route” into Europe via Iran. Interestingly, the UNODC also reported 35-40 tons of raw opium trafficked in 2010 from northern Afghanistan into Central Asian markets, raising questions as to whether it is now being processed into heroin outside of Afghan laboratories, which would be unusual.[3]

                Within the region, Tajikistan remains the key transit point for heroin leaving Afghanistan along the northern route, with Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan receiving considerably less trafficking across their borders. In fact, Uzbekistan receives significantly more heroin via Tajikistan than straight from Afghanistan. Estimates from 2010 reported 85 percent of the Central Asian opiate trade passing through Tajikistan. Traffickers naturally gravitate to areas with weakened governance and law enforcement, and given Tajikistan’s historically unstable position it has become a prime target. Traffickers prefer to continue through Tajikistan and across its relatively uncontrolled northern border into Kyrgyzstan, given its own issues with maintaining stability and the rule of law, particularly in the south. Despite attempted improvements to customs and the expansion of border guards along the Tajik-Afghan border, the UNODC reports that, as of 2012, “the majority of Northern route opiates continue to flow nearly uninterrupted into Tajikistan.” Moreover, entrenched corruption combined with historically strong criminal organizations in Tajikistan has created a broad array of large, highly organized groups and small operators involved in the trade that have been difficult for officials to handle.[4]

                Further worrying officials have been recent rises in Afghan heroin production and trade without a corresponding rise in drug seizures across Central Asia. It appears likely that traffickers have become more adept at concealing their illicit trade within legal trade flows across the region. The tendency for drug seizures to be located near main legitimate transit hubs and routes throughout not only Central Asia and Afghanistan, but also Iran and Pakistan provides support for this theory. The ability of traffickers to use licit transit routes has been enhanced by improved economic relations between Afghanistan and several Central Asian states, and between Kazakhstan and Russia. A number of trade agreements have been signed over the past decade with the goal of reducing trade barriers to increase regional trade. The reduction in customs inspections and border control points, and the standardization of transport regulations has resulted in a significant increase in trade that has been generally beneficial across the region. However, the higher volume of trade handled by local officials has not been accompanied by an expansion of law enforcement capabilities to discourage the traffickers from exploiting the new situation.[5] Key trade agreements include: the Afghanistan-Uzbekistan Trade and Transit Agreement signed in 2004; the Afghanistan-Tajikistan Joint Economic, Social and Business Agreement of 2012 that built upon a joint trade agreement in 2004; the Afghanistan-Turkmenistan Transport and Transit Agreement of 2007 that centered on supplying electricity but also provided for expanded rail connections; the Afghanistan-Kazakhstan Agreement on Trade and Economic Cooperation of 2004 and strengthened in 2011; and perhaps most importantly, the Customs Union of the Russian Federation, Kazakhstan and Belarus signed in 1995 and subsequently expanded with the possible future inclusion of Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan and Armenia.

                The Customs Union is of particular importance for several reasons. The agreement created a common, external border across the three nations that only requires one customs check at the Kazakh border before goods can be transported to the Russian or Belarusian border with the European Union. Once a trafficker gets into Kazakhstan, they face little threat of detection if their final destination is in Russia or Belarus. Moreover, additional regulations allow people to move freely across borders, which further facilitates not only the movement of illicit goods, but also eases the coordination and cooperation necessary for inter-state trafficking networks. A creation of the Customs Union has been the designation of International Road Transport (TIR) trucks that are inspected and sealed at their initial inspection by customs, but are nearly guaranteed no further inspections until their final destination as long as they stay within Customs Union territory. Law enforcement agencies in Kazakhstan have begun to suspect that TIR trucks have been tampered with and utilized by drug traffickers to conceal drugs en route to Russia.[6]

Finally, Central Asia’s unique location along the route between Afghanistan and Russia, and its remote and difficult terrain along the Afghan-Tajik border make it a natural transit corridor for drug traffickers and a difficult area for law enforcement to operate in. However, the roots of the problem go much deeper. Widespread poverty and limited employment opportunities across many areas within the region create willing collaborators for drug traffickers to exploit who are simply desperate for income. The UNODC estimated in 2010 that drug traffickers made a “net profit of US$ 1.4 billion from the sale of transiting opiates”, which was a third of Tajikistan’s total 2010 GDP (US$ 4.58 billion). For many of Tajikistan’s highly impoverished regions, the money brought in by drug trafficking is “likely a lifeline for isolated communities.”[7] Moreover, the presence of corruption at alarmingly high levels of government in all Central Asian states has restricted already weak law enforcement capabilities, with officials facilitating trafficking and shielding their collaborators for their own gain. Also contributing has been the inter-ethnic conflict that has plagued several Central Asian states since independence, destabilized the region, and taken law enforcement’s focus off of combating drug trafficking. Even labor migration, particularly destined for Russia or Kazakhstan, creates channels of people in legal limbo who can be exploited and used to transport drugs across borders.[8] While there is a strong argument for increasing law enforcement funding to increase shipment seizures, without improving the myriad of other contributing factors it will be difficult to significantly address the problem.

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[1] Dahl, Fredrik. 2013. Afghan Opium Cultivation to Rise in 2013. Reuters. Available at:

http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/04/15/us-afhganistan-opium-idUSBRE93E0OR20130415

[2] United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, World Drug Report 2013, Available at: http://www.unodc.org/unodc/secured/wdr/wdr2013/World_Drug_Report_2013.pdf

[3] United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, Opiate Flows Through Northern Afghanistan and Central Asia 2012, Available at: http://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-analysis/Studies/Afghanistan_northern_route_2012_web.pdf

[4] Ibid.

[5] United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, Misuse of Licit Trade for Opiate Trafficking in Western and Central Asia 2012, Available at: http://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-analysis/Studies/Opiate_Trafficking_and_Trade_Agreements_english_web.pdf

[6] Ibid.

[7] Ibid.

[8] United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, Securing Central Asia’s Borders with Afghanistan 2007, Available at: http://www.unodc.org/documents/regional/central-asia/Microsoft%20Word%20-%20yellow_paper__no%20maps_16.09.17.pdf